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Eyewitness evidence is often essential for the outcome of an investigation. However, 
research has shown that memory is not perfect, and eyewitnesses can make mistakes. 
In the past forty years, researchers have developed evidence-based techniques to 
interview eyewitnesses effectively and to maximise the amount and accuracy of the 
information elicited in an interview. Despite the wealth of research on best practice 
interviewing techniques, little is known about how these might affect eyewitness 
confidence. This is important because confidence plays a pivotal role in the 
regulation of memory output. For example, research in metamemory showed that 
confidence judgements underpin eyewitnesses’ decisions to report or withhold 
information. This PhD aims to fill this gap by investigating confidence changes 
within the context of an investigative interview and testing the hypothesis that 
confidence shifts following an interview might affect subsequent memory regulation. 
Study 1 showed that memory confidence can change after an interview. Study 2 built 
on this finding and showed that when the interview promotes free and undirected 
retrieval, confidence remains stable. On the contrary, when the interview promotes a 
directed retrieval via presenting Cued Recall questions, confidence decreases. A 
further investigation of the metacognitive processes that underpin these results 
(Study 3a and 3b) showed that different types of question lead to confidence shifts 
depending on the difficulty experienced when answering them. Finally, drawing 
upon these results, Study 4 investigated the conditions of an interview likely to lead 
to confidence shifts and those likely to promote confidence stability. Across the 
studies, no evidence was found that changes in confidence following an interview 
impact subsequent memory regulation. Overall, the results confirm and further the 
existing evidence in support of good practice in eyewitnesses interviewing. As such, 
evidence-based techniques are compatible with confidence stability, while deviations 










Table of contents  
 
Overview ................................................................................................................14 
Chapter 1: Best Practice in Eyewitness Interviewing ..............................................16 
Introduction ........................................................................................................16 
A framework of best practice in eyewitness interviewing ....................................17 
Planning the interview .....................................................................................17 
Interviewing instruction and rapport.................................................................18 
Gathering information ......................................................................................19 
The structure of an interview ......................................................................................20 
The types of question ..................................................................................................22 
Closing the interview .......................................................................................24 
Evaluating own practice ...................................................................................24 
Gap between best practice recommendation and real-life interviews....................24 
Conclusions ........................................................................................................26 
Chapter 2: Eyewitness Confidence ..........................................................................27 
Introduction ........................................................................................................27 
A framework for memory regulation ...................................................................27 
The basis of confidence judgements ....................................................................29 
Information-based and experienced-based judgements .....................................30 
Confidence during the interview, what do we know? ...........................................32 
On the confidence - accuracy relationship ...........................................................35 
Conclusions ........................................................................................................37 
Chapter 3: Changes in Eyewitness Confidence........................................................38 
Introduction ........................................................................................................38 
Confidence malleability ......................................................................................38 
Generalisability of findings .................................................................................40 




Search strategy ....................................................................................................42 
Inclusion and exclusion criteria ...........................................................................43 
Screening and selection .......................................................................................44 
Results ....................................................................................................................45 
Memory related variables ....................................................................................46 
Type of to-be-remembered event .....................................................................46 
Type of memory test ........................................................................................46 
Confidence related variables ...............................................................................47 
Type of question ..............................................................................................47 
Granularity of the judgement. ..........................................................................48 
Confidence scale ..............................................................................................49 
Experimental manipulations and factors analysed................................................49 
Changes in confidence and discussion .................................................................52 
Shifts and stability in Flashbulb and everyday memory ....................................52 
Shifts and stability in eyewitness memory ........................................................55 
Conclusions ........................................................................................................58 
Chapter 4: Study 1. Investigating the effect of different quality of an initial interview 








Video stimulus .................................................................................................63 
6 
 
Time 1: Initial Interview Type .........................................................................63 
Best Practice Interview ...............................................................................................63 
Free report phase ...............................................................................................63 
Questioning phase .............................................................................................64 
Behavioural components ...................................................................................64 
Poor Practice Interview. ..............................................................................................65 
Free recall phase ................................................................................................66 
Questioning phase .............................................................................................67 
Behavioural components....................................................................................67 
Time 2: Free Recall Test ..................................................................................68 
Confidence questionnaire .................................................................................68 
Procedure ............................................................................................................68 
Coding ................................................................................................................69 
Accuracy coding ..............................................................................................69 
Consistency coding ..........................................................................................70 
Results ....................................................................................................................70 
Memory recall at Time 1 and Time 2 ..................................................................70 
Consistency .........................................................................................................72 
Changes in memory confidence ...........................................................................73 
Changes in confidence in engaging with the Criminal Justice System..................74 
Discussion...........................................................................................................76 
Chapter 5: Study 2. Investigating the effect of free recall and closed questions on 
memory performance and memory confidence.........................................................83 
Introduction ........................................................................................................83 
Manipulation of the quality of the initial interview ..............................................83 








Video stimulus .................................................................................................87 
Time 1: Initial Interview Type .........................................................................87 
Free Recall Interview.. ................................................................................................87 
Cued Recall Interview ................................................................................................87 
Time 2: Free Recall Test ..................................................................................88 




Change in memory confidence ............................................................................89 
Changes in confidence in engaging with the Criminal Justice System..................90 
Memory recall at Time 2 .....................................................................................93 
Relation between confidence and memory recall at Time 2 .................................94 
Discussion...........................................................................................................95 
Chapter 6: Study 3. Investigating the effect of ease of retrieval on memory 
confidence and subsequent memory output and memory monitoring........................98 
Introduction ........................................................................................................98 
Rationale: expanding the gaps in memory hypothesis ..........................................98 
From correlation to calibration .......................................................................... 100 
Study 3a ................................................................................................................ 102 
Method ................................................................................................................. 102 
Design .............................................................................................................. 102 
Participants ....................................................................................................... 103 
Materials ........................................................................................................... 103 
Video stimulus ............................................................................................... 103 
8 
 
Time 1: Initial Recall Test.............................................................................. 103 
Difficult Cued Recall and Easy Cued Recall Test ...................................................... 103 
Free Recall ............................................................................................................... 104 
Control ..................................................................................................................... 104 
Time 2: Second Test ...................................................................................... 104 
Second Free Recall Test............................................................................................ 104 
Second Neutral Cued Recall Test .............................................................................. 104 
Confidence .................................................................................................... 105 
Procedure .......................................................................................................... 105 
Coding of the second Free Recall Test .............................................................. 106 
Results .................................................................................................................. 106 
Manipulation check ........................................................................................... 106 
Confidence stability .......................................................................................... 107 
Performance in the second Free Recall Test ...................................................... 109 
Monitoring in the second Neutral Cued Recall Test ........................................... 110 
Discussion......................................................................................................... 111 
Study 3b ................................................................................................................ 116 
Method ................................................................................................................. 117 
Design .............................................................................................................. 117 
Participants ....................................................................................................... 117 
Materials ........................................................................................................... 117 
Video Stimulus .............................................................................................. 117 
Time 2: Second Neutral Cued Recall Test ...................................................... 118 
Procedure .......................................................................................................... 118 
Results .................................................................................................................. 118 
Manipulation check ........................................................................................... 118 
Confidence stability .......................................................................................... 119 
Monitoring of memory in the second Neutral Cued Recall Test ......................... 120 
9 
 
Control of memory reporting during the second Neutral Cued Recall Test ........ 122 
Discussion......................................................................................................... 123 
Chapter 7: Study 4. Investigating shifts in confidence in a good practice and a poor 
practice interview ................................................................................................. 126 
Introduction ...................................................................................................... 126 
Rationale ........................................................................................................... 126 
Hypotheses ....................................................................................................... 128 
Method ................................................................................................................. 129 
Design .............................................................................................................. 129 
Participants ....................................................................................................... 129 
Material ............................................................................................................ 130 
Video stimulus ............................................................................................... 130 
The Interview phases ..................................................................................... 130 
Free Recall phase ............................................................................................. 130 
Probing phase .................................................................................................. 130 
The order of the Interview phases .................................................................. 130 
The mixed CR + FR. ................................................................................................. 130 
The FR + Related CR first ........................................................................................ 130 
The FR + Unrelated CR first ..................................................................................... 131 
Confidence .................................................................................................... 131 
Procedure .......................................................................................................... 131 
Coding .............................................................................................................. 134 
The Pilot Study ................................................................................................. 134 
Results .................................................................................................................. 135 
Manipulation check ........................................................................................... 135 
Confidence stability .......................................................................................... 135 
Confidence stability across Cued Recall type .................................................... 137 
Calibration on Related CR and Unrelated CR questions .................................... 139 
10 
 
Memory report .................................................................................................. 142 
Discussion......................................................................................................... 144 
Chapter 8: General Discussion ............................................................................. 147 
Introduction and overview ................................................................................. 147 
The malleability of confidence in the interviewing context: a gap in the literature
 ......................................................................................................................... 149 
The effect of interview structure and different types of questions on confidence 
malleability ....................................................................................................... 149 
The effect of best-practice and poor-practice interviews on confidence .......... 152 
Potential risks of shifts in confidence in the interviewing setting .................... 153 
The relation between shifts in confidence and subsequent confidence-accuracy 
calibration ......................................................................................................... 154 
A contribution to the debate on the confidence- accuracy relationship ............ 155 
Limitations of the PhD ...................................................................................... 156 
Suggestions for future research ......................................................................... 157 
Conclusions ...................................................................................................... 158 
References ............................................................................................................ 160 
Appendix A ........................................................................................................... 191 
Appendix B ........................................................................................................... 192 
Appendix C ........................................................................................................... 193 
Appendix D ........................................................................................................... 194 
Appendix E ........................................................................................................... 196 
Appendix F ........................................................................................................... 198 
Appendix G ........................................................................................................... 201 
Appendix H ........................................................................................................... 202 
Appendix I ............................................................................................................ 205 
Appendix J ............................................................................................................ 212 
Appendix K ........................................................................................................... 214 
11 
 
List of tables 
 
Chapter 4  
Table 4.1. Means (and Standard Deviations) of correct and incorrect details, and 
accuracy of information reported at Time 1 and Time 2 for the Best Practice 
Interview and Poor Practice Interview group……………………………………….72 
Table 4.2. Means (and Standard Deviations) of proportion and accuracy rate of 
consistent and new details in the Best Practice Interview and Poor Practice Interview 
group………………………………………………………………………………...73 
Table 4.3. Means (and Standard Deviations) of confidence ratings reported at Time 
1, and Time 2 for the Best Practice Interview and Poor Practice Interview 
group………………………………………………………………………………...74 
Table 4.4. Means (and Standard Deviations) of confidence in memory related to 
talking to the police, signing a statement, participating in an ID task, and presenting 
evidence in Court reported at Time 1 and Time 2 for the Best Practice Interview and 
Poor Practice interview group………………………………………………………75 
Table 4.5. Results of the 2 x 2 ANOVAs …………………………………………..76 
 
Chapter 5 
Table 5.1. Means (and Standard Deviations) of confidence reported at Time 1, and at 
Time 2 for the Cued Recall Interview and Free Recall Interview group……………90 
Table 5.2. Means (and Standard Deviations) of confidence in memory related to 
talking to the police, signing a statement, participating in an ID task, and presenting 
evidence in Court reported at Time 1 and Time 2 in the Cued Recall Interview and 
Free Recall Interview group…………………………………………………………92 
Table 5.3. Results of the 2 X 2 ANOVAs…………………………………………...93 
Table 5.4. Means (and Standard Deviations) of amount of correct details, amount of 
incorrect details, and accuracy of information at Time 2 for the Cued Recall 
Interview and Free Recall Interview group…………………………………………94 
 
Chapter 6 
Table 6.1. Means (and Standard Deviations) of confidence provided at Time 1 and 
Time 2 Recall in the four groups…………………………………………………..109 
12 
 
Table 6.2. Means (and Standard Deviations) of correct details and accuracy of the 
information reported in the second Free Recall test in the four groups…………....110 
Table 6.3. Means (and Standard Deviations) of the C-index, OU index and ANDI in 
the four group……………………………………………………………………....111 
Table 6.4. Means (and Standard Deviations) of confidence reported at Time 1 and 
Time 2 in the four groups………………………………………………………..…120 
Table 6.5. Means (and Standard Deviations) of C- index, ANDI, and over/under-
confidence measure in the four groups…………………………………………….121 
 
Chapter 7 
Table 7.1. Means (and Standard Deviations) of C-index, ANDI, and OU measures 
for the answers to Related Cued Recall and Unrelated Cued Recall in the two 
groups....................................................................................................................... 140 
Table 7.2. Means (and Standard Deviations) of number of correct, and accuracy rate 
of information reported in response of Cued Recall type (Related Cued Recall vs 




















List of figures 
 
Chapter 3  
Figure 3.1. PRISMA chart illustrating the four stages……………………………..45 
 
Chapter 6 
Figure 6.1. Procedure of Study 3a…………………………………………………106 
Figure 6.2. Calibration curves for the Difficult Cued Recall, Easy Cued Recall, Free 
Recall, and Control group in Study 3a …………………………………………….111 
Figure 6.3. Calibration curves for the Difficult Cued Recall, Easy Cued Recall, Free 
Recall, and Control group in Study 3b…………………………………………….122 
 
Chapter 7 
Figure 7.1. Procedure of Study 4…………………………………………………..134 
Figure 7.2. Means (and Standard Deviations) of confidence at Time 1, confidence at 
Time 2, and confidence at Time 4 for participants in the mixed CR +Fr, FR + Related 
CR first, and the FR + Unrelated CR first…………………………………………137 
Figure 7.3. Means (and Standard Deviations) of confidence at Time 1, confidence at 
Time 2, confidence at Time 3, and confidence at Time 4 for participants in the FR + 
Related CR first, and the FR + Unrelated CR first………………………………...138 
Figure 7.4. Calibration curves (and data points for each confidence interval) for the 
related CR and unrelated CR questions for participants in the FR + related CR & 
unrelated CR (panel a), and for participants in the FR + unrelated CR & related CR 









Eyewitness evidence is pivotal at all stages of the investigative processes. As such, 
investigators strive to extrapolate complete and accurate accounts each time an 
eyewitness is asked to recall the event witnessed. Psychological research has 
investigated the most effective interviewing methods by developing and testing 
different techniques to achieve this goal. Although best practice interviewing 
techniques are widely recognised as effective, we do not yet know how they impact 
eyewitnesses’ metacognitive processes, despite research on metamemory showing 
that metacognitive processes, such as confidence, are used to regulate the amount 
and quality of the information reported. Thus, it is important to understand how best 
practice interviewing techniques influence confidence and how this in turn is used to 
regulate the information subsequently reported.  
 Chapter 1 of this PhD provides an overview of the existing literature in 
support of the best practice interviewing techniques currently available, and outlines 
the current recommendations relating to eyewitness interviewing. Here, particular 
attention is given to the information gathering stage of the interview, the 
effectiveness of different types of question asked, and their use at different stages of 
the interview.   
 Chapter 2 focuses on eyewitness confidence. Here, I outline the role of 
memory confidence in the regulation of memory output. Further attention is given to 
the literature investigating confidence within the context of an investigative 
interview.  
An investigation of the factors likely to lead to shifts in memory confidence is 
reported in Chapter 3. Here, I present a systematic review of the literature with the 
aim to isolate the factors likely to cause changes in memory confidence. Of these 
factors, particular attention is given to those relevant to the interviewing context. 
Based on the literature discussed in the introductory chapters, in Chapter 4 I 
present my first study, investigating how different quality interviews affect 
eyewitness confidence and the quality of information reported subsequently. Here, 
Study 1 tested the hypothesis that a Poor Practice Interview (but not a Best Practice 
Interview) leads to decreased confidence and poorer quality of information reported 
in a subsequent recall test. 
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In Chapter 5, a similar study is presented; however, a Free Recall and a Cued 
Recall interview are used as proxies of a Best Practice and a Poor Practice Interview. 
Here, Study 2 tests the hypothesis that confidence decreases only following a Cued 
Recall Interview (but not following a Free Recall Interview). Furthermore, in this 
study I investigate whether decreased confidence following an interview is correlated 
with the amount and accuracy of information reported in a subsequent recall attempt. 
Based on the results on Study 2, Chapter 6 presents an investigation of the 
metacognitive processes that underpin the decrease in confidence following a Cued 
Recall Interview. Here, across two studies (Study 3a and Study 3b) I test the 
hypothesis that confidence is likely to decrease as a function of the difficulty 
experienced when answering different types of question. Further, I investigate 
whether decreased confidence leads to demonstrations of under-confidence and poor 
confidence-accuracy calibration in the information reported in a subsequent recall 
attempt. 
The last experimental Chapter (Chapter 7) builds on the results of the 
previous studies and investigates the conditions of an interview that promote 
confidence stability and those likely to lead to decreased confidence. 
 Finally, in Chapter 8 I discuss the findings of the PhD as a whole, within the 
context of the existing literature. I highlight the contributions that this research has 
made to the field of investigate interviewing, and to the current debate on the 








Chapter 1: Best Practice in Eyewitness Interviewing 
 
Introduction 
In the absence of CCTV footage, the only way to gather information about a 
crime is by asking what happen to those that were on the crime scene. Often the 
police have little more than the eyewitness or victim’s memories to reconstruct an 
incident and ensure the perpetrators to justice (Fisher et al., 1994; Geiselman & 
Fisher, 1989; Sanders, 1986). Therefore, it is important that the information gathered 
from eyewitnesses is as accurate as possible, since any error that eyewitnesses report 
represents a potential wrong clue that the police will pursuit. However, eyewitnesses’ 
recollections are not perfect, and witnesses can make mistakes (Loftus, 1979).  
It is well documented that memory is fallible and that numerous factors can 
impact on the accuracy of the account eyewitnesses report. Some of these factors are 
largely beyond the control of the Criminal Justice System. For example, research has 
found that contextual characteristics at the time of encoding, such as a short exposure 
to the criminal event, viewing distance or poor lightening conditions can decrease the 
accuracy of eyewitnesses’ reports (e.g., Granhag et al., 2014; Meissner et al., 2007; 
Memon et al., 2004). Eyewitnesses’ characteristics such as age or level of stress 
experienced during the event can also negatively impact the accuracy of the memory 
reported (Deffenbacher et al., 2004; Meissner et al., 2007; Yarmey, 1993).  
  Factors that decrease eyewitness accuracy can also stem from poor practice 
within the Criminal Justice System, including during the information gathering stage 
of the investigation. For example, the more time elapses between the incident and the 
first interview the less accurate eyewitnesses’ reports are (e.g., Dysart & Lindsay, 
2006; Odinot & Wolters, 2006). Or the more opportunities there are for eyewitnesses 
to encounter misleading post-event information from co-witnesses, the more likely 
they are to report incorrect information (e.g., Gabbert et al., 2003; Gabbert et al., 
2012; Paterson et al., 2009; Paterson et al., 2010). However, these ‘system’ variables 
can be controlled, and their negative effects can be attenuated. Thus, in order to 
avoid forgetting and memory contaminations good practice guidelines suggest 
interviewing eyewitnesses as soon as possible.  
Other system variables found to strongly impact on eyewitness’ accuracy are 
related to the way in which the information is extrapolated from eyewitnesses. 
Perhaps one of the most compelling examples relating to the influence of 
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interviewing practice on memory reporting can be found in the literature on leading 
questions. In a classic study Loftus and Palmer (1974) showed participants a video of 
a car accident and asked them to estimate the speed of the cars. Participants who 
received the question suggesting that the cars had smashed into each other reported 
significantly higher speed estimates than those that received the question suggesting 
that the car contacted each other (see also Loftus, 2005). The literature on leading 
questions clearly shows that factors and variables at play during an interview can 
strongly influence the accuracy of the information reported by eyewitness and it is 
therefore pivotal to ensure that investigative interviews are conducted by following 
the available evidence-based practice.  
 
A framework of best practice in eyewitness interviewing 
A significant attempt to standardise the professional practice relating to 
eyewitness interviewing in the UK was carried out in 1992, when the Home Office 
commissioned a training programme aimed to upskill investigators in England and 
Wales and improve the quality of the information gathered. The programme led to 
the development of the PEACE model (acronym of Planning and Preparation, 
Engage and Explain, Account, Closure, Evaluation) – which is currently the 
framework of best practice in investigative interviewing. The PEACE 
recommendations are grounded into psychological research and represent the best 
evidence-based techniques currently available. Each stage is outlined briefly below. 
 
Planning the interview 
The Planning and Preparation phase includes recommendations relating to 
the planning of the upcoming interview, such as revising the investigation and the 
information already available and organising any special arrangement the eyewitness 
might require. Evidence of the utility of this phase can be found in a work by 
Griffiths and Walsh (2018). In their study investigators reported reflective comments 
on their practice and highlighted several benefits of this stage, including identifying 
the areas to be further probed, and deciding a common interviewing plan and 
cohesive strategy with a potential co-interviewer. Further benefits were highlighted 
by investigators in Howes’s (2020) study. Here, practitioners reported discussing 
potential arrangements for booking and debriefing interpreters during this initial 
stage. As well as highlighting the benefits of this stage of the interview, research has 
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also shown that the lack of preparation at this stage of the interview is among the 
causes that lead to obtaining poor and incomplete accounts from eyewitnesses 
(Cherryman & Bull, 2001; Walsh & Milne, 2008). Although police officers often 
report to have no time to extensively prepare for the interview (e.g., Cherryman & 
Bull, 2001; Walsh & Milne, 2008), researchers strongly suggest that the Planning 
and Preparation stage is a vital part of the interviewing process (Clarke & Milne 
2001; Walsh & Milne, 2008). 
 
Interviewing instruction and rapport 
The Engage and Explain phase recommends taking time to establish a 
positive relationship with the interviewee, ensuring that they are comfortable and 
understand why they are being interviewed, what the objectives of the interview are, 
and how it is going to be conducted. The importance of explaining the aim of the 
interview has been outlined by Walsh and Milne (2008). Investigators are 
encouraged to explicitly outline the interview process and to cover the ground rules 
including the expectation that the eyewitness will take control of the interview during 
the free report phase. Failure to clarify these aspects of the interview could result in 
poor understanding of the  interviewer’s expectations (Griffith & Milne, 2010). 
Regarding the Engaging aspect of this phase, researchers generally agree that 
the interpersonal relationship between the interviewer and the interviewee can impact 
the quality of eyewitnesses’ account. For example, Collins et al. (2002), found 
evidence that the interviewer’s aptitude can influence the amount of information 
reported. When an effort was made by the interviewer to build rapport, participants 
reported more correct units of information at no cost of accuracy, compared with 
when the interviewers adopted a neutral or abrupt demeanour. This was observed 
especially in the free report phase of the interview. Evidence that rapport building 
also increases the accuracy of the information reported comes from Kieckhaefer et al. 
(2014) who found a high rapport interview to increase the accuracy of the account 
via inoculating against the subsequent exposure to misinformation (see also Nash et 
al., 2016; Vallano & Compo 2011). Furthermore, in a recent systematic review 
Gabbert et al. (2020) reported that the majority of the studies evaluated in the review 




Despite the consensus that building rapport increases the quality of 
information reported from witnesses, the elements that underpin an effective rapport 
are not yet clear. Consequently, rapport has been operationalised with both verbal 
and non-verbal components (St-Yves, 2006), or with a combination of both. Fisher 
and Geiselman (1992) originally suggested to ensure rapport by mean of verbal 
techniques, such as by using the interviewee’s name, or by showing interest through 
the use appropriate questions or active listening. St-Yves (2006) also highlighted the 
importance of active listening and minimal verbal (e.g., uh hum, okay) and non-
verbal encouragements (i.e. nodding, friendly facial expression), (see also 
Kieckhaefer et al., 2014; Vallano & Compo, 2011). 
A further insight into the effectiveness of the use of non-verbal rapport 
techniques comes from the literature on social support for child eyewitness which 
showed that a supportive interview can increase the accuracy of the children’s 
accounts. In this line of research, the non-verbal components of a supportive 
interview included conveying warmth, dressing casually, using eye contact, smiles, 
open body posture and a friendly tone of voice (e.g., Carter et al., 1996; Davis & 
Bottoms, 2002; Quas et al., 2005).  
 
Gathering information 
The Account phase of the PEACE model refers to the information gathering 
stage and includes recommendations about how to extrapolate accurate and complete 
accounts from witnesses. The information gathering process has received much 
attention and researchers have developed and tested various interviewing protocols 
tailored to both the type of interviewee and the contextual situation of the interview. 
Some of the best known interviewing tools are the Cognitive Interview (CI, Fisher & 
Geiselman, 1992; Fisher et al., 1989) used especially with cooperative witnesses, the 
Conversation Management (Shepherd, 1986; 1991) better suited to interview less 
cooperative witnesses (Dando et al., 2009). Some protocols are especially tailored for 
the child witness, such as the National Institute of Child Health and Human 
Development (NICHD, Lamb et al., 2007; Orbach et al., 2000). Others are especially 
designed for gathering information on the crime scene, such as the Structed Interview 
Protocol (SIP, Gabbert et al., 2015a; 2015b), or in the event in which multiple 
witnesses need to be interviewed as soon as possible, such as the Self-Administered 
Interview (SAI, Gabbert et al., 2009; Gabbert et al., 2012). Since these protocols 
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address specific issues, they vary in the form they are presented, for example the SAI 
is a written form while the others are guidelines of interviewing. Further differences 
can be found in the way the instructions are conveyed, for example the NICHD 
Protocol includes specific initial questions to assess if the interviewee understands 
the difference between telling the truth or lying; a practice phase and more detailed 
instruction about the interview that might not be needed when interviewing adults. 
However, the best practice interviewing protocols share many similarities, in 
particular relating to the structure of the interview and the types of question used.  
 
The structure of an interview. The vast majority of best practice 
interviewing protocols recommend initiating an interview with a free report phase 
followed by a questioning or probing phase. This structure enhances the likelihood of 
obtaining detailed and accurate accounts from witnesses. In particular, ensuring an 
eyewitness has the opportunity to freely report the whole event in an uninterrupted 
free recall allows for the memory to be activated, and for the details that are not 
immediately accessible to be reached. This is in line with the spreading activation 
theory of memory (Anderson, 1983) which conceives memory as in a network of 
related details (called nodes) that are connected to each other. When a detail is 
recalled, an activation-signal is sent to all the related details, and when the signal 
reaches a sufficient strength the related details can also be activated and recalled. 
Allowing an eyewitness to focus on the recollection task and activate the memory at 
their own pace increases the chances of recalling more details, including those that 
are not immediately accessible (for a review see Wheeler & Gabbert, 2017).  
Besides increasing the opportunity to provide detailed accounts, initiating an 
interview with a free recall is likely to increase the accuracy of the information 
reported. Research has shown that details reported in the free report phase of the 
interview are more likely to be correct than those reported during the questioning 
phase. In a recent study Kontogianni et al. (2020) found that the accuracy of the 
information reported in the follow-up questioning phase was significantly lower than 
that of the information reported in the initial free report phase. This result persisted 
even when participants were encouraged to be as accurate as possible before the 
questioning phase began. Thus, in order to enhance the opportunity to provide 
correct and detailed accounts, it is important that eyewitnesses are allowed to engage 
in an uninterrupted account of their memory. 
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Only after the free report has been completed should the questioning phase 
begin. The primary aim of this phase is to clarify and expand on the details provided 
in the freely reported account. During the probing phase a large proportion of new 
and correct information can be reported by eyewitnesses (e.g., Dando, 2013; Dando 
et al., 2009; Kontogianni et al., 2020; Memon et al., 1997), showing that the follow-
up questions asked during this phase can be necessary to reach details that have not 
been reached during the free recall phase. However, during this stage of interview 
eyewitness memory is more likely to be influenced by the interviewer and their 
utterances, hence it is important that the probing phase is carried out by using 
appropriate and effective techniques.  
Considering that each eyewitness is likely to store and retrieve their memory 
is a unique way, best practice guidelines recommend for this phase to be compatible 
with the structure and the content of the eyewitness’s free report, including their 
linguistic style (e.g., Fisher et al., 2011; Gabbert et al., 2015a; 2015b; Kebbell et al., 
2001). Here, the eyewitness’s account should be broken down into separate topics 
and each topic should be probed with appropriate questions, by following an order 
and a language style that closely match the eyewitness’s account. This procedure 
ensures that (i) only the content reported by the eyewitness is addressed in the 
probing phase, and (ii) the eyewitness memory is probed by using the eyewitness’s 
own cues, such as their own words or the unique order with which they remember 
the event. While probing only the interviewee’s account reduces the risk for the 
interviewer to contaminate the eyewitness’ memory by minimising the opportunities 
to suggest misleading information, providing an eyewitness with self-generated cues 
increases the likelihood to trigger details that were not accessed during the free report 
phase (e.g., Kontogianni et al., 2020; Wheeler & Gabbert, 2017).  
In summary, recommendations relating to interviewing structure are rooted 
within memory theories and are compatible with memory functioning. Initiating an 
interview with a free recall followed by a questioning phase is designed to facilitate 




The types of question. A further important aspect of the information 
gathering process relates to the questions asked during the probing phase. As such, 
researchers have investigated the types of question that are more likely to elicit 
accurate and complete accounts from witnesses. An initial distinction can be drawn 
between open and closed questions; however, several different subtypes of questions 
can be clustered within these two broader categories (Oxburgh et al., 2010). For 
example, open questions allow for unrestricted answers, however further subtypes of 
question are included within this category. One type is the free recall or free 
invitation (e.g., Aldridge & Cameron, 1999; Hershkowitz, 2001) which allow for 
interviewee’s complete control over the answer. Further open questions are the TED 
questions starting with the words "Tell"," Explain", or "Describe" (e.g., Griffiths & 
Milne, 2006), these require an elaboration of content already mentioned. Similarly 
questions that request to elaborate the answer further have been referred to as open-
ended breadth questions (e.g., “Tell me what happened”), while those requesting 
more information on a detail already mentioned have been referred to as open-ended 
depth questions (e.g., “You mentioned x; tell me more about x”), (e.g., Powell & 
Snow, 2007). 
 On the contrary, closed questions are defined as those requesting specific or 
targeted answers can include probing questions which commence with “wh” - often 
referred to as 5Wh (i.e., "Who", "What", "Where", "When", “Why”, and "How") or 
closed-specific questions (Aldridge & Cameron, 1999; Davies et al., 2000; Griffiths 
& Milne, 2006; Loftus, 1982). Other subtypes include questions that require a yes/no 
answer (e.g., Price & Roberts, 2011) often referred to as option-posing, and questions 
that target specific details, known as focused or directive questions (e.g., Sternberg et 
al., 1996). Focused questions are also further divided in leading or suggestive 
questions (e.g., Cederborg et al., 2000; Davies et al., 2000).   
Research has shown that open questions tend to elicit longer answers and 
more complete accounts from older children and adults compared to closed questions 
(e.g., Davies et al., 2000; Hamilton et al., 2016; Lamb et al., 2003; Lamb et al., 2007; 
Hershkowitz, 2001; Snook et al., 2012; Sternberg et al., 1996). Furthermore, open 
questions yield more accurate information (e.g., Ibabe & Sporer, 2004; Orbach & 
Lamb, 2001; Oxburgh et al., 2010; Shapiro, 2006; Sharman & Powel, 2011), and 
consistent accounts than closed questions (e.g., Orbach & Lamb, 2001; Poole & 
White, 1991). Among the different types of closed questions, the use of leading 
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questions is highly discouraged. These questions are not neutrally phrased and rather 
suggest an answer or contain a detail that was not mentioned by the eyewitness, thus 
they are likely to influence the eyewitness’s response (Lamb et al., 2011; Loftus & 
Palmer, 1974; Loftus & Zanni, 1975). In answer to this type of question eyewitnesses 
tend to either comply and report the suggested information even if unsure about it, or 
to incorporate the suggested detail in their original memory independently of its 
accuracy (Roebers & Schneider, 2000). The influence of leading questions is 
stronger when the suggested details is related to a peripheral rather than a central 
information (Roebers & Schneider, 2000; Sutherland & Hayne, 2001), and if the 
question is asked after a long delay (Shapiro et al., 2005). For similar reasons, 
researchers suggest limiting the use of questions that rely upon recognition rather 
than recollection memory, such as forced choice or multiple-choice questions. These 
types of question are more likely to yield incorrect information because they 
encourage eyewitness to choose an answer even if they might be unsure about its 
accuracy (e.g., La Rooy et al., 2015). 
However, despite responses to closed questions being more likely to be 
inaccurate, researchers do recognise that they can be useful when a specific piece of 
information is sought, because they narrow down eyewitnesses’ attention to 
individual aspects of their memory. Thus, in order to minimise the impact of closed 
questions on the accuracy of an eyewitness’s account, researchers suggest using them 
only when the information sought has not been elicited by open questions. For 
example, Griffiths and Milne (2006) introduced the distinction between appropriate 
and inappropriate closed questions depending on the time of the interview in which 
the questions are asked. For example, a yes/no question is defined as “appropriate” 
when it is asked in the conclusive probing phase of a topic area, after open (i.e., TED 
questions) and focused questions (e.g., 5Wh questions) have been asked. However, if 
the yes/no question is asked before the open or focused questions it is considered 
“inappropriate”. Similarly, Gabbert et al. (2015a; 2015b) developed a traffic-light 
coloured map to flag the types of question that are more likely to yield incorrect 
information. Here, the authors advice using the closed questions associated with high 




Closing the interview 
The PEACE model recommends conducting a Closure phase in order to 
summarise the account given by the eyewitness, to check that it is as complete as 
possible and that it has been clearly understood. At this stage the summary of the 
information reported can act as a further activation-signal and jog the witness’s 
memory for additional details (Anderson & Pichert, 1978; Wheeler & Gabbert, 
2017). Thus, it is important that the interviewee is provided with the opportunity to 
report any additional information they might remember. Beside summarising the 
account, confirming that this has been understood and providing the opportunity to 
report additional details, two further components should be included at this point of 
the interview: (i) providing an overview of the following stages of the investigation 
and (ii) leaving a contact detail for the interviewee to get in touch should they 
remember any other detail (i.e., Clark & Milne, 2001; Walsh & Milne, 2008). 
Researchers have suggested that a comprehensive closure is pivotal to enhance 
cooperation and to leave the interviewee in a positive state should they be asked to 
continue collaborating with the investigation (Bull, 2010). Despite the importance of 
this stage, research analysing real life interviews has highlighted that interviewers do 
not often cover the components of the Closure stage in sufficient details (Walsh & 
Milne, 2008). In particular, evidence exists that interviewers often fail to (i) include a 
summary of the account, (ii) seek confirmation that the account was understood, and 
(iii) leave contact details (Scott et al., 2015; see also Clark & Milne 2001).  
 
Evaluating own practice 
Finally, the Evaluation phase recommends taking note of any inconsistencies 
with the information previously held that might have emerged during the interview. 
This stage should serve to integrate the new information into the existing 
investigation. It is also an opportunity for interviewers to monitor their own 
interviewing practice. Walsh and Milne (2008) highlighted that this stage is pivotal 
in ensuring self-reflections and continuous improvement and it should be carefully 
conducted as part of the interviewing process. However, they also noted that 
evaluation should be paired with further training in order to ensure investigators can 
rely upon up to date skills.  
 
Gap between best practice recommendation and real-life interviews 
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Despite a large body of research that has consistently highlighted the risk 
related to inappropriate interviewing practice, deviations from best practice 
recommendations are not infrequent. Early research flagged several important issues 
related to common practice in investigative interviewing, in particular relating the 
way in which information is elicited from eyewitness. Fisher et al. (1987) assessed 
tape-recorded forensic interviews conducted in the US by experienced detectives and 
found that after initiating a free recall they tended to interrupt it after an average of 
7.5 seconds. The interviews were dominated by rapid-fire closed questions, asked in 
an unstructured sequence, which did not match the interviewees’ account. The lack 
of retrieval support was paired with the use of misleading questions and negatively 
phrased questions. The style was often difficult to understand due to the excessive 
use of jargon and technical terms. Similar findings were also reported by George 
(1991) in interviews conducted by British investigators. He found that interviews 
were dominated by the use of closed questions often misleading. Furthermore, pauses 
were rare which suggested questions were asked in a rapid sequence leaving little 
time for the interviewee to elaborate detailed answers (see also Milne & Bull, 1999).  
 Many of the issues in a typical forensic interview highlighted by Fisher et al. 
(1987) and George (1991) suggested that investigators were not eliciting detailed and 
reliable information from witnesses. In particular, the interruption of a free recall, the 
rapid-fire questioning, and the used of closed questions suggested that the 
interviewee had little opportunity to recall the entire event at their own pace, and that 
most of the information was provided in response to interviewer’s specific questions. 
This interviewing style can only elicit the information targeted by the questions and 
it is unlikely to reach all the details the witnesses could potentially remember.   
Consistent with early research, more recent studies documented similar issues 
in relation to current interviewing practice. For example, interviewers’ interruption 
and excessive use of rapid-fire yes/no questions were found in Wright and Alison 
(2004), and Myklebust and Alison (2000). While a large number of studies reported 
that closed questions are still broadly used in real-life interviews (Carson & La Rooy, 
2015; La Rooy et al., 2013; La Rooy et al., 2011; Loftus & Greenspan, 2017; Otgaar 
et al., 2018; Oxburgh et al., 2012; Wade et al., 2018). In addition, studies that 
analysed field interviews showed that the proportion of closed questions compared to 
open questions can be surprisingly high. For example, Myklebust and Bjørklund 
(2006) sampled 100 field interviews and found that interviewers tended to use 10 
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times more closed than open questions. More recently Luther et al. (2015) reviewed 
45 interviews with children victim of sexual abuse conducted in Canada between 
2006 and 2012 and found that only 8% of the interviewers’ question were open 
invitations. In contrast 36% were option posing type of question and 61% were 
directive (see also Verkampt et al., 2019; Waterhouse et al., 2016; Wolfman et al., 
2016). Concerning is also the possibility that the quality of the types of question 
asked might not be consistent over repeated interviews, and that while the use of 
open questions can decrease (e.g., Cederborg et al., 2008), the use closed or 
inappropriate questions can increase in follow up interviews (e.g., Petterson & Pipe, 
2006). 
The deviation from best-practice recommendations is particularly concerning 
and suggests that the interviewers and their interviewing style are likely to influence 
eyewitness reporting and undermine the accuracy of the information they elicit. 
 
Conclusions 
Research in psychology has shown that eyewitness memory is malleable and 
numerous variables affect the quality of the evidence that eyewitnesses report. While 
some of these variables are beyond the control of the Criminal Justice System, others 
derive from poor interviewing techniques. Thus, in order to standardise the 
interviewing practice and ensure that the information elicited from eyewitnesses is as 
accurate as possible, the PEACE framework was developed as a joint effort between 
practitioners and researchers in psychology. The PEACE model represents the 
authorised professional practice in investigative interviewing the UK and includes 
recommendations related to all aspects of the interviewing process, including the 
information gathering stage. A large body of research has identified the most 
effective way to extrapolate information from witnesses and this chapter has outlined 
the ideal structure of the interview and the most effective types of question used. 
While recognising that deviation from recommended best practice is still largely 
observed in the field, the goal of this PhD is to understand the impact that 







Chapter 2: Eyewitness Confidence 
 
Introduction  
Research on investigative interviewing has largely focused on understanding 
the impact of interviewing techniques, such as the types of question, on the quality of 
the information reported in response. In a typical study, participants are exposed to a 
to-be-remembered stimulus and then are asked to report what they can remember. 
Researchers often manipulate the types of question asked, or the retrieval facilitation 
techniques used. The effectiveness of the retrieval technique in eliciting accurate and 
complete accounts is then quantified by measuring several indexes of memory 
quality such as the amount and accuracy of the details reported. This paradigm 
allows researchers to understand the effect of the retrieval technique on memory 
reporting. However, it provides limited insight into how memory reporting occurs, 
which cognitive processes it involves, and how they operate. In a different yet 
relevant body of work, research on metamemory has focused more closely on the 
mechanisms that underpin memory reporting and has proposed a pivotal role for 
metacognitive processes such as memory confidence.  
 
A framework for memory regulation 
Research on metacognition has highlighted the relevance of many 
metacognitive processes that underpin memory retrieval and reporting. A 
fundamental assumption of the model is that people can self-direct their retrieval 
process and regulate the information they report. Under this perspective, people do 
not automatically retrieve and report information they have in memory, rather they 
engage in several decisions, including whether to start the retrieval process and when 
to interrupt it, and whether to report or withhold any of the information retrieved. For 
example, Barnes et al. (1999) proposed that in answer to an external input such as a 
question, a Feeling of Knowing (FOK) is evoked, and only when it exceeds a certain 
threshold is a decision made to start the memory search for the response. If the 
search is successful and an answer is retrieved, a confidence judgement is generated 
to assess the accuracy of the answer. If the magnitude of the confidence judgement 
exceeds a certain criterion, then the answer is likely to be reported, otherwise it will 
be withheld. If the candidate answer does not pass the satisfactory criterion for 
reporting, people might revaluate the strength on their FOK and any personal 
28 
 
motivation to re-start the memory task. If they still feel they know the answer to the 
question and are willing to continue searching, then they will engage in further effort 
to retrieve another candidate answer, otherwise they will end their memory search.  
While Barnes et al.’s (1999) model encompasses metacognitive processes 
involved in memory retrieval and memory reporting, Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) 
focused primarily on the regulation of the information reported. The model proposes 
two core processes involved in the regulation of memory reporting: the monitoring 
and control process. The monitoring process refers to the array of judgements (e.g., 
FOK, Judgements of Learning (JOL), confidence judgements) that people have 
regarding their memory and the information they retrieve. These judgements are used 
to monitor or assess different qualities of the memories retrieved, such as their 
accuracy. The control process in turn uses these judgements to decide whether or not 
an answer should be reported. If the assessed probability of accuracy passes a certain 
criterion the answer is likely to be reported, otherwise it will be withheld.  
 In order to test the model, Koriat and Goldsmiths (1996) proposed a two-
phase methodology – often referred to as Quantity - Accuracy Profile (QAP). In the 
first ‘forced-report phase’, participants are asked a series of memory questions to 
which they have to provide an answer and a confidence judgement. In a following 
‘free-report phase’ participants are given the same test again and are invited to decide 
which answers they would like to volunteer and which they would prefer to 
withdraw. Three core findings showed that (1) participants reported less but more 
accurate information in the free-report phase, hence they were able to gain accuracy 
at cost of the amount of information reported, (2) participants were able to 
effectively (although not perfectly) discriminate between correct and incorrect 
answers via their confidence judgements, and finally (3) participants’ tendency to 
report an answer depended strongly on the confidence judgement, as shown by the 
fact that volunteered answers had a relatively high mean confidence rate (.89). Thus, 
participants were able to increase the accuracy of their memory report by selecting 
the details to volunteer and withhold based on an evaluation of their probability of 
accuracy.  
Memory regulation can be achieved also by other means, for example by 
regulating the specificity, or ‘grain-size’ of the information reported in order to 
achieve high accuracy (Goldsmith et al., 2002). In their study Goldsmith et al. (2002) 
gave participants a set of memory questions and asked them to provide both a fine-
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grained answer and a coarse-grained answer, with associated confidence judgements 
for each. In a subsequent phase, participants were presented with their answers and 
were asked to volunteer only one out of the two answers given. The results of interest 
showed that (1) participants preferred to report fine-grained answers but only when 
these were confidently held. However, when unsure about their fine-grained answers, 
participants were successful in increasing accuracy by withdrawing the fine-grained 
answer and volunteering the coarse-grained answers instead, (2) participants were 
able to effectively (but not perfectly) discriminate between correct and incorrect 
answers at both level of grain-size, and finally (3) participants’ confidence was a 
strong predictor of volunteering rate, hence participants tended to report answers 
where the assessed probability of correctness was high. Thus, confidence judgements 
- together with other available information (e.g., the level of informativeness of the 
answer, potential risks of error, external incentives) underpin the decision to 
volunteer an answer at different levels of grain-size (Ackerman & Goldsmith, 2008; 
Brewer et al., 2018; Evans & Fisher, 2011; Goldsmith et al., 2005). In summary, the 
framework of memory regulation depicts eyewitness memory reporting as a self – 
directed process whereby decisions to report or withhold information, and the level 
of granularity to report, depend strongly on how confident a person is that their 
memories are correct.  
 
The basis of confidence judgements 
Considering the relevance of confidence judgements in the regulation of 
memory output, it is important to understand how confidence is generated. A dual-
process theory, referred to as cue-utilisation theory (Koriat, 2000; Koriat et al., 2008) 
proposes that the accuracy of a memory can rarely be accessed directly, and in most 
occasions it has to be inferred from the evaluation of available cues. Typically, two 
types of cues are evaluated when generating confidence judgements: information-
based (theory-based) and experienced-based cues (affect-based). The former - 
information-based cues, refer to beliefs and thoughts that people hold regarding their 
own memory. For example, when people attempt to assess the quality of their 
memory they might evaluate pre-existing information regarding their own 
competencies and knowledge in that specific domain (e.g., ‘I tend to perform well on 
memory tests’). While the latter - experienced-based cues, refer to cues generated 
during the retrieval process. For example, in order to assess the accuracy of a 
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memory, people might evaluate the retrieval experience such as how easily the 
memory came to mind, or how vivid or complete the memory appeared. 
 
Information-based and experienced-based judgements 
Within the eyewitness memory literature, information-based judgements have 
been investigated primarily in relation to social influence and its effects on 
confidence. For example, feedback on performance given during a lineup task or 
interview can lead an eyewitness to feel more or less confident in their memories. In 
eyewitness identification research, studies have shown that participants who are led 
to believe they have chosen the correct culprit, show higher confidence in their 
identification decision compared with those who had not received feedback. 
Similarly, confidence decreases when eyewitnesses are led to think they have picked 
the wrong person (e.g., Bradfield et al., 2002; Wells & Bradfield, 1998; Wells & 
Seelau, 1995). Similar results can be found in studies investigating social influence 
on confidence for recollection, for example leading eyewitness to think their memory 
is poor can reduce confidence (e.g., Leippe et al., 2006).  
Further evidence that metacognitive judgements are likely to be influenced by 
the beliefs that people hold, is demonstrated in a study by Costermans et al. (1992) 
who found both FOK and confidence judgements to be correlated with beliefs that 
the answer to the question should be known (e.g., the question is in a familiar 
domain, and other people would know the answer). Finally, some evidence that 
confidence judgements might be reliant at least in part on information-based cues 
comes from the neuroimaging research. For example, Chua et al. (2006) observed 
greater activation in the brain regions associated with self-reflection when 
participants were making confidence judgements about a recognition task compared 
to when they were performing the task. This result suggests that confidence 
judgements are not solely reliant on the retrieval process but might involve addition 
self-reflective processes (see also Chua, 2012).  
However, substantial evidence exists that experienced-based cues also 
influence confidence judgements. For example, Robinson et al. (2000) investigated 
the role of vividness as a basis for confidence judgements. In their study participants 
were asked a series of questions about a crime video. For each answer participants 
provided a confidence judgement, and three further estimates of subjective effort, 
vividness, and time taken to answer the questions. Vividness was found to be the best 
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predictor of confidence, showing that people strongly rely on this mnemonic cue 
when generating their confidence judgements. Similarly, Brewer et al. (2005) 
showed that confidence judgements are also based on the completeness of a memory. 
In this study participants were asked to recall sentences and to report a confidence 
judgement assessing whether the sentences they recalled were as originally encoded. 
Participants were found to associate higher confidence to the sentences they judged 
to be recollected completely as, rather than partially or not at all as those they 
originally encoded. A further experience-based cue used as indicator of memory 
accuracy is the ease with which the memory is retrieved. For example, Lindholm et 
al. (2018) interviewed participants about a video and asked them to provide a 
confidence rating for each statement reported. They analysed linguistic indicators of 
retrieval effort such as: hedges (“I guess” or “maybe”), and filler words (“uhm” or 
“you know”) and found that these were negatively correlated with accuracy. Thus, 
when the number of hedges or pauses increased, confidence judgements decreased 
(see also Gustafsson et al., 2019; Kelley & Lindsay, 1993).  
Further evidence that confidence judgements are based at least in part on the 
ease of retrieval can be found in studies that have manipulated the difficulty of the 
retrieval task. Winkielman et al. (1998) asked participants to recall events from their 
childhood with either a difficult task, whereby, they were asked to recall 12 events of 
their childhood, or an easy task where they were asked to recall four events. 
Participants that were given the difficult task judged their childhood memory as less 
complete than those that were given the easy task, presumably because the former 
(but not the latter) experienced retrieval difficulty (see also Belli et al., 1998; Gregg 
et al., 2019; Merckelbach et al., 2001; Schwarz et al., 1991). Similar results were 
found by Kebbell et al. (1996) who manipulated the difficulty of the questions asked 
and found that participants were significantly more confident in their correct answers 
to the easy questions compared to difficult questions – presumably because the 
former were more easily retrieved than the latter. Confidence for incorrect answers to 
easy questions was also higher than confidence for incorrect answers to difficult 
questions, however, crucially, the difference in mean confidence between correct and 
incorrect answers was far greater for easy than difficult questions. This indicates that 
when information come to mind easily confidence judgements better discriminate 
between correct and incorrect answers (see also Wheatcroft et al., 2015).  
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A further theoretical insight into how the ease of retrieval is used to inform 
metacognitive judgements can be found in  Raghubir and Menon’s (2005) model. 
The authors speculated that the subjective difficulty experienced during a retrieval 
task triggers a process whereby the participant attempts to assess the causes of such 
difficulty. Crucially, the model predicts that when the experienced retrieval difficulty 
is not expected, participants can (after discarding other possibilities) attribute this 
difficulty to the quality of their own memory. Raghubir and Menon’s (2005) model 
is particularly important because it underlines the relevance of pre-existing 
expectations in the evaluation of retrieval cues, and potentially suggests that both 
information-based and experience-based cues concur in the formation of 
metacognitive judgements.    
 
Confidence during the interview, what do we know? 
If confidence judgements are dependent upon metacognitive experience 
during memory retrieval, then it is of interest to investigate the role of the 
interviewing techniques, and different ways in which they cue memory. In particular, 
different interviewing techniques are likely to prompt and direct eyewitness retrieval 
in different ways, and therefore differentially affect memory confidence. An attempt 
to understand how eyewitness confidence is influenced by interviewing techniques 
can be found in a study  by Gwyer and Clifford (1997). They interviewed 
participants with either a Cognitive Interview (CI) or a Standard Interview (SI), 
either 48 or 96 hours after they had viewed a live staged event. Confidence was 
measured both before and after the interview. A pre-post confidence difference was 
calculated by subtracting confidence reported before the interview from the 
confidence reported after the interview. The results showed that confidence increased 
after the interview, and that this increase was larger for participants who had 
received the CI. The authors argued that the CI mnemonics could be responsible for 
the increase in confidence via the effect they had on participants’ retrieval 
experience. When given a CI the participants reported many details and a complete 
narrative; this high performance in turn had likely promoted the impression that their 
memory was good. This interpretation is in line with the notion that the experience of 
memory completeness was used as a cue to build the confidence judgements.  
While Gwyer and Clifford (1997) investigated how confidence changed 
depending on the type of interviewing received, Granhag et al. (2004) investigated 
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the effect of different types of interview on confidence and realism. They showed 
participants a video and interviewed them with either a CI or a SI, while a third 
group did not recall the event. After the interview, all participants were given a set of 
45 forced-choice questions to which participants had to provide an answer and an 
associated confidence rating. Confidence for participants who initially had been 
interviewed with either the CI or SI was found to be very similar (68.8%, and 68.1%, 
respectively), and significantly higher than controls (63.6%). Furthermore, 
participants in the CI group (but not those in the SI) were overconfident in their 
memory compared with controls. However, in this study it is difficult to clearly 
isolate the direct effect of the types of interview on confidence considering that both 
confidence and overconfidence were measured on the information recognised during 
the follow-up forced-choice questions and not on the information recalled during the 
interview. As the authors also explain, a reiteration effect might have inflated 
confidence by mean of repeating statements already recalled. To overcome these 
limitations, Allwood et al. (2005) interviewed participants with either a CI or a SI, 
then transcribed and coded the interviews and two weeks later asked participants to 
rate their confidence in each unit of information (each statement) that they had 
provided during the interview. Confidence for participants in both groups was high 
(91% for the CI, and 91.2% for the SI), and statistically similar. Furthermore, 
participants in the two groups were similarly well calibrated when highly confident 
(i.e., 80-100% confidence). Contrary to Granhag et al. (2004), in this study 
participants in the CI showed under-confidence, but only on the information 
associated with lower confidence (0-20%, 20-40%).   
 Thus, the effect of CI and SI on confidence appear to be relatively similar; 
both types of interview are likely to promote realistic (although not perfect) 
confidence judgements, and increase eyewitness confidence in their own memory, 
although this increase is slightly larger for the CI. While the CI notoriously yields 
more information than the SI, its effect on confidence seems to be largely similar to 
that of the SI, perhaps due to the relatively similar structure of the two interviews, 
whereby a free report phase is followed by a questioning phase. An attempt to 
compare the effect that free report and follow-up focused questions have on 
confidence can be found in a study by Allwood et al. (2008). Here, participants were 
shown a video, and a week later they were asked to recall what they had seen in 
response to a free report prompt followed by a set of focused questions. In a 
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subsequent session, the authors coded the response to the free recall and focused 
questions in small units of information (or statements), and asked participants to 
report a confidence rating in each statement. Adult participants (and children) 
showed better realism and lower overconfidence in response to the free report 
invitation compared to focused questions. The authors argued that this difference was 
likely to be due to the higher level of control over memory reporting that participants 
have when they respond to a free recall invitation. Under free report conditions 
participants have control to report information that they were reasonably sure about 
and withhold information that they were less confident about. However, when 
answering focused questions, they exert less control because they are not able to 
control the questions, and thus were more likely to report answers they were less sure 
about (for similar results see also Yarmey & Yarmey, 1997). Somewhat similar 
results were found by Knutsson et al. (2011) who investigated whether memory 
confidence is influenced by requiring participants to expand on their free reported 
narrative with repeated recall requests and probing questions (i.e., TED questions). 
The relevant results for this discussion are those related to the different types of 
question asked. Here, confidence for information reported in response to the probing 
questions was lower than confidence for information reported in response to the free 
recall invitation. This suggests that in response to the probing questions, participants 
were likely reporting details that did not pass the report threshold during the free 
recall, i.e., details that had been withheld during the previous free report phase (see 
also Kontogianni et al., 2020).  
 The literature on eyewitness realism highlights two important considerations, 
(i) confidence judgements relating to information elicited by free recall and probing 
questions are more realistic than confidence judgements relating to information 
elicited by the focused questions and (ii) confidence judgements are higher for 
information reported in response to free report invitations and tend to decrease for 
information reported in answers to follow-up questions (probing and focused). The 
first consideration suggests that confidence judgements might be better predictors of 
accuracy under certain circumstances only (i.e., free recall). A second important 
point of note suggests that confidence might not be constantly held during the 
interview, and that it can change as a function of the types of question asked at 
different stages of the interview, presumably via the effect they have on the retrieval 
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cues (i.e., experience-based cues). This can be problematic because ideally an 
interview should not increase or decrease eyewitness confidence.  
 This PhD will explore these two considerations further. In particular, Study 1 
will be focused on confidence shifts promoted by different types of interview, while 
in Study 2 and Studies 3a and 3b changes in confidence will be investigated in 
relation to the type of question asked. Finally, Study 4 will attempt to identify the 
conditions or circumstances related to the interview in which eyewitness confidence 
remains  stable and a realistic predictor of accuracy.  
 
On the confidence - accuracy relationship  
The notion that confidence is a better predictor of accuracy under certain 
conditions is not new, and it is conceptually similar to the argument - developed in 
the field of eyewitness identification - that confidence is a good predictor of memory 
accuracy when memory is elicited under ideal conditions. For example, researchers 
have suggested that confidence in an identification decision is a relatively reliable 
predictor of accuracy if (and only if) it is elicited under pristine conditions (Brewer 
& Wells, 2006; Palmer et al., 2013; Sauer et al., 2010; Wixted & Wells, 2017; see 
also Wixted et al., 2015). As such, if a confidence judgement is collected as soon as 
possible, before any memory contamination occurs, and by using unbiased lineup 
procedures, then it can be highly reliable and extremely useful for the Criminal 
Justice System. However, while this general proposal is not directly disputed, many 
researchers have questioned whether the pristine conditions can really be met in real 
life (e.g., Berkowitz & Freda, 2018; Loftus & Greespan, 2017; Wade et al., 2018). 
Recently Sauer et al. (2019) underlined that even under controlled, unbiased 
experimental conditions almost 40% of the identification made with very high 
confidence are wrong, this variation in the confidence and accuracy relation is too 
high to safely conclude that confidence is a strong indicator of accuracy. 
 The concept that the relationship between confidence and accuracy is more 
reliable under certain conditions was initially proposed by Deffenbacher (1980) with 
the optimality hypothesis. Deffenbacher argued that when the conditions are not ideal 
for memory processing (e.g., high stress level, suggestive instruction or under longer 
retention intervals) the correlation between confidence and accuracy is more likely to 
be weak, however the correlation between the two variables improves the closer the 
conditions are to ideal (see also Leippe, 1980). The optimality hypothesis is based on 
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the assumption that confidence is a better predictor of accuracy when it is based on 
the direct access to the memory trace. Under ideal conditions the access to the 
memory trace is stronger and therefore confidence judgements are more likely to be 
reliably correlated with memory accuracy (Leippe & Eisenstadt, 2007). Conversely, 
under less ideal conditions confidence judgements are more reliant on the evaluation 
of the retrieval heuristics (e.g., fluency, ease of retrieval, completeness) which are 
often – but not always - valid indicators of accuracy. 
  In light of this, it becomes important to understand under which conditions 
eyewitness confidence judgements are correlated with memory accuracy, or, in 
metacognitive terms, it is important to understand when eyewitnesses are monitoring 
their memory effectively. Under conditions of effective memory monitoring 
eyewitnesses will also be more likely to effectively control the information they 
report by filtering out details that they believe (and are more likely) to be incorrect 
(Koriat & Goldsmiths, 1996; see also Goldsmith, 2015), or by regulating their 
specificity (grain-size). The literature has highlighted several examples of 
circumstances in which monitoring is likely to be poor. For example, when 
participants are asked deceptive questions, designed to trigger answers that are 
incorrect and associated with high confidence (e.g., What is the capital of 
Australia?), then memory monitoring is less effective (see Brewer et al., 2005; 
Brewer & Sampaio, 2011; Koriat & Goldsmiths, 1996). Further evidence of poor 
monitoring can be found in the literature on misinformation and memory 
suggestibility. For example, Loftus et al. (1989) found that participants tended to 
uptake and confidently hold post-event misinformation. Similarly, Howie and 
Roebers (2007) found evidence of poorer calibration for answers to misleading 
questions compared to answers to unbiased questions (see also Bohnam & Gonzalez-
Vallejo, 2009; Tomes & Katz, 2000). Poor monitoring can be induced by 
encouraging memory elaboration, as shown by the literature on the imagination-
inflation effect (e.g., Garry et al., 1996; Thomas & Loftus, 2002), and by repeatedly 
questioning eyewitness about their memories (e.g., Shaw, 1996; Shaw & McClure, 
1996; however, for contrasting findings see Odinot & Wolters, 2006; Odinot et al., 
2012). Finally, memory monitoring and in particular, discrimination - the ability of 
the confidence judgements to distinguish between correct and incorrect answers - has 
been found to decrease over time (e.g., Goldsmith et al., 2005; Shapira & Pansky, 
2019), and in response to difficult questions (Kebbell et al., 1996).  
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 To summarise, evidence has shown that monitoring is prone to error, however 
under conditions in which this process is not impaired, people are able to effectively 
(albeit not perfectly) assess the accuracy of their memory (e.g., Luna & Martin-
Luengo, 2012; Pansky et al., 2005).  
 
Conclusions 
 Eyewitness confidence has a very important role to play within an 
investigative interviewing context because it underpins eyewitness’s memory 
regulation, and thus influences decisions regarding whether to report retrieved 
details, and if so, how to report them. That said, the literature on the basis of 
confidence has shown that confidence judgements are generated within an error-
prone evaluation process, that takes into account both pre-existing knowledge and 
beliefs about one’s own memory abilities, as well as cues generated during the 
retrieval process itself. The assessment of these cues is not always perfect and 
therefore confidence is not always a realistic indicator of accuracy. However, when 
attempting to determine the strength of the relation between confidence and accuracy 
it is important to consider the contextual factors relating to the retrieval attempt.  
 Researchers have investigated conditions under which confidence is less 
likely to be correlated with accuracy, some of which are extremely relevant for the 
investigative interviewing setting. For example, when time elapses between the 
encoding and the interview or when eyewitnesses are presented with misinformation, 
their ability to effectively monitor their memory accuracy is negatively impacted. 
Finally, evidence also suggests that the types of question asked might influence both 
confidence, and the confidence and accuracy relationship, and that eyewitness might 
have both higher confidence and better monitoring regarding the information they 
provide in free report and open questions as compared to focused questions. Based 
on these findings this PhD explores the interviewing conditions that are more likely 









Chapter 3: Changes in Eyewitness Confidence 
 
Introduction 
Although researchers are still debating whether and how eyewitness 
confidence should be used in Court, both researchers and practitioners recognise that 
confidence is an important factor within the legal context. The relevance of 
eyewitness confidence is clearly captured by the cases of miscarriage of justice due 
to eyewitnesses whom confidently made a wrong identification. A compelling 
example can be found in the Thompson vs Cotton case. In 1985 Jennifer Thomson 
identified Ronald Cotton as the person who raped her. Despite at the time of the 
identification she was reported to “think” Cotton was the culprit, during the trail she 
become increasingly confident about her identification. Cotton was convicted largely 
on the base of her testimony and spent over ten years in prison for a crime he did not 
commit. It was only in 1995 – when the DNA testing become available, that Cotton 
was cleared of all charges and released from prison (Thomson-Cannino et al., 2010). 
This case clearly shows that confidence is not a perfect proxy of accuracy and 
confident eyewitnesses can be wrong. Yet, confident eyewitnesses are perceived as 
extremely persuasive, as shown by the surveys and empirical research conducted on 
police, attorneys and jurors (e.g., Brewer & Burke, 2002; Potter & Brewer, 1999). 
However, despite its relevance, the extent to which confidence is influenced by many 
variables at play during an interview is yet to be fully understood. In order to address 
this topic, a systematic review of the literature was conducted with the aim of 
identifying and understanding the factors that can lead to shifts in confidence within 
a recall task. The findings are discussed in relation to which of these factors have 
implications for the interviewing context. 
 
Confidence malleability 
Changes in confidence have been documented in the field of eyewitness 
identification investigating confidence malleability – the tendency that eyewitnesses 
become more or less confident regarding an identification judgement as a 
consequence of certain factors encountered either before or after the identification 
(Wells & Seelau, 1995). For example, Wells and Bradfield (1998) showed that post 
identification confirmatory feedback led to inflated certainty in the accuracy of the 
identification made. Furthermore, it led to the inflated perception of several qualities 
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related to the identification such as, the quality of the view of the culprit, the 
attention paid during encoding, how easily the identification was made, and the 
willingness to testify (for similar results see also Bradfield et al., 2002; Greenspan & 
Loftus, 2020). Similar, although somewhat smaller, effects have been found for 
disconfirming feedback which tends to deflate confidence (Luus & Wells, 1994; 
Steblay et al., 2014; Wells & Bradfield, 1998). Factors related to the administration 
of the lineup can also influence confidence. For example, leading eyewitness to think 
that the culprit is in the lineup when they are not, can inflate confidence in a 
misidentification, because the eyewitness will be more likely to make the 
identification, and to choose the person in the lineup that looks most familiar, albeit 
innocent (Leippe et al., 2009; Semmler et al., 2004; Steblay, 1997). 
 The effect of feedback on eyewitness confidence has also been found to 
influence memory recollection. For example, Leippe et al. (2006) found that 
eyewitnesses who received negative feedback about their memory report expressed 
lowered accuracy in their recollection compared to controls who did not receive the 
feedback (see also Lida et al., 2020). More recently, Gurney et al. (2014) 
investigated whether more subtle non-verbal feedback can lead to shifts in 
confidence. After watching a video of a crime, participants answered questions 
during which the interviewer either nodded (positive feedback) or shook their head 
(negative feedback). Participants who received the positive feedback were more 
confident in their answers than those who received the negative feedback, and the 
difference between the groups were more pronounced when participants reported to 
have noticed the head movement.  
Eyewitness confidence is clearly strongly affected by social factors such as 
the administrator’s feedback, and by factors related to information gathering 
procedures, such as instructions administered in identification lineups. However, 
confidence can shift even without external influence. For example, Granhag et al. 
(2000) found evidence that eyewitness confidence can change in relation to repeated 
attempts to (1) judge the confidence in a memory previously reported, and (2) 
reiterate confidence judgements previously reported. In their study, participants 
answered questions and reported accompanying confidence judgements relating to 
the accuracy of each answer given. When asked to provide a new confidence 
judgement regarding the answers they had given a week before, participants reported 
deflated confidence on correct answers. Participants who were asked to remember 
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the confidence judgments given a week before reported inflated confidence for both 
correct and incorrect answers (for similar results see also Granhag, 1997). In a 
previous study, Shaw and McClure (1996) found that when participants attempt to 
answer the same questions repeatedly, confidence increased (see also Shaw, 1996; 
for contrasting findings see Odinot & Wolters, 2006; Odinot et al., 2009). Thus, 
despite differing findings regarding the direction of the shift in confidence, these 
studies collectively show that confidence judgements regarding the accuracy of one’s 
own memory are not stable. 
 
Generalisability of findings 
Clearly, a relatively large body of evidence has shown that confidence is 
malleable. The majority of this research has focused on the relationship between 
confidence and accuracy in recognition tasks, such as eyewitness identification. 
There are grounds to suggest that the findings from these studies might not be 
generalisable to other eyewitness tasks, such as memory recall in an investigative 
interview. First, memory for faces is often considered unique and, at least to some 
extent, dissociated from memory for non-face stimuli (e.g., Kanwisher & Yovel, 
2006). Furthermore, the retrieval process involved in recognition tasks compared to 
that involved in recollection tasks can yield slightly different cues for confidence, 
because the former is likely to be driven by familiarity while the latter requires an 
intentional, more elaborated memory search. Here, several cues such as the retrieval 
effort or ease of retrieval, are more likely to be available during recollection tasks 
than recognition tasks (Robinson & Johnson, 1996; Robinson et al., 1997; see also 
Robinson et al., 2000). If the cues that underpin confidence judgements in 
recollection and recognition memory are different, then it is also possible that 
confidence for these two types of memory is affected to a different extent by any 
variable of influence.  
Evidence that internal cues mediate confidence shifts caused by feedback is 
reported by Semmler and Brewer (2006) who found that when participants had good 
internal evidence that their identification was correct (quicker and more fluent 
identification), then ‘confirming feedback’ led to smaller confidence alteration 
compared with disconfirming feedback. In contrast, when the internal evidence for 
the identification decision was poor (slower and less fluent identification), then 
‘confirming feedback’ caused a larger confidence alteration than ‘disconfirming 
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feedback’. Thus, in this study fluency might have mediated the extent to which 
confidence was altered by the external feedback.  
A second pitfall within the available literature is that the influence of 
different factors on confidence shifts is often investigated using between-subjects 
design, and therefore overlooks potential individual differences. Evidence of 
individual differences in relation to confidence judgements has been documented in 
the literature (e.g., Pallier et al., 2002; Soll, 1996; see also Thompson & Mason, 
1996). More broadly, the large variability between confidence and accuracy 
relationship often found in the literature suggests that individuals vary in the way 
they monitor and control their memory (e.g., Deffenbacher et al., 1981; Thompson & 
Mason, 1996) and so these should also be considered. 
 
The present review of the literature on confidence shifts 
The goal of this systematic review is to identify and synthesise findings from 
studies that have examined confidence shifts within an episodic recall task, so that 
implications can be drawn for understanding the role of confidence on performance 
within an investigative interview. Thus, studies examining shifts in confidence were 
excluded if they featured a recognition memory task such as multiple - choice 
questions or yes/no questions, or a facial identification task. Studies were included if 
(a) they used to-be-remembered stimuli such as events or episodes, which are of a 
similar complexity to crimes or wrongdoings that eyewitnesses are asked to recall 
during an interview, and (b) they featured a recall test. Furthermore, we only 
included studies that analysed confidence within-subjects. Finally, we embrace a 
broad perspective in the analysis of confidence shifts compared with the literature on 
confidence malleability. While the latter often aims to identify the factors that lead to 
inflated or deflated retrospective confidence and do not affect accuracy, we analysed 
shifts in confidence independently from changes in memory accuracy. This is 
because we do not aim to analyse the reliability of confidence judgements (i.e., the 
confidence-accuracy relation) but rather to understand if, and under which 
conditions, the impression of accuracy changes. We are therefore able to include in 







The search was conducted on two electronic databases: Web of Science (Web 
of Knowledge) and PsycInfo. The first is an interdisciplinary database and the second 
is primarily focused on psychology and related disciplines, therefore a combination 
of both was likely necessary to access the literature of interest. A year range was 
introduced which identified studies published between 1990 to 2019 (June), whereby 
the former date refers to the publication year of the framework of metamemory 
developed by Nelson and Narens (1990), while the latter is the year I first conducted 
the search. The search strategy constituted of three keywords strings which identified 
studies focused on (i) a metacognitive judgement, (ii) which was aimed to assess the 
accuracy of a memory, (iii) and either changed or remained stable. In order to 
maximise the number of included studies at this stage, the strings were all searched 
In Topic. 
The first string constituted the following keywords: (confidence NEAR/4 
memor*) OR “confidence/accuracy” OR "retrospective confidence" OR (confidence 
NEAR/4 judg$ment*) OR (metacognit* NEAR/4 judg$ment*) OR (memor* 
NEAR/4 judg$ment*) OR (metamemor* NEAR/4 judg$ment*) OR "judg$ment* of 
learning". The Wildcard used were the asterisk (*), which includes the truncation, for 
example the keyword “memor*” finds both “memory” and “memorial”. The second 
Wildcard used was the dollar ($) which finds words that can be spelled in different 
ways, for example “judg$ment” finds studies including both the word “judgement” 
and “judgment”. I also used the Proximity operators such as “confidence NEAR/4 
memor*”, in this example NEAR/4 finds the studies where the words “confidence” 
and “memory” are separated by a maximum of 4 words. Quotation marks were used 
to search for exact words sequence, for example "retrospective confidence" looks for 
studies containing this exact words-string. The two databases adopt similar Wildcard 
and Proximity operators but use different syntaxes, therefore this was adapted 
accordingly to the database guidelines.  
In the first string the keywords “(confidence NEAR/4 memor*)”, 
“confidence/accuracy”, "retrospective confidence", and ‘(confidence NEAR/4 
judg$ment*)’ were included to target studies on memory confidence. I predicted that 
relevant studies might have used more general labels, hence I also included the 
keywords “(metacognit* NEAR/4 judg$ment*)”, “(memor* NEAR/4 judg$ment*)”, 
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“(metamemor* NEAR/4 judg$ment*)”. Finally, I assumed that relevant studies 
might have compared judgements of learning (i.e., a judgment on the likelihood to 
remember a target memory) to retrospective memory, therefore the keyword 
"judg$ment* of learning" was also added.   
The second string included the keywords (accura* OR correct*) AND 
memor*, these narrowed down the studies yielded by the first string and included 
only those focused on the judgements in memory accuracy. For example, this string 
excluded articles focused (exclusively) on judgements on vividness, or frequency 
judgements (i.e., a judgement on the number of correct answers given on a test). 
 Finally, the third string narrowed down the studies yielded by the two 
previous strings to those including either a reference to a change, or variation, or a 
lack of change (i.e., stability). The keywords used were: (stab* OR unchang* OR 
invariat* OR chang* OR malleab* OR inflat* OR retrospect* OR prospect* OR 
altera* OR variat* OR increas* OR decreas* OR shift* OR (repeat* recall*) OR 
(repeat* retriev*) OR (repeat* test*) or retell* OR (pre test* AND post test*) OR 
(pre recall* AND post recall*) OR (pre retriev* AND post retriev*) OR (before 
recall* AND after recall*) OR (before retriev* AND after retriev*) OR (before test* 
AND after test*) OR “repeated measure*” OR “within subject*”). We were 
particularly interested in studies that had measured confidence on two occasions, 
therefore we added keywords such as “repeat* recall*”, “repeat* retriev*”, and “pre 
recall* AND post recall*”. The last two keywords included were “repeated 
measure*” and “within subject*” which we expected to target studies that 
manipulated confidence within participants.  
  
Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
In order for a study to be included, five criteria had to be met: (1) the 
keyword confidence, or judgement of learning, or metacognitive judgement or a 
synonym had to be mentioned within the abstract; (2) the judgement measured had to 
relate to memory accuracy; (3) the judgement on the accuracy of the same memory 
had to be measured at least twice using a within participants design; (4) the memory 
had to be recalled and not recognised, and finally (5) the to-be-remembered memory 
had to be an episode or event.  
 The aim of the review was to quantify the malleability of confidence, 
therefore only experimental articles were considered. Non-experimental papers, 
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qualitative studies, book chapters and review papers were excluded. Furthermore, 
considering that this review is not focused on atypical cognitive functioning, I also 
excluded studies on mental health population. Last, studies were excluded if they 
were not published in English. 
  
Screening and selection 
The search yielded 827 results, of which 480 were from Web of Science, 
while the remaining studies were from PsycInfo. The selection strategy that followed 
was conducted in four stages. At each stage, studies that were not clearly excluded 
were eligible for the following selection stage.  
  The initial sifting stage was carried out in Zotero, which identified the 
duplicates, which were then excluded. Following this, the remaining studies were 
copied into an Excel file for the title screening stage. Studies that were clearly off-
topic, for example studies on non-human animals, or studies on non-human memory 
or computer memory, were excluded.  
Following this, the abstracts of the remaining studies were analysed. Here the 
reasons for exclusion depended on the information available in the abstract, which 
varied largely. Indicatively at this stage I excluded: (i) studies that did not mention 
confidence or a metacognitive judgement, (ii) those that clearly did not measure 
confidence on memory accuracy, (iii) studies featuring a clinical sample or mental 
health population, (iii) studies that clearly stated to have tested memory with a 
recognition test, such as an identification task or using multiple - choice questions, 
(iv) or to have used study material that did not meet Criterion 5, such as: word pairs, 
words lists, geometric or simple shapes, and (v) studies that had clearly measured 
confidence only on one occasion.  
The remaining studies were then progressed to the full text reading stage. At 
this stage I scrutinised the method and result sections, and excluded studies that did 
not fully meet the inclusion criteria. In the last stage, I analysed the reference lists 




































Figure 3.1. PRISMA chart illustrating the four stages.  
 
Results  
The search yielded 24 articles, comprising a total of 26 eligible studies. About 50% 
(n = 13) were in the field of on eyewitness memory, 42% (n = 11) were in the field of 
Flashbulb Memory (FBM), and 8% (n = 2) in the field of autobiographical memory. 
Although there is substantial overlap between the FBM and autobiographical 
memory, the former investigates personal memories related to a relevant public 
event, while the latter focuses on personal memories not necessarily linked to any 
public event.  
All the studies tested adult participants; of these, 80% (n = 21) reported to 
have tested university/college students, two studies included students as young as 16 
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changes in confidence (n = 9) 
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(Kraha et al., 2014; Gwyer & Clifford, 1997), while two studies included adults older 
than 60 (Holland & Kensinger, 2012; Wolters & Goudsmit, 2005). The latter were 
both in the field of FBM.  
 
Memory related variables 
Type of to-be-remembered event 
The majority of the studies on eyewitness memory used short videos of crime 
related events in the encoding phase. The content (not always specified) included 
kidnapping, car accidents, and theft. Exceptions to the use of video as the to-be-
remembered material included live staged events (Gwyer & Clifford, 1997; 
Winningham & Weaver, 2000), a photo of a crime (Sharps et al., 2012), and a 
description of a co-participant (Ebbesen & Rienick, 1998).  
 The studies on FBM asked participants to remember details of the 
circumstances in which they first heard about an extraordinary real-life event (e.g., 
the September 11th terrorist attack, Osama Bin Laden’s assassination, Karol 
Wojtyła’s death, or an important sports event). These details are often referred to as 
canonical or autobiographical. Beside the canonical FBM, in some studies 
participants are also asked to remember factual memories about the event, often 
referred to as event memories (Coluccia et al., 2010, studies 1 and 2; Hirst et al., 
2015; Talarico & Moore, 2012; Wolters & Goudsmit, 2005). For example, Wolters 
and Goudsmit (2005) asked participants how many planes were involved in the 
September 11th terrorist attack. Four studies compared FBM to everyday memory 
(Kraha et al., 2014; Talarico & Rubin, 2003; 2007; Weaver, 1993).  
Similar to the studies on FBM, the studies on autobiographical memory did 
not present to-be-remembered material, rather, participants were asked to recall 
personal events. An exception was Holland and Kensinger’s (2012) study, where 
participants were asked to report their memory for a presidential election.  
 
Type of memory test 
As specified in the inclusion criteria (criterion 5), all studies included a 
retrieval test. Across studies the full lists of questions asked were rarely available, 
therefore the following descriptions are based on the information provided in the 
method sections. Five studies on eyewitness memory included closed questions 
requiring short answers (i.e., 5Wh) (Buratti & Allwood 2012; 2013; Michael & 
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Garry 2016, study 1; 2019, study 2; Turtle & Yuille 1994, study 1). Four studies used 
a mixture of 5Wh and TED questions or open prompts (Ebbesen & Rienick, 1998; 
Pezdek et al., 2007, study 1 and 2; Winningham & Weaver, 2000). The remaining 
studies adopted a more complex, interview-like memory test. For example, Odinot 
and Wolters (2006), and Odinot et al. (2012) used a general invitation followed by 
open questions (i.e., TED questions), while Sharps et al. (2012) used a free invitation 
followed by three requests to recall additional information. Gwyer and Clifford 
(1997) adopted the full CI (including the four mnemonics). 
 Across the studies on FBM, the majority reported to have used surveys which 
included a predominance of 5Wh questions. However, some authors (i.e., Kraha et 
al., 2014; Talarico & Rubin, 2003; 2007) refer to these as open-ended questions, 
therefore for these studies I was unable to clearly identify the type of test used. 
Finally, Weaver (1993), and Weaver and Krug (2004) also asked a mixture of 5Wh 
and TED type of prompt.  
 Regarding the studies on autobiographical memory, Holland and Kensinger 
(2012) used 5Wh questions, while Stone et al. (2013) used a free recall invitation.  
 
Confidence related variables 
Type of question 
As specified in the inclusion criteria (criterion 2), all studies must have 
elicited a confidence or metacognitive judgment relating to memory accuracy. The 
way in which confidence judgements were solicited varied largely. In the studies on 
eyewitness memory, accuracy or correctness was often mentioned in the question 
eliciting the judgement (e.g., Odinot & Wolters, 2006; Pezdek et al., 2007). While 
these questions vary in clarity, they all ask participants to report a retrospective 
judgement to assess an answer given. An exception is Gwyer and Clifford (1997) 
who asked participants to report both a retrospective confidence judgement and a 
prospective judgement (i.e., “how confident are you that you will be able to answer 
correctly the questions that I am about to ask you”, p. 126).  
 Similarly, the studies on FBMs largely used non-specific questions where 
participants were asked to rate confidence or their level of certainty in their 
recollection. For example, Stone et al. (2013) used a specific retrospective judgment 
where participants were asked how confident they were that “they were remembering 
each event as it originally occurred” (p. 252). A slight variation of this can be found 
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in the study by Weaver and Krug (2004), where participants were asked how 
confident they were that they answered the question correctly. Some, studies on 
FBM used composite measures of confidence by pulling together confidence ratings 
elicited by two questions. For example, Kraha et al. (2014) collapsed the ratings from 
two questions asking about (1) the belief that the memory participants had, really 
occurred the way they remembered it, and (2) if they could be persuaded that their 
memory was wrong (see also Talarico & Rubin, 2003; 2007). While, Hirst et al. 
(2015) asked half of the participants how confident they were in their recollection (a 
retrospective judgement), and the other half how well they thought they would 
remember the event in ten years (a prospective judgement), however they only 
reported results for the sample that answered retrospective judgements. A 
prospective judgement was also used by Holland and Kensinger (2012) who asked 
participants how well they thought they would remember the event in six months.  
 
Granularity of the judgement.  
Considering the variety of memory test used across the studies, it is important 
to also analyse the granularity or level of the detail of the memory participants were 
required to assess with each judgement. This is because confidence judgement asked 
at a question level can be different from confidence judgement on the overall 
recollection of a complex event. Here, the former is a much more precise estimate of 
accuracy than the latter, because it assesses the correctness of a smaller unit. 
 All the studies using closed or 5Wh questions asked for a confidence 
judgment after each answer, with the exception of Kraha et al. (2014), Talarico and 
Moore (2012), and Talarico and Rubin (2003; 2007), who collected retrospective 
confidence judgements in the recalled memory as a whole, and Holland and 
Kensinger (2012) who collected a prospective judgement in the memory as a whole.  
Michael and Garry (2016, study 1; 2019, study 2) asked for confidence ratings at 
both levels; after each question and in the memory as a whole.  
 The studies that adopted TED questions or open invitations generally 
collected confidence at the question level without clarifying which part of the answer 
given was to be assessed by the judgement. For example, Weaver (1993) asked 
participants “describe in as much detail as possible how you heard about the news of 
the beginning of the bombing of Iraq” (p. 41), and then asked them to report a 
confidence judgement in the whole answer given. An attempt to collect precise 
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confidence judgements on answers to open questions can be found in studies by 
Odinot and Wolters (2006), and Odinot et al. (2012), where participants were asked 
to write their answers in small units of information and were then asked a confidence 
judgement for each statement (e.g., ‘question; ‘What did the dog do when it came out 
of the water?’ answer; ‘it climbed on the bank’; ‘it shook off the water’; ‘it ran to his 
boss’’, Odinot & Wolters 2006, p. 977). A similar methodology is used by Turtle and 
Yuille (1994, study 1), whereby participants were asked to report confidence ratings 
in both statements given in the written CI, and in their answers to ten closed 
questions about forensically relevant elements (however insufficient information was 
reported on the former measure, therefore we only analysed the latter). Finally, 
Gwyer and Clifford (1997) asked for global prospective and retrospective confidence 
judgements.  
 
Confidence scale  
The majority of the studies collected confidence judgements using a five or 
seven point Likert scale. However, Weaver (1993), and Gwyer and Clifford (1997) 
used a three point scale and a ten point scale, respectively. The remaining studies 
used a confidence scale ranging from 0% to 100%.  
 
Experimental manipulations and factors analysed  
The descriptive characteristics of the target memory and the confidence 
judgment outlined above provide an insight into the similarities and differences 
between the studies. However, of central importance for this review is an 
examination of the variables that led to either shifts in confidence or, alternatively, to 
confidence stability. Due to the focus on confidence measured within-subject, in this 
section I will only consider factors for which the effect has been investigated across 
confidence measurement times.   
Regardless of whether studies focus on FBMs, autobiographical memory, or 
eyewitness memory, there is an observable consistency in the methodology applied, 
whereby participants are given a largely similar memory test on several occasions 
and at different time intervals. Despite this similarity, these studies differ with 
regards to whether the topic of interest is on shifts in confidence in relation to time 
lags (i.e., the time elapsed between recall tests), or whether the focus is on shifts in 
confidence in relation to repeated recall attempts.  
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All the studies on FBM and one study on autobiographical memory (Holland 
& Kensinger, 2012) focused on confidence shifts across time lags. The length of 
time-lag varied between studies but, in general, the studies adopted relatively wide 
time intervals. The narrowest time interval was found in Wolter and Goudsmit’s 
(2005) study where participants were asked to recall the FBM twice; two weeks 
after, and again two months after, the target event was encoded. The longest time lag 
was found in the study by Hirst et al. (2015) that requested participants to complete a 
survey about the FBM event on five occasions, up until 119 months after the event 
was encoded.  
In the FBM studies, all the remaining manipulations or factors which effect 
was measured on confidence shifts were (i) types of memory, for example, Coluccia 
et al. (2010) investigated confidence shifts in autobiographical FBM versus event 
memory; while Kraha et al. (2014); Talarico and Rubin (2003; 2007) and Weaver 
(1993) investigated confidence shifts in relation to FBM versus everyday memories. 
In addition, Ferre Romeu (2006) measured changes in confidence in relation to core 
(or canonical, e.g., when they heard about the news, where were they at the time, 
what were they doing) versus peripheral details (e.g., the clothing they were wearing 
when they heard about the news, what was their first thought, and what they did 
immediately afterward hearing the news). Other factors include (ii) number of recall 
attempts in Kraha et al. (2014) who reported results for participants that completed 
the survey two or three times; (iii) emotional valence analysed in Kraha et al. (2014) 
who studied the impact of a positive event on confidence shifts, and in Stone et al. 
(2013) who analysed confidence shifts for positive versus negative events. While 
Holland and Kensinger (2012) investigated shifts in confidence for an event 
perceived by participants as either positive, negative or neutral; (iv) residency was 
investigated by Hirst et al. (2015) that reported mean confidence for memories about 
the September 11th  terrorist attack for participants who resided in New York versus 
those who resided elsewhere in North America (although no statistical comparison 
was reported on the means); (v) social group was manipulated in Talarico and Moore 
(2012) which investigated shifts in confidence in the memory for a sport event in two 
rival fan groups; (vi) age, was investigated in Holland and Kensinger (2012) how 
compared young, middle aged, and elderly, and (vii) expectation, investigated by 
Coluccia et al. (2010) who measured shifts in confidence for both surprising and 
expected FBMs. A final variable manipulated was (viii) selective retrieval in Stone et 
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al. (2013), here participants were asked to recall some memories but not others and 
confidence was measured for both practised and unpractised memories before and 
after the practice session.  
Where confidence shifts across repeated retrieval attempts was of interest, 
most studies were in the field of eyewitness memory, presumably because witnesses 
are often interviewed on multiple occasions. For example, Winningham and Weaver 
(2000) asked participants to recall a staged event on five separate occasions, each 
time with a one-week interval between recall attempts, (see also Turtle & Yuille, 
1994, study 1). The method used by Sharps et al. (2012) differed slightly in that there 
was no time delay between tests, instead participants first recalled the encoded event 
in response to a free-recall prompt, and then immediately after responded to three 
follow-up invitations to report additional information. While, Pezdek et al. (2007) 
manipulated the number of presentations of questions within the same recall attempt, 
here all participants were presented with three unanswerable questions once versus 
on three occasions (study 2). 
Three further studies investigated confidence shifts as a function of repeated 
recall and (i) retention interval, i.e., the time elapsed between the encoding phase and 
the initial recall attempt. For example, Odinot and Wolters (2006) and Odinot et al. 
(2012), interviewed groups of participants at different retention intervals (one week 
or three weeks after encoding) and on different occasions (on two or three 
occasions). Similarly, Ebbesen and Rienick (1998) asked groups of participants to 
recall attributes of an unfamiliar co-participant (e.g., ethnicity, eye colour, hair 
colour) at different retention intervals (immediately, one day, one week or 28 days 
after encoding) and on different occasions (on two or four occasions).  
The effect of (iii) type of test on changes in confidence was investigated in 
several eyewitness memory studies. In particular, Pezdek et al. (2007) asked 
participants both answerable and unanswerable questions on two separate occasions, 
while Michael and Garry (2016, study 1; 2019, study 2) investigated shifts in 
confidence in relation to either difficult or easy questions. The type of test was also 
manipulated in Gwyer and Clifford’s (1997) study, whereby participants were 
interviewed with either a CI or a SI.  
The remaining factors and manipulations measured in the eyewitness memory 
studies related to the type of test instruction given to participants. For example, 
Winningham and Weaver (2000) manipulated the (iv) retrieval instruction, whereby 
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participants were either pressured to report everything they could remember 
(pressure group), or not pressured and instead instructed to report only the 
information they were absolutely sure about (control group). While, Pezdek et al. 
(2007) asked participants in the initial recall test to either answer all the questions 
(forced guess group) or to volunteer their answers if they chose to do so (volunteer 
guess group). Buratti and Allwood (2012; 2013) investigated the instruction to 
improve realism. In both studies participants completed a confidence and an 
adjustment phase (a further extra adjustment phase was added in Buratti and 
Allwood, 2013). In the confidence phase, participants answered all the questions 
about the event and provided confidence judgements in the accuracy of their 
answers. In the adjustment (and extra adjustment) phase they were given the chance 
to modify their judgements in order to achieve maximum realism. Furthermore, 
additional metacognitive prompts and advice on how to improve the realism of the 
confidence judgements were manipulated. In the former participants were asked to 
either rate the ease with which they recalled their answers or to state if their 
remembered or knew the answer given (Buratti & Allwood, 2012). While in the latter 
participants were advised to improve realism by either decreasing confidence in the 
answers they thought were incorrect and increasing confidence in the answers they 
thought were correct, or by taking into account that “remembered” answers are 
generally accompanied by higher realism than “known” answers (Buratti & Allwood, 
2013). 
  
Changes in confidence and discussion 
Shifts and stability in Flashbulb and everyday memory 
All the studies that investigated confidence on FBMs report that these are 
generally associated with very high confidence. Out of the studies that investigated 
time lags, those that analysed the average confidence ratings associated with the 
canonical questions (e.g., what was the source of the news, where were they when 
they heard the news, whether other people were there and what they were doing) 
often reported confidence stability (Hirst et al., 2015; Talarico & Rubin, 2003; 2007; 
Wolters & Goudsmit, 2005). Partial evidence of confidence stability was reported by 
Weaver and Krug (2004) who analysed mean confidence ratings at the question level 
and found that confidence was generally stable. However, confidence was found to 
decrease in relation to two questions asking respectively about the clothing worn and 
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the first thought participants had when they first heard about the event. Ferre Romeu 
(2006) found decreased confidence across all questions. However, the magnitude of 
the decrease was different depending on the type of memory; in particular confidence 
decreased more for peripheral details than core details (for somewhat different results 
about similar questions see Weaver, 1993). Decreased confidence for FBMs as a 
function of time lags was also reported by Talarico and Moore (2012) who asked 
participants canonical questions and measured confidence about the overall memory 
rather than at questions level. Similar results were found by Kruha et al. (2014) who 
investigated an event not found to lead to the formation of a prototypical FBM, hence 
showing that confidence for non FBMs is likely to decrease over time. In line with 
the latter result, the studies that manipulated the type of memory reported that 
confidence for everyday memories decreased more over time than confidence for 
FBMs (Talarico & Rubin, 2003; 2007; Weaver, 1993). An exception was found by 
Coluccia et al. (2010) who reported evidence that confidence in both FBM and event 
memory followed a quadratic trend, whereby it decreased after five months and 
increased after one year.  
Further factors analysed in the literature of FBM were the number of recall 
attempts, social groups, and expectation, of which none were found to have a 
statistically significant effect on shifts in confidence (Coluccia et al., 2010; Kruha et 
al., 2014; Talarico & Moore, 2012). Less clear conclusions can be made regarding 
emotional valence, age and residency. An examination of the mean confidence 
reported by Holland and Kensinger (2012) shows a decrease in confidence for 
participants that reported positive, negative and neutral emotions regarding the event, 
and this decrease was slightly more pronounced in the middle age group compared 
with the young and older group. However, clear conclusions cannot be made because 
the authors did not report information about the statistical comparisons between these 
means. While in Hirst et al. (2015) participants that lived in New York reported 
similar shits in confidence that those that lived in other cities in North America; 
however, no clear conclusion can be made because statistical comparisons between 
the means were not reported. Finally, Stone et al. (2013) found a significant 
interaction of emotional valence, retrieval practice and recall time, whereby non-
practiced positive memories (but not non-practiced negative memories) were held 
less confidently after the practice session than before the practice session.  
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In summary, the research on FBM seems to report that long time intervals are 
likely to lead to decreased confidence for everyday or personal memories. However, 
the evidence regarding shifts in confidence for FBMs is less consistent; while some 
studies show that confidence remains stable over long periods of time, other find that 
confidence tends to decrease. The studies that have measured confidence at the 
‘question level’ provide some insight into the specific aspects of the FBMs that are 
more likely to be associated with decreased confidence. In particular, confidence for 
peripheral details, such as the clothing worn and/or the first thought at the time, was 
more consistently found to decrease. On the contrary, confidence for the core 
(canonical) details related to the circumstances in which the participants heard about 
the news was more consistently (albeit not always) found to remain stable. An 
examination of memory performance showed that core details are more consistently 
remembered than peripheral details, which could explain why confidence for the 
former type of details tends to decrease less (Ferre Romeu, 2006). However, the 
difference between the decrease in confidence for core and peripheral details could 
also be explained in terms of the retrieval cues that underpin confidence, such as the 
ease of retrieval (e.g., Kelley & Lindsay, 1993). It is possible that peripheral details 
become more difficult to retrieve over time compared to core details, perhaps 
because the former are rehearsed less frequently than the latter (for a discussion on 
the relation between rehearsal and confidence for FBMs see Ferre Romeu, 2006; 
Talarico & Moore, 2012). The higher increase in retrieval difficulty over time for 
peripheral details compared with core details could in turn lead to a larger decrease 
in confidence for the former compared with the latter type of details. 
The cues associated with the retrieval of FBMs can also explain the 
consistent finding that confidence for canonical details tends to remain very high 
after a long delay. FBMs are by definition vivid memories (Brown & Kulik, 1977), 
and vividness is an important cue for the formation of confidence judgements 
(Robinson et al., 2000). Research has showed that the vividness with which FBMs 
are retrieved tends to remain high even after a long delay (e.g., Talarico & Moore, 
2012; Ferre Romeu, 2006), which could in turn explain why FBMs remain associated 
with high confidence. The high confidence associated with FBMs could also be 
explained in terms of ease of retrieval. FBMs are related to shocking, salient, and 
unique events that are more likely to stand out in the array of memories that people 
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hold, and it is possible that they remain particularly easy to retrieve even after very 
long period of time.  
 
Shifts and stability in eyewitness memory 
As with the literature on shifts and stability in FBM and everyday memory, 
the literature that investigated the effect of repeated recall attempts and retention 
interval on confidence in eyewitness memory presents some contrasting findings. For 
example, Turtle and Yuille (1994, study 1) stated that repeated recollections of the 
same information did not detect potential changes in confidence (however, in the 
latter study no statistical tests are reported to support this comparison). Furthermore, 
Ebbesen and Rienick (1998) found that confidence (and accuracy) did not change 
significantly between the initial and last recall attempt and this was independent of 
the retention interval. More recently, Winningham and Weaver (2000) also found 
confidence stability in relation to repeated recall attempts. Similar findings are 
reported by Odinot and Wolters (2006) and Odinot et al. (2012), who found 
confidence (and accuracy) to remain stable over repeated recall tests, independently 
of the retention interval. Confidence for correct answers was also found to remain 
stable across recall attempts, but inflated confidence for repeatedly reported errors 
was found in the longer retention interval group (3 weeks) in Odinot and Wolters 
(2006). However, the latter result was not replicated in Odinot et al. (2012).  
In stark contrast are findings from Sharps et al.’s (2012) study, who found a 
decrease in confidence at each attempt to recall further information. While, Pezdek et 
al. (2007) found a non-significant main effect of recall time on confidence (this was 
significant in study 2), a main effect of type of question (type of test) and a 
significant interaction between recall time and type of question. Here, the interaction 
revealed that the direction of the change in confidence depended on the type of test. 
In particular, confidence for repeatedly reported correct answers to answerable 
questions decreased over time, while confidence for repeatedly reported guessed 
answers to unanswerable questions increased over time (similar findings were found 
in study 2).  
Evidence that the type of test can lead to changes in confidence is also 
reported by Gwyer and Clifford (1997) who found a slight increase in confidence 
after the interviews, with the participants in the CI group reporting higher confidence 
increase than those in the SI (although the statistical significance of these shifts was 
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not reported). Another example is provided by Michael and Garry (2016, study 1; 
2019, study 2), who showed that the difficulty of the test influenced changes in 
confidence. Here, a comparison between mean confidence in answer to the initial 
question of the test and confidence in the whole memory reported after the test 
showed that confidence decreased when the initial question was easy and increased 
when the initial question was difficult.  
Some of the studies focusing on confidence in eyewitness memory examined 
retrieval instruction. Here, the type of retrieval instruction was not found to affect 
confidence changes, as showed by the lack of interaction between recall time and (i) 
the ‘pressure instruction’ in the study by Winningham and Weaver (2000), or (ii) the 
‘forced/voluntary guess instruction’ in the study by Pezdek et al. (2007). 
Furthermore, in the latter study, the manipulation relating to the number of 
presentations did not interact with recall time, showing no effect on shifts in 
confidence. While Buratti and Allwood (2012; 2013) showed that the instruction to 
improve realism strongly influenced confidence shifts. In both studies participants 
tended to express lower confidence in the incorrect answers and not to change their 
confidence for correct answers, in the adjustment phase (but not in the extra 
adjustment phase in Buratti and Allwood, 2013), and were therefore able to improve 
their realism. Whereas, the additional manipulations (i.e., metacognitive prompts and 
the advice on how to improve realism) did not affect this adjustment significantly. 
Overall, the studies on eyewitness memory seem to provide relatively 
convergent evidence that repeated recall attempts at different retention intervals and 
at time delays of at least one day, are not likely to lead to statistically significant 
changes in confidence. Whereas, repeated attempts to recall further information 
during the same test is likely to lead to decreased confidence. This pattern of results 
suggests that repeatedly asking participants to report additional information 
compared to asking them to recall the target event on multiple occasions might 
trigger different retrieval experiences that in turn could lead to the observed results. 
It is possible that when participants are asked to report details in addition to those 
they volunteered in the initial free recall phase, they are more likely to report details 
associated with higher retrieval difficulty compared to when they are asked to recall 
their memory on multiple occasions.  
For example, Sharps et al. (2012) presented participants with three invitations 
to report any additional information they could remember. Each request might have 
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increasingly pressured participants to either report details that initially did not pass 
the report threshold and were selected to be withheld, or to search for details that 
were not initially accessed. In the first instance the initially withheld details were 
likely to be associated with low retrieval fluency and therefore low confidence, while 
in the second instance memory search might have triggered details that were 
increasingly more difficult to access and therefore likely to be associated with low 
confidence. On the contrary, when participants were presented with a similar test and 
reported their memory on several occasions, (e.g., Ebbesen & Rienick, 1998; Odinot 
& Wolters, 2006; Odinot et al., 2012), they were less likely to report details 
associated with low retrieval fluency and less likely to search for details difficult to 
access. Thus, in these studies participants did not show decreased confidence. This 
difference is important and suggests that pressuring participants for further 
information might lead to confidence decline, while repeatedly interviewing 
participants about their memories might only have a trivial impact on memory 
confidence.  
The systematic review also suggests that confidence seems to change in both 
directions in relation to the type of test. Complex interview protocols, such as the CI 
and the SI, seem to lead to increased confidence, however the magnitude of such 
increase in unclear (Gwyer & Clifford, 1997). Furthermore, while answerable 
questions can seemingly decrease confidence when the same correct answer is 
repeatedly reported, unanswerable questions are likely to cause confidence inflation 
when incorrect answers are repeatedly reported (Pezdek et al., 2007). While the latter 
result implies that suggestible questions are likely to lead to confidence inflation, the 
former result is not in line with the general findings reported above; i.e., confidence 
remains relatively stable across repeated recall attempts. One possibility, although 
speculative in nature, is that the decrease in confidence for repeatedly reported 
correct answers found by Pezdek et al. (2007) was due to the interposition of the 
suggestive questions in the retrieval test. It is possible that suggesting details that 
participants had never encoded might have promoted the impression that their 
memory was not so good, hence the decision to decrease confidence for correct 
answers. However, this explanation does not account for the inflated confidence in 
incorrect answers to unanswerable and suggestive questions.  
One final finding is related to the shifts in confidence made while attempting 
to improve realism. This result shows that confidence judgements are built within an 
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error-prone heuristic process, and it suggests that participants might be aware of 
potential unrealistic judgements they initially reported. Thus, when instructed they 
are able to report more appropriate and reliable confidence judgements. 
 
Conclusions 
The aim of this review was to (1) gather the available evidence relating to 
changes in confidence in a recalled memory, (2) identify the factors that are likely to 
lead to such changes, and (3) understand whether any of these factors are likely to 
influence eyewitness confidence within the context of interest – i.e., an investigative 
interview. We selected strict criteria to identify relevant studies and gather this 
evidence, therefore the literature that met our criteria was not large. However, in line 
with the research on confidence malleability, the eligible literature clearly supports 
the idea that confidence for episodic memory can change. Among the variables that 
are likely to promote such changes, some are directly relevant for the investigative 
setting.  
 In particular, the results related to the effect of repeated recall attempt and 
types of question are useful to pinpoint some of the circumstances in which 
eyewitness confidence is more likely to change and some in which confidence is 
more likely to remain stable. For example, the literature highlighted that repeated 
recall attempts do not appear to cause changes in confidence in circumstances in 
which the type of test (1) is similar across retrieval attempts, (2) is not misleading or 
suggestive, (3) does not repeatedly pressure for addition information, and (4) the 
time delay between interviews is relatively short (i.e., up to 7 days). Some of these 
results are not new, and underpin the already available guidelines on best-practice 
eyewitness interviewing. For example, it is well established that suggestive and 
misleading questions should not be asked within an interview because they are likely 
to elicit inaccurate memories from witnesses (e.g., ABE, Home Office, 2011). 
Similarly, research has shown that the access to a memory trace is likely to decay 
over time and it suggests that eyewitnesses should be interviewed as soon as possible 
after the incident (e.g., Gabbert et al., 2009). It appears that these suggestions are 
compatible to eyewitness confidence as they are to eyewitness memory. As such, 
repeatedly interviewing an eyewitness with similar, non-misleading interviews, 




 Perhaps a less clear conclusion can be made regarding the encouragement to 
provide additional information. It appears that confidence is likely to decrease during 
the probing phase of an investigative interview, presumably because in answer to 
probing questions eyewitnesses are more likely to lower their report criterion and 
therefore report information they are less sure about, or because they engage in a 
more effortful memory search for the requested details. This explanation is in line 
with the literature on realism of confidence discussed in Chapter 2. In particular, with 
the finding that confidence for information recalled via follow-up probing questions 
is more likely to be lower than confidence for information recalled via a free recall 
invitation. Following this pattern of results, one aim of this PhD is to understand 
whether eyewitness confidence is likely to change during an interview, and in 
particular whether confidence is likely to remain stable during the free recall phase 




















Chapter 4: Study 1. Investigating the effect of different quality of an initial 
interview on memory performance and memory confidence. 
 
Introduction 
 Reporting a memory about a witnessed event in the context of an 
investigative interview is a very complex task. While, people retrieve event 
memories from the past on an everyday basis, the demands of an investigative 
interview are unique and often exceed the demands of everyday memory search. 
Normally, whether we remember all the details of an event or not is not vital, and 
often remembering the gist of a memory is sufficient to satisfy the purpose of the 
memory search. In comparison, the task for an eyewitness is to report everything 
they have seen, as details can make a difference for the outcome of the investigation. 
Remembering all the details of an event is not easy, neither a task we are accustomed 
to, therefore the support that the interviewers can offer during an interview is pivotal 
to ensure that the eyewitness’s account is as accurate and detailed as it can be. 
 Furthermore, during the course of an investigation eyewitnesses are often 
asked to report their memory for the event seen more than once (Odinot et al., 2013), 
and it is important that the information gathered on each occasion is as accurate and 
detailed as possible. For example, if the eyewitness is the person reporting the crime, 
they are likely to be asked to recall what seen in the emergency call. Following this, 
they might be asked to report the crime to a frontline police officer on the crime 
scene (Gabbert et al., 2015). Finally, further into the investigative process 
investigators might ask an eyewitness to recall what seen once again in a more in-
depth interview. Additional reasons for multiple interviews being required include if 
new evidence has been found - especially if this contrasts with the eyewitness’s 
initial account (Gabbert et al., 2015), or if witnesses have not reported sufficient 
information in the first interview (e.g., La Rooy et al., 2009).  
 
Rationale 
 As highlighted in Chapter 1, research in psychology has proposed several 
techniques and interviewing protocols aimed to enhance eyewitnesses’ memory 
performance, while ensuring their accounts remain accurate. In general, such 
techniques have been found to be beneficial also across repeated interviews. In 
particular, research has shown that memory activation is likely to strengthen the 
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memory trace and increase the likelihood of accessing the trace in future (e.g., 
Roediger & Payne, 1982). Thus, recalling a memory in an initial interview increases 
the likelihood of remembering the memory in a subsequence interview; however, this 
is contingent to the quality of the initial interview (Hope et al., 2014; Marsh et al., 
2005). A thorough memory activation following a good practice interview compared 
to a shallow memory activation, is more likely to improve memory performance in a 
subsequent interview.  
 Clearly, whether an interview can enhance eyewitnesses’ performance is 
important; however, it is also important to understand whether an interview can 
impact other aspects of the eyewitness’s cognition. As such, the research discussed in 
Chapter 2 showed also that eyewitness confidence can be affected during an 
interview. For example, the interviewer’s feedback (e.g., Leippe et al., 2006; Lida et 
al., 2020), the type of interview (e.g., Gwyer & Clifford, 1997), or the retrieval 
prompts can influence confidence (e.g., Granhag et al., 2004; Knutsson et al., 2011). 
Investigating whether and why confidence changes is pivotal for the legal context, 
because confidence in turn underpins whether and how the information is reported 
(Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). Furthermore, evidence suggests that confidence might 
also affect eyewitness’s willingness to testify (Hafstad et al., 2004; Wells & 
Bradfield, 1998). Importantly, the literature on metamemory has shown that 
confidence depends on the retrieval process and its products, such as how complete 
the recalled memory seems (Brewer et al., 2005).  
 Thus, the primary aim of Study 1 is to investigate how the quality of the 
initial interview affects memory performance and in turn confidence in the quality of 
one’s own memory, as well as confidence in engaging with the Criminal Justice 
System. Participants recalled their memory for the event seen on two occasions. 
Initially (Time 1) they received either a Best Practice Interview – designed by 
following the PEACE recommendations, or a Poor Practice Interview – which 
deviates from the best practice guidelines. At Time 2 all the participants received the 
same Free Recall test. Confidence in the accuracy of own memory and confidence in 
engaging with the CJS was measured before and after the initial Interview. 





 H1: A Best Practice Interview is more likely to promote memory activation 
and to strengthen memory trace, which in turn lead to more complete, more accurate 
and more consistent accounts in both recall attempts. On the contrary a Poor Practice 
Interview is more likely to disrupt memory activation, which is turn is likely to lead 
to fewer and less accurate information being reported, and less consistent accounts. 
Predictions: Participants in the Best Practice Interview group (compared to those in 
the Poor Practice Interview group) are expected to report more and more accurate 
accounts at Time 1 and at Time 2, and more consistent information at Time 2.  
 
 H2: A Poor Practice Interview (but not a Best Practice Interview) is likely to 
disrupt memory performance and to yield poor accounts, which in turn is likely to 
promote (i) lowered confidence in own memory, and (ii) lowered confidence in 
engaging with the Criminal Justice System.   
Predictions: after the initial interview participants in the Poor Practice Interview 
group are expected to show decreased confidence in the quality of their own memory 
and decreased confidence in engaging with the CJS. While the opposite pattern is 




A 2 (Initial Interview Type: Best Practice Interview, Poor Practice Interview) 
x 2 (Confidence measurement time: Time 1, Time 2) mixed design was used, with 
Initial Interview Type manipulated between subjects, and confidence manipulated 
within subjects. The DVs for memory recall at Time 1 and Time 2 were: (a) amount 
of correct details, (b) amount of incorrect details, (c) overall accuracy, and (d) 
consistent information. The DVs for confidence were: (e) confidence before the 
Initial Interview (Time 1), and (f) confidence after the Initial Interview (Time 2).  
 
Participants 
A total of 40 participants took part in the study (31 females; Mean age = 
21.89, SD = 7.09). All participants were recruited in the Goldsmiths University, 50% 
were recruited from the first-year cohort of Psychology students, the remaining were 
students or staff members of different departments. All participants received either 
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A mock crime video (1 minute, 40 seconds) was used as stimulus material. 
The video was presented on a 17 inch HD screen. The event was non-violent robbery 
filmed in a Blockbuster video-rental store and a total of four males were involved in 
the scene. In the video a customer enters the shop and asks the shopkeeper where the 
new release can be found. He obtains direction and goes in a different section of the 
store. Shortly after, two males enter the shop and proceed straight to the section were 
the customer is browsing for videos. The two males confer briefly, then cover their 
faces with disguises and proceed to the front area to confront the shopkeeper. One of 
them walks to the door and guards the entrance, while the other asks for the money. 
After a few seconds, the customer who first entered the shop comes back to the front 
area and one of the robbers pushes him to the floor. Finally, the robbers take their 
disguises off and run out of the store. 
 
Time 1: Initial Interview Type 
Best Practice Interview. The Best Practice Interview followed the PEACE 
guidelines (College of Policing, 2020). However, we excluded the Planning and 
Preparation and Evaluation phase because they are not relevant for the purpose of 
this experimental study.  
Free report phase. Introduction and preferred name. The researcher thanked 
the participant for taking part in the study, introduced herself, and asked for the 
interviewee’s preferred name. 
Instruction. Once established the preferred name the researcher 
acknowledged that she knew nothing about the event seen and to be able to 
understand what happened, she needed the interviewee to tell all they could possibly 
remember. 
Retrieval aid. Three memory prompts were provided during the introduction, 




Initiating the Free Recall. In order to encourage completeness, participants 
were asked to report as many details as they could remember, including those that 
might appear irrelevant. The instruction was as follows: “Thank you for coming and 
taking part in this study, my name is Alessandra, how would you like to be called? 
We are now going to talk about the video you have just seen. Please think that I know 
nothing about the event you have seen and to be able to reconstruct the event I need 
you to tell me all you know about it. I would like you to take the time you need and 
think about the event, focus your attention on the location in which the event 
happened. Think about the people involved, what they looked like, and what they did 
or said. When you are ready tell me everything you remember please do so in as 
many details as possible. All the information you have are equally important for me 
so please try not to skip any detail.”   
Questioning phase. The questioning phase initiated when the participant had 
completed the Free Recall phase. 
Follow up questions. The questioning phase included three TED follow up 
questions (tell, explain, describe); one was related to the main action (e.g., the 
robbery), one to the location in which the event happened (e.g., the shop), and one to 
the robbers’ description (e.g., robber’s clothing). These were built upon the 
participant’s narrative. Each question was phrased by using the interviewee’s own 
words and language style, (e.g., ‘you told me that the robbers went back to the till 
where the guy was and shouted at him, tell me more about this scene’). Hence, all the 
questions were focused on topics mentioned by the interviewee (interviewee-led 
probing of topic). 
Closure. The participant was asked if there was any other detail they could 
remember, including details they were not asked about. Finally, the researcher 
thanked the participant about the information provided and explained that every 
detail reported was very important for the investigation.  
Behavioural components. Two behavioural components were used to further 
support the recollection task and enhance cooperation; (1) open body language, and 
(2) active listening. These were kept constant throughout the free recall and 
questioning phase. 
Open body language. The researcher’s non-verbal behaviour appeared 
relaxed and the gestures confident but also polite and supportive. In order to establish 
and maintain a positive relationship, subtle similarities and mirroring techniques 
65 
 
were also used (e.g., if the participant was directed towards the researcher, the latter 
responded with a similar posture). 
Active Listening and Facilitations. Active listening was expressed by 
maintaining eye contact without being invasive and keeping the posture directed 
towards the participant. Nods and other facilitation such as: “yes, go on”, “okay, I 
understand” were also presented in the interview and used sensibly when needed 
(e.g., if the participant was struggling to recall information the researcher waited 
showing interest, and if after a few seconds the interviewee remembered that 
information, the researcher nodded a few times).  
 
Poor Practice Interview. The Poor Practice Interview is composed of the 
most common deviations from the PEACE models observed in police interviews. In 
order to identify these components we randomly selected 10 transcripts of interviews 
conducted by police officers and found five common mistakes: lack of instructions 
for the interviewing process, lack of rapport building, use of closed questions, 
interviewer-led style of questioning, and absence of closure (e.g., Fisher et al., 1987). 
Basic instructions about the interview process were found in two interviews 
out of ten. In both interviews the police officers clarified they intended to talk with 
the witnesses about the incident in order to gather information that could potentially 
be important for the investigation. In one interview the police officer also mentioned 
further possible stages the witness might be asked to take part in, such as testifying in 
Court.  
In none of the ten interviews did the police officer attempt to build rapport 
through establishing the interviewee’s preferred name, however in two interviews the 
police officers introduced themselves and specified their rank. Some attempt to 
connect or demonstrate interest in the interviewee’s wellbeing was found in three 
interviews. Here, the police officers checked the interviewees were comfortable and 
did not feel intimidated by anybody.  
5Wh and Yes/No type of questions were coded as closed questions, and were 
found in all the interviews, accounting for more than 85% of the questions asked in 
each interview, while the remaining 15% of the questions were phrased in the form 
of TED questions.  
Instances of an interviewer-led style of questioning were found in all of the 
interviews. This style consisted of questions that shifted the interviewee’s attention 
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constantly from topic to topic. For example, in one transcription the police officer 
asked if the robbers interacted with the interviewee during the robbery, followed by a 
question on where the interviewee was before entering the shop, followed by a 
question on the robber’s description. Although these questions are useful for the 
interviewer and can elicit important information, topic-hopping such as this might 
not be compatible with the interviewee’s recollection process. In line with 
Anderson’s (1983) theoretical model of memory, by shifting interviewee’s attention 
from topic to topic, the interviewee is less likely to engage in a thorough memory 
activation and might have less opportunities to remember each topic in detail. 
Closure was found in two interviews out of ten. The police officers 
summarised the event and asked if there was any other information the interviewee 
wanted to add. In one interview the police officer further explained that the 
interviewee could be asked to testify in Court and invited the interviewee to ask any 
questions about this. 
From the transcriptions we were unable to access information about non-
verbal behaviour such as active listening expressed by nodding, or body posture and 
eye contact. Facilitation such as “okay” or “yes” were coded in all the interviews, 
however we did not find any sophisticated forms of encouragement for the 
recollection task. Because the facilitations observed are broadly used in everyday 
conversations and are not skillful techniques, we decide not to include them in the 
Poor Practice Interview.  
A final component added was interruptions. We were unable to assess the 
amount of interruptions in the transcriptions; however, evidence exists that less 
skilled police officers do interrupt eyewitnesses’ account (e.g., McLean, 1995; Fisher 
et al., 1987; Wright & Alison, 2004), therefore we include this in the Poor Practice 
Interview.  
In sum, the Poor Practice Interview used in Study 1 comprised a lack of 
instructions for the interviewing process, a lack of social support, heavy use of closed 
questions, an interviewer-led style of questioning, and the absence of closure. 
Operationalisation of this was as follows; 
Free recall phase. Introduction. In the introduction the interviewer thanked 




Instructions. A general instruction about the recollection task was given, in 
particular the research informed the participants they were going to talk about the 
video they had just seen.  
Retrieval aids. The retrieval prompts were identical to that used in the Best 
Practice Interview. Participants were asked to focus on the location of the event, the 
people involved and their actions.  
Initiating the Free Recall. Finally, participants were asked to report what 
happened. The instruction for the free recall phase in the Poor Practice Interview 
condition was as follows: “Thank you for coming and taking part in this study, my 
name is Alessandra. We are now going to talk about the event you have seen. Focus 
your attention on the location in which the event happened, the people involved, what 
they looked like, what they did or say and then tell me what happened”. 
Interruptions. Between two and three interruptions were used in the Poor 
Practice Interview. An interruption was defined as an intrusion of the interviewer 
into the interviewee’s narrative and it could occur when the participants had just 
concluded a sentence, but they could still potentially talk or when they were thinking 
in silence. Note that participants were never interrupted when they were actually 
speaking. The interruptions were used to introduce the follow up questions. 
Questioning phase. Follow up questions. Three 5Wh follow up questions 
were asked in the Poor Practice Interview. As for the Best Practice Interview one 
question was focused on the main action, one on the location, and one on the 
robbers’ description. The questions did not match the participants’ language style as 
they were not phrased by using the participants’ own words. Each question 
introduced a new topic area, and this was different from the topic the participants 
were talking or thinking about when the question was asked. For example, if the 
participant was talking about the robbers coming towards the till and shouting at the 
shopkeeper, the research interrupted and asked: “ok, how were these robbers 
dressed?” Finally, no Closure for the interview was presented in the Poor Practice 
Interview.  
Behavioural components. In the Poor Practice Interview non-verbal support 
was not provided. The researcher sat on the chair and did not change her position 





Time 2: Free Recall Test  
The recall test at Time 2 was a written Free Recall test, and it was the same 
for all participants. The instruction was as follows: ‘Please focus the attention on the 
setting in which the event happened, the people involved, what they did or looked 
like. When you are ready please write down what happened’. No time limit was 
given for this task. 
 
Confidence questionnaire  
The confidence questionnaire measured how confident participants were in 
their memory for the event seen. Furthermore, a section of the questionnaire 
investigated participants’ confidence in engaging with the Criminal Justice System 
(Appendix A). Here, we identified three of the most significant stages a witness is 
likely to be involved in (Home Office, 2013): (i) report the crime, (ii) provide a 
statement, and (iii) provide evidence in Court. To these we added another possible 
stage that an eyewitness might be asked to participate in, (iv) an identification task. 
In the questionnaire participants were asked to imagine they were real witnesses of 
the robbery, and to rate how confident they were in their memory to be able to talk to 
the police, sign a statement, participate in an identification task and present their 
evidence in Court. All the confidence scales ranged from 10% to 100%.  
 
Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in a laboratory at Goldsmiths University, the 
room was equipped with a desk, a computer with headphones and two chairs facing 
each other. During the testing session no one apart from the participant and the 
researcher was present in the room. The experiment took about 30 minutes and was 
conducted in one session. Participants were informed through the consent form 
(Appendix B) that the study investigated the impact of different questioning styles on 
memory confidence, no other information about the hypotheses was given. The study 
procedure was briefly illustrated, in particular participants were told they were going 
to watch a crime-video, take part in a face-to-face interview and answer questions 
about how confident they felt in their memory. Before the experiment started 
participants were randomly assigned to one of the two experimental conditions (i.e., 
Best Practice Interview, or Poor Practice Interview). After that they were presented 
with the crime-video and reminded to pay attention to it. Then, participants were 
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interviewed accordingly to the condition they were assigned to. Participants were 
asked permission to audio record the interview and all participants agreed, therefore 
all the interviews were recorded. The confidence questionnaire was administered 
after the video but before the initial interview (Time 1), and again after the initial 
interview (Time 2). Once participants had completed the confidence questionnaire at 
Time 2, they were given the written Free Recall test. Finally, participants were 




Information reported in the interview (Time 1) was transcribed, and the recall 
data provided at Time 1 and Time 2 (Free Recall test) was coded by using the same 
coding scheme (Appendix D). Each detail was coded as Action (a) whenever it 
referred to an action, Location (l) if it referred to the setting, and Person Descriptor 
(pd) if the detail referred to the people involved, their clothing and personal objects. 
As an example, the string “the robber (pd) was blond (pd) and was standing (a) at 
the door (l)” was coded as 1 x Action, 1 x Location and 2 x Person Descriptors1. 
Plurals were coded as two details. The details were coded as Correct if present in the 
video, or as Incorrect if not present in the video. Non-specific information was not 
coded; for example, in the string “he said something”, the detail ‘something’ was not 
coded. Also, personal opinions such as “I think they were accomplices”, and 
ambiguous information, such as “somewhere in the shop” were not coded. To ensure 
consistency across coding, ten (12.5%) randomly selected transcripts were coded by 
two research assistants. A percentage agreement between coders was calculated by 
dividing the number of details agreed by the number of total details (agreed and 
disagreed) and was found to be high (100%). Inter-rater reliability - assessed with 
Cohen’s Kappa was 0.9, reflecting almost perfect agreement (McHugh, 2012). 
 
                                               
1 We did not have a hypothesis regarding the type of details reported, therefore we 
collapsed action, location and person descriptors details correct into number of 





Each detail reported at Time 2 was coded as Consistent if the same detail was 
recalled also at Time 1, while details reported at Time 2 but not at Time 1 were 
coded as new information. 
Results 
All statistical tests were performed at alpha level of .05 unless otherwise 
specified. Homogeneity of variance was assessed with Levene’s test (1960).  
 
Memory recall at Time 1 and Time 2 
A series of 2 (Initial Interview Type: Best Practice Interview, Poor Practice 
Interview) x 2 (Confidence Measurement Time: Time 1, Time 2) mixed design 
ANOVAs were conducted on the DVs: correct, incorrect information, and accuracy 
rate.  
For the correct information reported we found a significant main effect of 
Initial Interview Type F(1, 38) = 5.04, p = .03, η2p = .12; meaning that overall 
participants in the Best Practice Interview group reported more correct information 
than those in the Poor Practice Interview group (Mdiff. = 10.65, p = .03, 95% CI [1.04, 
20.21]). The main effect of Time was non-significant F(1, 38) = 1.69, p = .20, η2p = 
.04. However, we found a significant interaction F(1, 38) = 14.97, p < .001, η2p = 
.28. A post-hoc power analysis conducted in G*power (Erdfelder et al., 1996), with α 
= .05, n = 40, and the average of the observed effect sizes, yielded a power (1 – β) of 
.67 (ranging from .23 to .96). This analysis suggests the study might be 
underpowered and unable to detect small to medium size effects. Follow up 
comparisons as a function of Initial Interview Type showed that participants in the 
Best Practice Interview group reported more correct information than those in the 
Poor Practice Interview group, but this difference was only significant at Time 1 
(Mdiff. = 16.05, p = .002, 95% CI [6.53, 25.56]). Furthermore, comparisons as a 
function of Time showed that participants in the Best Practice Interview group 
reported significantly more correct information at Time 1 compared to Time 2 (Mdiff. 
= 7.25, p = .001, 95% CI [3.23, 11.26]). While participants in the Poor Practice 
group reported more correct information at Time 2 compared to Time 1, but this 
difference did not reach significance (see Table 4.1 for Means and Standard 
Deviations at Time 1 and Time 2). 
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 For the number of incorrect details we found a significant main effect of 
Initial Interview Type F(1, 38) = 8.17, p = .007, η2p = .17, meaning that across recall 
attempts participants in the Poor Practice Interview group reported more errors (Mdiff. 
= 2.02, p = .007, 95% CI [.59, 3.45]). The main effect of Time was found non-
significant F(1, 38) = 3.41, p = .07, η2p = .08. However, we found a significant 
interaction F(1, 38) = 6.17, p = .017, η2p = .14. Follow-up comparisons showed that 
at Time 2 (but not at Time 1) participants in the Poor Practice Interview reported 
more errors than those in the Best Practice Interview (Mdiff. = 3.00, p = .002, 95% CI 
[1.15, 4.84]). Furthermore, participants in the Poor Practice Interview reported more 
errors at Time 2 compared to Time 1 (Mdiff. = 1.70, p = .004, 95% CI [.57, 2.82]). 
For the accuracy rate of the information reported we found a significant main 
effect of Initial Interview Type F(1, 38) = 9.35, p = .004, η2p = .19; a non-significant 
main effect of Time F(1, 38) = 3.09, p = .08, η2p  = .07; and a non-significant 
interaction F(1, 38) = 2.32, p = .13, η2p = .05. Follow up comparisons showed that 
across the two time-points participants in the Best Practice Interview group were 
more accurate than those in the Poor Practice Interview group (Mdiff. = 4.13, p = .004, 
95% CI [1.39, 6.87]).  
To summarise, when collapsing the results across recall attempts the quality 
of the initial interview was found to have a significant impact on the three DVs, as 
shown by the significant main effect of Initial Interview Type on the correct and 
incorrect information reported, and on the accuracy of the information reported. This 
impact was positive; overall participants in the Best Practice Interview reported more 
correct details, fewer errors, and more accurate information than those in the Poor 
Practice Interview. The non-significant main effect of Time on the DVs, showed that 
time in isolation did not affect the quality of information reported. However, the 
significant interaction for correct and incorrect showed that only at Time 1 the 
quality of the interview had a significant impact on the correct information reported. 
At this time point only participants in the Best Practice Interview group reported 
more correct details than those in the Poor Practice Interview group. While at Time 2 
this was not the case as participants in the Best Practice Interview group decreased 
the amount of correct details reported, thus the difference in the amount of correct 
information reported between the two groups disappeared. On the contrary, the effect 
of the quality of the initial interview on the amount of incorrect details reported was 
only significant at Time 2. Only in this time point participants in the Poor Practice 
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Interview reported more errors than participants in the Best Practice Interview. At 
Time 2 participants in the Poor Practice interview showed an increase in the number 
of incorrect details reported compared to Time 1. 
 
Table 4.1. Means (and Standard Deviations) of correct and incorrect details, and 
accuracy of information reported at Time 1 and Time 2 for the Best Practice 
Interview and Poor Practice Interview group. 
 
Consistency 
Each unit of information reported at Time 2 was coded as consistent if it was 
reported also at Time 1. We calculated the proportion of consistent information as a 
function of the amount of details (correct and incorrect) reported at Time 2. Overall 
at Time 2, approximately 88% of the information reported by the participants in the 
Best Practice Interview group was consistent with the information that had been 
reported at Time 1, compared to 75% for participants in the Poor Practice group; this 
difference was significant, t(38) = 4.21, p < .001, d = 1.33, (Mdiff. = 12.27, 95% CI 
[6.38, 18.17]; see Table 4.2 for Means and Standard Deviations). We also explored 
the accuracy of the consistent details, and found a significant difference between 
groups t(38) = 2.79,  p = .01, d = .88, (Mdiff. = 3.37, 95% CI [.92, 5.81]), with 
participants in the Best Practice Interview group (M = 97.63; SD = 2.21) reporting 
more accurate consistent information than those in the Poor Practice Interview group 
(M = 94.26; SD = 4.92).  
Conversely, in the Best Practice Interview group approximately 12% of the 
total information reported at Time 2 were new, against the 24% for the Poor Practice 
Interview group, and this difference was significant t(38) = - 4.17, p < .001, d = -
1.32, (Mdiff. = -12.07, 95% CI [-17.92, -6.22]; see Table 3.2 for Means and Standard 
Deviations). No differences between groups was found on the accuracy of the new 
 Time 1 Time 2 
Best Practice Poor Practice Best Practice Poor Practice 
Correct 62.80 (15.66) 47.75 (14.01) 55.55 (16.23)  50.35 (16.32) 
Incorrect 2.60 (1.35) 3.65 (2.77) 2.35 (2.11)  5.35 (3.49) 
% Accuracy rate 95.68 (2.68) 92.56 (5.80) 95.52 (4.16) 90.36 (5.72) 
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information reported t(38) = -.41, p =.68, d = -.13, (Mdiff. = -2.95, 95% CI [-17.66, 
11.75]). 
In summary, as predicted participants in the Best Practice Interview were 
more consistent across interviews that those in the Poor Practice Interview group. 
 
Table 4.2. Means (and Standard Deviations) of proportion and accuracy rate of 
consistent and new information in the Best Practice Interview and Poor Practice 







Changes in memory confidence 
In order to investigate the effect of the quality of the initial interview on 
memory confidence, we collected subjective confidence ratings before and after the 
interviews. Our hypothesis was that confidence after the initial interview (Time 2) 
would decrease for participants in the Poor Practice Interview group and increase for 
participants in the Best Practice Interview group.  
 First, we looked at confidence reported before the interview (Time 1), and 
found no significant difference between groups t(38) = .65 p = .51, d = .20, (Mdiff. = 
2.50, 95% CI [-5.27, 10.27]; see Table 4.3 for Means and Standard Deviations).  
Following this, a 2 (Initial Interview Type: Best Practice Interview, Poor Practice 
Interview) X 2 (Confidence Measurement Time: Time 1, Time 2) mixed design 
ANOVA revealed a non-significant main effect of Initial Interview Type F(1, 38) = 
.37, p = .54, η2p  =.01; a significant main effect of Time F(1, 38) = 5.82, p = .021, η2p 
=.13, indicating that confidence decreased over time independently on the Initial 
Interview Type group (Mdiff. = -4.48, p = .021, 95% CI [-8.16, -.71]); and a non-
significant interaction F(1, 38) = 0.8, p = .97, η2p =.01.  
Thus, the results only partially support Hypothesis 2, in particular as 
predicted confidence in memory decreased after the initial interview, however 
contrary to our expectation this was independent on the type of initial interview.  
 Best Practice Poor Practice 
Consistent Proportion 87.72 (7.46)  75.44 (10.66) 
 Accuracy 97.63 (2.21) 94.26 (4.92) 
New information Proportion    12.27 (7.46) 24.34 (10.54) 
 Accuracy  75.10 (25.19) 78.10 (19.96) 
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Table 4.3. Means (and Standard Deviations) of confidence ratings reported at Time 






Changes in confidence in engaging with the Criminal Justice System 
In order to investigate the effect of the quality of the initial interview on 
confidence in engaging with the Criminal Justice System, we collected four 
confidence measures. Participants were asked to rate how confident they were in 
their memory in relation to (i) talking with the police, (ii) signing a statement about 
what they had witnessed, (iii) providing identification evidence, and (iv) presenting 
evidence in Court. We first examined confidence ratings reported at Time 1 and 
found no difference between groups in the confidence measures reported: talking to 
the police t(38) = -.59 p = .53, d = -.19, (Mdiff. = -4.00, 95% CI [-17.53, 9.53]); 
signing a statement t(38) = -1.23, p = .22, d = -.39, (Mdiff. = -7.50, 95% CI [-19.77, 
4.77]); participating in an ID task t(38) = .32 p = .74, d = .10, (Mdiff. = 2.50, 95% CI 
[-12.94, 17.94]), and presenting evidence in Court t(38) = -.44 p = .65, d = -.14, 
(Mdiff. = -3.50, 95% CI [-19.33, 12.37]; see table 4.4. for Means and Standard 
Deviations). 
 A series of 2 (Interview Type: Best Practice Interview, Poor Practice 
Interview) X 2 (Confidence Measurement Time: Time 1, Time 2) mixed design 
ANOVAs conducted on the four confidence measures revealed only a significant 
main effect of Time on confidence in presenting evidence in Court F(1, 38) = 5.17, p 
= .03, η2p  =.12. No other significant main effect or interaction was found (see Table 
4.5).  
In conclusion, we found no support for Hypothesis 2. Confidence in relation 
to presenting evidence in Court decreased similarly for participants in Best Practice 
Interview and Poor Practice Interview group. 
 
 
 Best Practice Poor Practice 
Confidence  Time 1 67.38 (13.46) 64.88 (10.65) 
Time 2 62.88 (13.57) 60.50 (17.08) 
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Table 4.4. Means (and Standard Deviations) of confidence in memory related to 
talking to the police, signing a statement, participating in an ID task, and presenting 
evidence in Court reported at Time 1 and Time 2 for the Best Practice Interview and 





















 Best practice Poor practice 
Talking to the police Time 1 65.50 (21.63) 69.50 (20.97) 
Time 2 62.50 (22.44) 66.00 (25.01) 
Signing a statement  Time 1 60.00 (18.04) 67.50 (20.22) 
Time 2 54.50 (20.82) 64.00 (24.79) 
Participating in ID 
task  
Time 1 56.50 (21.58) 54.00 (25.83) 
Time 2  53.00 (21.05) 50.50 (26.84) 
Presenting evidence in 
Court 
Time 1 56.50 (24.49) 60.00 (24.49) 
Time 2  44.50 (23.05) 58.50 (28.52) 
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Table 4.5. Results of the 2 x 2 ANOVA  
 
Talking to the police 
Result variables df test value p value Effect size 
(np2) 
Main effect Interview (1, 38) F = 1.81 = .18 η2p = .04 
Main effect Time (1, 38) F = .05 = .81 η2p = .01 
Interaction Interview x 
Time 
(1, 38) F = 2.26 = .14 η2p = .05 
Signing a statement 
Main effect Interview (1, 38) F = 1.78 = .19 η2p = .05 
Main effect Time (1, 38) F = 3.22 = .08 η2p = .07 
Interaction Interview x 
Time 
(1, 38) F = .15 = .69 η2p =.01 
Participating in an ID task 
Main effect Interview (1, 38) F = .12 = .72 η2p = .01 
Main effect Time (1, 38) F = 1.44 = .23 η2p = .04 
Interaction Interview x 
Time  
(1, 38) F = .00 = 1.00 η2p = .00 
Presenting evidence in Court 
Main effect Interview (1, 38) F = 3.12 = .08 η2p = .07 
Main effect Time (1, 38) F = 5.17  = .03* η2p = .12 
Interaction Interview x 
Time  
(1, 38) F = 3.13 = .08 η2p = .07 
* indicates significance at p < .05 
 
Discussion 
 Study 1 investigated the effect of the quality of the initial interview on (i) 
memory performance, (ii) confidence in the quality of own memory, and (iii) 
confidence in engaging with the Criminal Justice System. We found that participants 
in the Best Practice Interview reported more correct information, less errors and 
more accurate and consistent accounts over the two recall attempts. However, 
contrary to our expectation participants in the Best Practice Interview reported more 
correct information at Time 1 only, while participants in the Poor Practice Interview 
reported more errors at Time 2 only. Despite participants in the Poor Practice 
Interview reported less complete accounts than those in the Best Practice Interview, 
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confidence in their own memory and confidence in engaging with the CJS decreased 
similarly for participants in the two groups.  
 Overall, the quality of initial interview strongly affected the quality of the 
information reported. As such, the Best Practice Interview elicited more correct and 
more accurate information than the Poor Practice Interview. Thus, the Best Practice 
Interview compared with the Poor Practice Interview was successful in promoting a 
more in-depth memory activation and eliciting more correct details. The former 
interview was designed to support participants in their recollection task, it provided 
instructions to clarify the interviewers’ expectation relating to the desired level of 
details. In addition, it ensured the opportunity to engage in an uninterrupted free 
recall that encouraged participants to think and activate their memory, and facilitated 
the access to large amount of target details. Furthermore, the use of open questions 
and compatible questioning style further facilitated the access to details by 
respectively (i) encouraging participants to concentrate their attention to more 
specific aspect of the event, and (ii) proving the cues that are more likely to reach the 
target details stored in memory. On the contrary, in the Poor Practice Interview, the 
lack of instruction was less likely to prepare participants for the interview, while the 
interruptions and topic-hopping were more likely to force eyewitness to shift their 
attention to different aspects of the memory, and overall to disrupt their recollection 
task. Furthermore, the use of closed questions and incompatible questioning style 
was less like to encourage memory activation in the probing phase of the interview. 
 The results of Study 1 showed that at Time 1 participants in the Best Practice 
Interview group benefitted from the format of their interview more than those in the 
Poor Practice Interview group, hence they were able to retrieve and report more 
correct information, however this effect was not carried over to the second recall 
attempt. At Time 2 the difference between groups in the amount of correct 
information reported disappeared, primarily because at Time 2 participants in the 
Best Practice Interview group reported significantly fewer correct details. The 
finding that participants can down-report in a subsequent recall test was unexpected 
but it is not new, and research investigating the carryover enhancing effect of a good 
quality initial interview have found similar results (Kraus et al., 2017, Krix et al., 
2014; see also Memon et al., 1997). For example, in Krix et al.’s (2014) study 
participants recalled a memory with either a SAI or a Free Recall at Time 1, while at 
Time 2 participants in both groups recalled their memory with the same Free Recall 
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test. At Time 2 participants who initial received a SAI (but not those that received a 
Free Recall) reported significantly less correct information compared with Time 1. 
The authors explained that this result might be due to a report issue; in particular, the 
participants that received the initial SAI reported less correct details at Time 2, 
because the instruction of the Free Recall did not clarify the expectation that they had 
to report highly complete accounts. Similarly, in Study 1 participants in the Best 
Practice Interview group were specified the desired level of completeness during the 
initial interview, but not in the second Free Recall test. Consequently, at Time 2 they 
might have decided to withhold more details compared to Time 1. Interestingly, this 
harsher control over memory reporting did not lead to increased accuracy or to fewer 
incorrect information being reported, meaning that in the second recall attempt 
participants in the Best Practice Interview were withholding potentially valuable 
correct details.  
 The other unexpected result is that the Poor Practice Interview yielded more 
errors compared with the Best Practice Interview at Time 2 but not at Time 1. The 
lack of statistical difference between the groups in the amount of errors reported at 
Time 1 is surprising considering that the Poor Practice Interview included 
interruptions, closed questions, and an overall questioning style incompatible with 
the interviewee’s memory reporting. It appears that at Time 1 our operationalisation 
of the quality of the initial interview had a larger effect on the correct rather than the 
incorrect information reported. In other words, at Time 1 the disruptive effect of the 
Poor Practice Interview had a larger effect in reducing the amount of correct 
information reported rather than in increasing the amount of errors. Certainly, the 
interruptions, the closed questions and the topic-hopping were likely reducing the 
access to the target details stored in memory. However, it remains the question as to 
why they did not lead to more errors. A possibility is that the short retrieval interval 
might have buffered the negative effect of the poor retrieval techniques on the 
amount of errors reported. For example, it is possible that at Time 1 participants’ 
memory representation was still strong and so was the trace of the target details (i.e., 
details pertaining to the target event). Thus, despite the poor interviewing techniques 
the target details remained more likely to be reported than any competing and thus 
incorrect detail (i.e., a detail not pertaining to the target event). However, with longer 
delays and weaker memory representation, the combination of weaker traces and 
poor interviewing techniques could lead to more competing details being mistakenly 
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recalled (and reported) while searching for target details. Therefore, despite in Study 
1 we found no evidence of a negative impact of the quality of the initial interview on 
the number of errors reported at Time 1, it is worth clarifying that this might be 
largely a consequence of the short retrieval interval we used. Furthermore, the results 
that overall participants in the Poor Practice Interview group reported less correct 
details and were overall less accurate than those in the Best Practice Interview group 
show that the quality of the initial interview remains key in eliciting good quality 
information from eyewitnesses.   
 Beside the short retrieval interval, a further limitation of Study 1 prevents us 
from making further conclusions relating to the impact of the quality of the initial 
interview on memory performance. In particular the study does not include a control 
group, thus when evaluating the effect of the quality of the initial interview on 
memory performance we are unable to determine whether the observed differences 
on the amount of correct and incorrect details and accuracy rate are due to the 
enhancing effect of the Best Practice Interview, or the detrimental effects of the Poor 
Practice Interview, or to a combinations of both.  
 In addition to investigating the impact of the type of the initial interview on 
memory performance, a further aim of Study 1 was to investigate how the quality of 
the initial interview affects confidence (i.e., confidence in the quality of the overall 
memory and confidence in engaging with the CJS). We expected participants in the 
Poor Practice Interview group to provide less complete accounts and therefore to 
decrease their confidence after the initial interview. On the contrary we expected 
participants in the Best Practice Interview group to report more complete and 
detailed accounts and therefore to increase their confidence after the initial interview. 
Results showed that the quality of the initial interview influenced the completeness 
of the accounts, but not confidence in the expected direction. Thus, despite the 
accounts reported by participants in the Poor Practice Interview were less complete 
than those reported by the participants in the Best Practice Interview, confidence 
decreased similarly in both groups. It is surprising that while the two initial 
interviews had a very different effect on the quality of the memory reported, their 
impact on confidence appeared to be largely similar.  
 It is worth mentioning that research investigating confidence in the 
information elicited by different quality interviews reported similar results. For 
example, Allwood et al. (2005) interviewed participants with either a CI or a SI 
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interview and found no difference between confidence ratings reported by 
participants in the two groups (see also Granhag et al., 2004). However, in Allwood 
et al.’s study neither of the interviews included elements of poor interviewing 
practice. In particular, the CI and SI were identical apart from the mnemonics 
“mental reinstatement of context” and “report everything instruction”, that were 
included in the CI only. Both interviews presented a rapport phase, clear instructions, 
and probing invitations for additional information. Furthermore, in neither of the two 
interviews were participants asked specific questions. In sharp contrast, in Study 1 
the two initial interviews were largely different. Specifically, the Poor Practice 
Interview included elements that previous research has found to be disruptive and 
detrimental for eyewitness reporting (Fisher et al., 1987; George; 1991), such as 
interruptions, lack of social support, and the use of interviewer-led questions and 
non-compatible questions. Based on these differences we predicted that the Poor 
Practice Interview would have a larger detrimental impact on memory performance 
and memory confidence compared to previous research.  
 Thus, it is unclear why the Best Practice Interview and Poor Practice 
Interview caused a similar decrease in memory confidence. Certainly, despite these 
two interviews include different interviewing techniques, they share some 
similarities that might explain the statistically comparable impact they had on 
confidence. For example, both the interviews include a questioning phase in which 
the participants are asked to report additional details they had not reported in the free 
recall phase. Research has showed that confidence in the information reported in 
response to forced choice questions (Allwood et al., 2008) or follow-up open 
invitations (Knutsson et al., 2011; Sharps et al., 2012) is lower than confidence on 
information reported in response to a free recall prompt. It is possible that in Study 1 
participants’ confidence decreased in the probing phase of the Best Practice 
Interview and Poor Practice Interview alike.  
 However, the question remains as to why confidence decreased in the probing 
phase of the interviews. Clearly, participants did not base their confidence 
judgements only on the completeness of their accounts, and it is likely that when 
asked about their confidence they evaluated other products of their own retrieval 
process. It is possible that the supposed difference between confidence for 
information reported in the free report and probing phase are due to the different 
retrieval products generated during the free recall phase compared to the probing 
81 
 
phase. In line with this, Allwood et al. (2008) suggests that in response to a free-
report invitation, participants are more likely to exert higher control over their 
memory, thus they tend to report only information they are confident about. 
However, when asked specific questions they have less control and are more likely to 
report information they are less confident about. Thus, in Study 1 participants’ 
confidence might have decreased in the probing phase, because during this stage of 
the interview in answer to probing questions the retrieval experience is more likely to 
yield lower confidence. However, Study 1 does not allow us to clearly conclude that 
confidence for participants in both groups decreased in the probing phase, not that 
decreased confidence was due to the products of the retrieval process generated 
during the probing phase. In particular, we are unsure whether the decrease in 
confidence depended on the type of retrieval prompt asked in the free and probing 
phase of the interviews. In Study 1, we aimed to design realistic interviews, that 
resemble real-life interviews. They are composed of serval different components and 
techniques; thus, it is difficult to disentangle the effects each element might have had 
on memory confidence. In other words, the operationalisation of quality of the initial 
interview we used does not allow us to isolate the potential elements of the 
interviews that might have caused the observed decrease in confidence. As a 
consequence, Study 1 does not allow us to fully understand the aspects of the two 
initial interviews that lead to the observed shifts in confidence.  
 A further limitation is that the complexity of the operationalisation we 
adopted raises issues related to consistency and replicability. The interviews 
conducted were not identical, as the interviewer’s utterances dependent largely on 
the information reported by each participant. Similarly, it would be relatively 
difficult for other researchers to reproduce identical interviews and replicate the 
results of Study 1. In order to overcome these limitations, in Study 2 we adopted a 
more controlled operationalisation of the quality of initial interview and further 
investigate the impact of an initial interview on memory confidence. 
 In conclusion, Study 1 shows that the quality of the initial interview is likely 
to affect memory reporting. In line with existing literature an interview that follows 
the PEACE guidelines compared with an interview that diverts from such 
recommendations, is more likely to elicit good quality information in both the initial 
and the subsequent recall attempt. Furthermore, we found evidence that eyewitness 
confidence can change during an interview, and contrary to our expectation, 
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confidence appears to decrease independently on the quality of the initial interview 
received. However, due to the limitations of Study 1 we are unable to understand 
why confidence decreases and what elements of the Best Practice Interview and Poor 
Practice Interviews are likely to cause such change. Therefore, Study 2 aims to 
address the two remaining questions: (i) why does eyewitness confidence change 



























Chapter 5: Study 2. Investigating the effect of free recall and closed questions 
on memory performance and memory confidence. 
 
Introduction 
In Study 1 we investigated; (i) the impact of the quality of the initial 
interview (Best Practice Interview and Poor Practice Interview) on memory 
performance and memory confidence. We speculated that participants in the Best 
Practice Interview would report more complete accounts and therefore increase their 
confidence after the initial interview. On the contrary we expected that participants in 
the Poor Practice Interview would report less complete accounts and therefore 
decreased confidence after the initial interview. The results only partially supported 
our hypotheses. In particular, we found that after the initial interview participants in 
the Best Practice Interview group reported more complete accounts compared with 
those in the Poor Practice Interview group (as measured by the amount of correct 
information reported), however, this difference did not lead to the expected 
difference in confidence shifts. Despite participants in the Best Practice Interview 
group reporting more complete accounts than those in the Poor Practice Interview 
group, confidence for participants in the two groups decreased to a similar extend 
after the initial interview. 
Despite not finding support for our hypothesis, Study 1 shows that eyewitness 
confidence is malleable and can change during an interview. However, due to the 
complexity of the initial interviews adopted in Study 1, we were unable to 
understand why confidence changed and what factors led to such change. In order to 
address these remaining questions, and build on the limitations of Study 1, we 
adopted a more controlled manipulation of the quality of the initial interviews in 
Study 2, as well as investigating why confidence changes after an interview and what 
might cause such change.  
 
Manipulation of the quality of the initial interview 
In Study 1 we operationalised the quality of the two initial interviews by 
manipulating several interviewing techniques, such as verbal and non-verbal rapport, 
types of question used, and use of compatible questioning style. Similarly, in Study 2 
we aimed to develop a ‘best practice’ and ‘poor practice’ initial interview that (a) 
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represented commonly accepted good and poor investigative interview practice, and 
(b) had replicable features within each interview to ensure consistency and 
experimental control. In order to do so the decision was made to focus on the 
differences in the types of question used in each initial interview. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, early and more recent research investigating the quality of real-life 
interviews highlighted that a common deviation from best-practice in interviewing 
witnesses relates to the use of questions (Carson & La Rooy, 2015; La Rooy et al., 
2013; La Rooy et al., 2011; Loftus & Greenspan, 2017; Otgaar et al., 2018; Oxburgh 
et al., 2012; Wade et al., 2018). In particular, while best practice guidelines advocate 
for the use of open questions, in real life interviewers still strongly rely on the use of 
closed questions. Therefore, in this study we use the Free Report invitation as proxy 
of the Best Practice Interview and a set of Cued Recall questions as proxy of the 
Poor Practice Interview.  
Study 2 was similar to Study 1. Here, participants were asked to recall their 
memory on two occasions. At Time 1 participants were given either a Free Recall 
Interview or Cued Recall Interview. While at Time 2 all participants received the 
same written Free Recall test. Confidence in overall memory and confidence in 
engaging with the Criminal Justice System was measured both before and after this 
initial interview. 
 
Rationale: gap in memory 
Research has showed that confidence in the information reported in response 
to forced-choice questions (Allwood et al., 2008), TED questions (Knutsson et al., 
2011), and a probing invitations (Sharps et al., 2012) is lower than confidence in the 
information reported in response to a free recall invitation. A potential explanation is 
that during a free recall, participants can exert higher control over their own memory, 
and therefore they are more likely to report information they are sure about. On the 
contrary, when answering specific questions participants have less control over their 
memory, therefore they are more likely to report information they are not confidence 
about (Allwood et al., 2008). In line with this explanation, we speculate that when 
participants recall a memory via a free recall invitation, and therefore have higher 
control over their own retrieval process, they only think about and report the 
information they know, and do not necessarily focus on information they don’t 
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know, thus their confidence remains unchanged. On the contrary, when answering 
closed questions participants’ retrieval is largely dependent on the interviewer’s 
questions, and their attention is more likely to be directed towards information they 
might not know. Thus, when participants answer specific questions, they are more 
likely to think about potential gaps in memory and therefore their confidence is more 
likely to decrease.  
Confidence can influence the willingness to testify (Hafstad et al., 2004; 
Wells & Bradfield, 1998), thus confidence in engaging with the Criminal Justice 
System is expected to decrease in the Cued Recall Interview group and to remain 
stable in the Free Recall Interview group. 
Research on metamemory suggests that memory confidence underpins the 
decision to regulate the information reported (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). For 
example, when a detail retrieved is associated with low confidence participants are 
less likely to volunteer it and more likely to withhold it. Thus, decreased confidence 
after the initial interview is expected to influence the quality of information 
subsequently reported. To test this hypothesis, we investigated whether decreased 
confidence (expected in the Cued Recall Interview group only) (i) leads to fewer and 
less accurate information being reported at Time 2, and (ii) is correlated with the 




H1 : Under conditions of free recall, participants are likely to only think about 
the information they know, and their attention is unlikely to be directed towards 
unknown information, thus their confidence is likely to remain stable. On the 
contrary, under condition of directed retrieval participants’ attention is more likely to 
be directed towards unknow information and therefore their confidence is more 
likely to decrease. 
Predictions: Confidence is expected to remain stable for participants in the Free 





H2: Memory confidence is likely to influence participants’ confidence in 
engaging with the Criminal Justice System. 
Predictions: Confidence in engaging with the CJS is expected to follow a similar 
pattern of that of memory confidence. Thus, we predict it to decrease in the Cued 
Recall Interview group and to remain stable in the Free Recall Interview group.  
 
 H3: Decreased confidence following an initial interview is likely to influence 
the quality of information subsequently reported. 
Prediction 1: At Time 2 participants in the Cued Recall Interview group are expected 
to report fewer correct and less accurate information than participants in the Free 
Recall Interview group. 
Prediction 2: The decreased confidence after the initial interview is expected to be 
correlated with lower amount of information and lower accuracy of the information 




A 2 (Initial Interview Type: Cued Recall vs Free Recall) x 2 (Confidence 
Measurement Time: Time 1, Time 2) mixed design was used, with Initial Interview 
Type manipulated between subjects, and Time manipulated within subjects. The DVs 
for memory recall at Time 2 were: (a) amount of correct details, and (b) accuracy of 
information reported. The DVs for confidence were: (c) confidence reported before 
the initial interview (Time 1), and (d) confidence reported after the initial interview 
(Time 2).  
 
Participants 
A total of 40 participants took part in the study (33 females; Mean age = 
22.16, SD = 7.41). All participants were recruited in the Goldsmiths University, 
about half of the sample was recruited among the first-year cohort of Psychology 
students, the remaining were students of different departments. All participants 







The crime-video was the same as described in Study 1, and depicted a non-
violent robbery filmed in a Blockbuster video-rental store.  
 
Time 1: Initial Interview Type  
Both Interviews were administered face-to-face. 
Free Recall Interview. In the Free Recall interview the researcher started by 
introducing herself, and then gave a general instruction of the task by informing the 
participants that they were going to talk about the video they had just seen. 
Participants were asked to recall what they had seen in response to the general open-
ended question: “What happened?” Three memory prompts were provided whereby 
the participant was asked to focus their attention of the setting of the robbery, the 
people involved, and their actions. No interruptions, facilitations, or follow up 
questions followed this recall. The instruction was as follows: ‘My name is 
Alessandra, thank you for taking part in this experiment. We are now going to talk 
about the video you saw. Please focus your attention on the setting in which the event 
happened, the people involved, what they did, and what they looked like. When you 
are ready, please tell me what happened’. No time limit was given for this task.  
Cued Recall Interview. In the Cued Recall Interview the researcher started 
by introducing herself, and then informed the participants that they were going to 
talk about the video they had just seen, and that questions would be asked about the 
setting, the people involved, and their actions; thus, the participant was provided with 
the three memory prompts. The interview consisted of 24 5Wh- questions (e.g., 
what? where? who?) regarding actions (8 questions), location (8 questions), and 
person descriptions (8 questions) (Appendix E). The instruction was as follow “My 
name is Alessandra, thank you for taking part in this experiment. We are now going 
to talk about the video you saw. I will ask you questions about the setting in which 
the event happened, the people involved, what they did, and what they looked like”. 
After this the researcher asked the questions in the same order for all participants. 
Participants were told that they could say “I don’t know” if they were not sure about 




Time 2: Free Recall Test 
The second Free Recall test was a written memory test, the instruction was 
similar to that described for the Free Recall Interview, the instruction was as follows; 
‘Please focus your attention on the setting in which the event happened, the people 
involved, what they did, and what they looked like. When you are ready, please write 
down what happened’. No time limit was given for this task. 
 
Confidence questionnaire  
The questionnaire was identical to that described for Study 1. Here we 
investigated both (a) confidence in the memory for the event seen and, (b) 
confidence in memory as to able to engage with the Criminal Justice System. The 
scale ranged from 10% to 100%. 
 
Procedure 
The basic procedure was the same as described for Study 1. Data collection 
was conducted in a laboratory at Goldsmiths University, and the interviews at Time 1 
were conducted face-to-face. The experiment took about 20 minutes. After reading 
and signing the consent form (this was identical to that used for Study 1, see 
Appendix B), participants watched the crime video which was displayed on a 17-
inche computer screen. After that they were randomly assigned to one of the two 
conditions and interviewed accordingly. The confidence questionnaire was 
administered after the video but before the interview (Time 1), and again after the 
interview (Time 2). When participants had completed the confidence questionnaire at 
Time 2, they were given the written Free Recall test to complete. Finally, all 
participants received the debrief form (this was similar to that used in Study 1, see 
Appendix C) and were compensated for their time.  
 
Coding 
Only the details reported in the Free Recall test at Time 2 were coded. It 
would not have been meaningful to compare recall at Time 1 due to the format of the 
interviews being too different. Each detail was coded as an Action (a) if it referred to 
an action, Location (l) if it referred to the setting of the event, and Person Descriptor 
(pd) if the detail referred to the people involved, their clothing, or personal objects. 
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The details were coded as Correct if present in the video, or as Incorrect if not 
present in the video. The coding scheme used was identical to that used for Study 1. 
Two researchers coded ten (25%) randomly selected transcripts. The percentage 
agreement between coders was calculated by following the same procedure as that 
described in Study 1 and it was found to be high (99%). Cohen’s Kappa was 0.9, 
reflecting almost perfect agreement (McHugh, 2012). 
 
Results 
All statistical tests were performed at alpha level of .05 unless otherwise 
specified. Homogeneity of variance was assessed with Levene’s test (1960).  
 
Change in memory confidence 
As in Study 1, confidence ratings were collected both before and after the 
initial interview. We predicted that confidence after the initial interview (Time 2) 
would decrease for participants in the Cued Recall Interview group, while confidence 
for participants in the Free Recall group would remain stable. 
First, we looked at confidence rating reported before the interview, and found 
no difference between groups t(38) = .48 p = .63, d = .15, (Mdiff. = 1.87, CI [-6.02, 
9.77]; see Table 5.1 for Means and Standard Deviations). Following this, we 
investigated changes in memory confidence with a 2 (Initial Interview Type: Free 
Recall, Cued Recall) X 2 (Confidence Measurement Time: Time 1, Time 2) mixed 
ANOVA. We found a non-significant main effect of Initial Interview Type F(1, 38) = 
3.25, p = .08 , np2 = .08, a significant main effect of Time F(1, 38) = 12.92, p = .001 , 
η2p = .25, and a significant interaction F(1, 38) = 16.51, p < .001 , η2p = .30. A post-
hoc power analysis conducted in G*power (Erdfelder et al., 1996), with α = .05, n = 
40, and the average of the observed effect sizes, yielded a power (1 – β) of .87 (ranging 
from .43 to .98). This analysis suggests the study might be underpowered and unable 
to detect small to medium size effects. Follow up comparisons showed that confidence 
for participants in the Cued Recall Interview was significantly lower than confidence 
for participants in the Free Recall Interview group at Time 2 only (Mdiff. = -15.50, p = 
.002, 95% CI [-25.08, -5.92]). Comparisons as a function of Time confirmed that only 
participants in the Cued Recall Interview group decreased their confidence 
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significantly after the initial interview (Mdiff. = -16.37, p < .001, 95% CI [-22.49, -
10.25]).  
In summary we found support for our Hypothesis 1 in that confidence for 
participants in the Cued Recall Interview group decreased significantly after the 
interview, while confidence for participants in the Free Recall group remained stable. 
 
Table 5.1. Means (and Standard Deviations) of confidence reported at Time 1, and at 







Changes in confidence in engaging with the Criminal Justice System 
As in Study 1, in Study 2 we used four measures to investigate changes in 
participants’ confidence in engaging with the different stages of the Criminal Justice 
System (i.e., talking to the police about their recollection for the event, signing a 
statement, taking part in an identification task, and presenting evidence in Court). We 
first examined confidence ratings reported at Time 1 and found no difference 
between groups in the confidence measures reported: talking to the police t(38) = -
.38 p = .70, d = -.12, (Mdiff. = -2.50, 95% CI [-15.69, 10.69]); signing a statement 
t(38) = -.23, p = .81, d = -.07, (Mdiff. = -1.50, 95% CI [-14.62, 11.62]); participating in 
an identification task t(38) = -.38 p = .70, d = -.12, (Mdiff. = 2.50, 95% CI [-15.64, 
10.64]), and providing evidence in Court t(38) = -.54 p = .65, d = -.17, (Mdiff. = -3.50, 
95% CI [-15.04, 8.04]). See Table 5.2. for Means and Standard Deviations. 
Following this, we performed a series of 2 (Initial Interview Type: Free 
Recall, Cued Recall) x 2 (Confidence Measurement Time: Time 1, Time 2) mixed 
ANOVAs on the DVs: (i) talking to the police, (ii) signing a statement, (iii) 
participating in an ID task, and (iv) presenting evidence in Court (see table 5.3). We 
found a significant main effect of Initial Interview Type on confidence in presenting 
evidence in Court only F(1, 38) = 5.74, p = .022, η2p = .13, meaning that across the 
two time points participants in the Cued Recall Interview group compared with those 




Confidence  Time 1 72.25 (14.53) 70.38 (9.67) 
Time 2  55.88 (15.92)  71.38 (16.72) 
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in the Free Recall Interview group were significantly less confidence in providing 
evidence in Court (Mdiff. = -11.75, p = .02, 95% CI [1.82, 21.67]). The main effect of 
Time on the four DVs was found non-significant, meaning that confidence in 
engaging with the CJS did not change exclusively as function of time.  
However, we found a significant interaction for (i) signing a statement F(38) 
= 8.95, p = .005, np2 = .19; (ii) participating in an ID task F(1, 38) = 7.71, p = .008, 
η2p = .17; and (iii) presenting evidence in Court F(1, 38) = 9.69, p = .004, np2 = .20. 
Follow up comparisons as a function of Time confirmed that at Time 2 only 
participants in the Cued Recall Interview group significantly decreased their 
confidence in relation to (i) signing a statement (Mdiff. = -12.50, p = .004; 95% CI [-
20.63, -4.36]); (ii) participating in an ID task (Mdiff. = -13.50, p = .005; 95% CI [-
22.77, -4.22]); and (iii) providing evidence in Court (Mdiff. = -13.00, p = .001; 95% 
CI [-20.58, -5.41]). Consequently, at Time 2 participants in the Cued Recall 
Interview group compared with those in the Free Recall Interview group were 
significant less confidence in (i) signing a statement (Mdiff. = -18.50, p = .003; 95% 
CI [-30.36, -6.63]), (ii) participating in an ID task and (Mdiff. = -20.50, p = .014; 95% 
CI [-36.63, -4.36]); (iii) presenting evidence in Court (Mdiff. = -20.00, p = .001; 95% 
CI [-31.01, -8.99]). 
In summary, we found support for Hypothesis 2, in that after the initial 
interview participants in the Cued Recall group decreased their confidence in 
engaging with the Criminal Justice System. On the contrary, confidence in engaging 
with the CJS for participants in the Free Recall group did not change significantly 













Table 5.2. Means (and Standard Deviations) of confidence in memory related to 
talking to the police, signing a statement, participating in an ID task, and presenting 
evidence in Court reported at Time 1 and Time 2 in the Cued Recall Interview and 



































Talking to the 
police 
Time 1 64.00 (24.58) 66.50 (15.65) 
Time 2 60.00 (21.52) 72.00 (15.76) 
Signing a 
statement  
Time 1 66.50 (22.07) 68.00 (18.80) 
Time 2 54.00 (20.36) 72.50 (16.50) 
Attending ID task  Time 1 59.50 (24.59) 62.00 (15.42) 
Time 2  46.00 (30.15) 66.50 (18.99) 
Presenting 
evidence in Court 
Time 1 55.00 (19.86) 58.50 (15.98) 
Time 2  42.00 (18.23) 62.00 (16.09) 
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Table 5.3. Results of the 2 X 2 ANOVAs 
 
Talking to the police 
Result variables df test value p value Effect size 
(np2) 
Main effect Interview (1, 38) F = .31 = .58 η2p = .01 
Main effect Time (1, 38) F = 1.85 = .18 η2p = .05 
Interaction Interview x 
Time 
(1, 38) F = .01 = .92 η2p = .01 
Signing a statement 
Main effect Interview (1, 38) F = 3.32 = .07 η2p = .08 
Main effect Time (1, 38) F = 1.98 = .16 η2p = .05 
Interaction Interview x 
Time 
(1, 38) F = 8.95 = .005** η2p =.19 
Participating in an ID task 
Main effect Interview (1, 38) F = 3.12 = .08 η2p = .07 
Main effect Time (1, 38) F = 1.73 = .17 η2p = .04 
Interaction Interview x 
Time  
(1, 38) F = 7.71 = .008** η2p = .17 
Presenting evidence in Court 
Main effect Interview (1, 38) F = 5.74 = .022 η2p = .13 
Main effect Time (1, 38) F = 3.21 = .08 η2p = .07 
Interaction Interview x 
Time  
(1, 38) F = 9.69 = .004** η2p = .20 
** indicates significance at p < .01 
 
Memory recall at Time 2 
At Time 2, all participants were given the same Free Recall test. Here we 
predicted that participants in the Cued Recall Interview group – which reported 
lowered confidence following the interview, would report poorer quality of 
information (as measured by: amount of correct details, and accuracy of information) 
compared to those in the Free Recall Interview group. However, a series of 
Independent t-tests showed no difference in either the amount of correct details 
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reported, t(38) = -1.07, p = .28, d = -.33, (Mdiff. = -5.45, 95% CI [-15.73, 4.81]), or in 
the accuracy of information reported, t(38) = -.78, p = .43, d = -.25, (Mdiff. = -1.32, 
95% CI [-4.71, 2.07]). See Table 5.4 for Means and Standard Deviations.  
In summary, we found no support for our Hypothesis 3; in particular, 
participants in the Cued Recall group, despite showing a drop in confidence after the 
initial interview, did not report poorer quality accounts in a subsequent recall 
attempt, as measured by the amount of correct details and the overall accuracy of the 
details reported at Time 2. 
 
Table 5.4. Means (and Standard Deviations) of amount of correct details, amount of 
incorrect details, and accuracy of information at Time 2 for the Cued Recall 







Relation between confidence and memory recall at Time 2 
Our Hypothesis 3 predicted that the decrease in confidence reported after the 
initial interview would lead to poorer quality accounts reported at Time 2. Thus, we 
expected that decreased confidence would be correlated with the amount of correct 
details and the accuracy of the information reported at Time 2. For each participant 
we calculated a decrease in confidence measure by subtracting the confidence ratings 
reported at Time 1 from the confidence ratings reported at Time 2. Following this, 
Pearson Correlations were conducted between decreased confidence and (i) amount 
of correct details, and (ii) accuracy of the details reported at Time 2. We found a 
non-significant relationship between the decreased confidence and both the amount 
of correct details reported at Time 2, r(38) = .06, p = .71; and the accuracy of the 
information reported, r(38) = -.06, p = .69.  
 In summary, contrary to our expectations, we found no support for the 
hypotheses that decreased confidence after the initial interview is associated with the 
amount or accuracy of the information reported at Time 2. 




Correct details  46.45 (16.56) 51.90 (15.48) 




Study 2 further investigated how and why the quality of an initial interview 
can affect eyewitness confidence. The primary aim was to understand when 
eyewitness confidence is likely to change and what are the factors of an interview 
likely to cause such change. We predicted that when the initial interview triggers a 
free or undirected retrieval, participants are less likely to think about the information 
they do not know and therefore their confidence is unlikely to change. On the 
contrary when the interview directs participants’ retrieval, their attention is more 
likely to focus on the information they do not know and therefore their confidence is 
more likely to decrease. We found support for this hypothesis in that participants that 
received a Cued Recall Interview decreased their confidence after the initial 
interview, while participants in the Free Recall Interview group showed stable 
confidence after the initial interview. Furthermore, the results of Study 2 confirm the 
predictions that confidence in Engaging with the Criminal Justice System changed in 
a similar direction. Thus, after the initial interview participants in the Cued Recall 
Interview were less confident is signing a statement about what they had witnessed, 
providing identification evidence, and presenting evidence in Court. Finally, we 
speculated that that decreased confidence following the initial interview would 
impact the quality of information subsequently reported. However, we found no 
support for this hypothesis, as shown by the trivial difference in the quality of 
information reported at Time 2 by participants in the two interview groups, and by 
the non-significant correlation between decreased confidence and amount of correct 
details and accuracy of the information reported at Time 2. 
 Researchers have shown that the information reported in response to a free 
report invitation is more likely to be associated with higher confidence compared 
with information reported in response to specific or follow up questions (Allwood et 
al., 2008; Knutsson, et al., 2011; Sharps et al., 2012), and they have argued that this 
is due to the higher control that participants have over their own memory search in 
response to free recall invitations compared to more specific questions. However, we 
did not know whether these differences lead to potential changes in confidence. In 
Study 2, we adopted a within-subjects methodology and investigated the conditions 
of the interview that are more likely to cause confidence changes and those that are 
more likely to leave confidence stable. In line with our hypothesis, Study 2 
confirmed that eyewitness confidence can change after an interview, however such 
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change is contingent on the quality of the initial interview. A good practice initial 
interview – that promotes a free and undirected retrieval, is more likely to leave 
confidence unchanged. On the contrary, a poor practice interview - that directs 
participants’ retrieval on specific details of the memory is more likely to decrease 
confidence.  
 In Study 2 we found evidence that the quality of the initial interview can 
influence confidence in engaging with the Criminal Justice System. Therefore, 
practitioners should be aware that when the interviewing process exposes potential 
gaps in memory, and eyewitnesses experience their memory as less good than they 
initially thought, they might lose confidence in their ability to engage with the 
investigation and its stages. This is concerning for the legal context, because 
decreased confidence following a poor interview might lead eyewitness to become 
reluctant in taking part in future interviews and cooperate further with the police. 
Furthermore, the loss of confidence in the quality of own memory, could lead 
eyewitnesses to perceive themselves as unable to help the investigation, with 
detrimental consequence for their wellbeing – especially if the eyewitness is also the 
victim of the crime being investigated (Diesen, 2012).  
 On the other hand, Study 2 shows that decreased confidence following a poor 
initial interview might not necessarily lead participants to report poorer accounts in a 
subsequent recall attempt. Research on metamemory has showed that confidence is 
pivotal in the control the information reported (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996), and it is 
surprising that the decreased confidence in the quality of own memory did not show 
the expected effects on subsequent memory performance. However, our 
methodology is unlikely to capture the effect that decreased confidence might have 
had on eyewitness’s cognitive processes. For example, decreased confidence after 
the initial interview could have affected participants’ monitoring process. It is 
possible that decreased confidence led participants to systematically associate 
lowered confidence to the details they retrieve independently on their objective 
accuracy. However, in Study 2 the methodology does not allow us to investigate 
participants’ monitoring process. 
Similarly, the statistical tests used in Study 2 are not appropriate to 
investigate the relation between confidence and accuracy of information reported. 
Previous research suggests that correlation analysis might not be ideal to investigate 
the relation between confidence and accuracy. In particular, researchers suggest that 
97 
 
this analysis can provide useful information relating to the shared variance between 
subjective confidence and objective accuracy, but it does not provide information 
about over or under-confidence (i.e., Brewer & Wells, 2006; Brewer et al., 2002; 
Juslin et al., 1996; Weber & Brewer, 2004; Wixted et al., 2015). Thus, the analysis 
adopted in Study 2 might be unable to fully capture the effect that decreased 
confidence had on how participants were monitoring the accuracy of their own 
memory. 
In conclusion Study 2 provide evidence that eyewitness confidence is not 
stable, and that the quality of an initial interview can impact memory confidence. An 
interview that promotes free retrieval is unlike to cause shifts in confidence, 
presumably because eyewitness do not focus their attention on information unknown, 
and they are likely to only think about information they do know about. On the 
contrary, an interview that directs eyewitness’ attention towards specific details is 
more likely to cause shifts in confidence because attention is more likely to be 
directed towards unknown information. Furthermore, we found evidence that a poor 
practice interview, compared with a good practice interview, is more likely to 
decrease confidence in one’s own memory and confidence in engaging with the 
Criminal Justice System. Finally, we found no evidence that decreased confidence 
following a poor practice interview leads participants to report poorer accounts in a 
subsequent recall attempt.  
In Study 3, we aim to better understand the cognitive processes that underpin 
our results. In particular we investigate further the specific aspects of the directed 
retrieval process (i.e., retrieval products) likely to cause decreased confidence 
following a poor practice interview. Furthermore, by adopting more appropriate 
methodologies and statistical tests, we examine whether decreased confidence 
impacts eyewitnesses’ monitoring (Study 3a) and control (Study 3b) of the 
information subsequently reported. 
 





Chapter 6: Study 3. Investigating the effect of ease of retrieval on memory 
confidence and subsequent memory output and memory monitoring  
 
Introduction  
Study 2 tested the hypothesis that when participants engage in a free and 
undirected retrieval task (i.e., Free Recall Interview) they only recall the information 
they are sure about and do not necessarily focus their attention on the information 
they do not know, thus their confidence is unlikely to change. On the contrary, when 
participants answer questions and their retrieval is directed (i.e., Cued Recall 
Interview), their attention is more likely to be led towards unknown information, 
therefore confidence is more likely to decrease. We also expected that the confidence 
in engaging with the CJS would change in the same direction as confidence in the 
own memory. Finally, we speculated that decreased confidence following a poor 
practice initial interview would lead participants to report poorer accounts in a 
subsequent recall attempt.  
As expected, confidence decreased only after a Cued Recall Interview, while 
it remained stable following a Free Recall Interview. Furthermore, confidence in 
engaging with the CJS followed a similar pattern; as such, confidence in signing a 
statement, providing identification evidence, and providing evidence in Court 
decreased following a Cued Recall Interview, while it remained stable following a 
Free Recall Interview. However, contrary to our predictions decreased confidence 
did not lead participants to report fewer or less accurate information and was not 
associated with the amount of correct details and the accuracy of the details reported 
in a subsequent recall attempt. 
 In Study 3a we investigated the cognitive processes that underpin these 
results. In particular, we focus our attention on (i) the specific cognitive processes 
that are likely to lead to decreased confidence, and (ii) the effects that decreased 
confidence following an interview has on subsequent memory monitoring.  
 
Rationale: expanding the gaps in memory hypothesis  
In Study 2 we speculated that eyewitness confidence might decrease only 
when during the search in memory, participants become aware of details they do not 
know. This is likely to promote the impression that the memory for the event seen is 
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less good than they had previously thought. During a Cued Recall Interview, in 
answer to each question participants attempt to retrieve the information triggered by 
the question; if this is not accessible or not available, participants are likely to 
experience a degree of retrieval difficulty. The retrieval difficulty that derives from 
attempting to access unavailable or un-accessible information can in turn lead to 
reduced memory confidence. However, during a Free Recall Interview, participants 
are unlikely to experience retrieval difficulty, presumably because they are more 
likely to search for the details they know and that are easy to access. In Study 3a we 
investigate whether retrieval difficulty experienced when answering different initial 
recall tests might underpin the decrease in confidence following an initial recall test. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Raghubir and Menon (2005) suggested that 
unexpected retrieval difficulty can be attributed to the quality of own memory. 
Furthermore, the metamemory literature has provided evidence that the ease of 
retrieval influences subsequently made confidence judgements relating to the quality 
of own memory (e.g., Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; Gustafsson et al., 2019; Lindholm et 
al., 2018). Further evidence that the ease of retrieval is used to build confidence 
judgements regarding the quality of own memory comes from the literature 
manipulating the difficulty of the retrieval task (Belli et al., 1998; Gregg et al., 2019; 
Merckelbach et al., 2001; Schwarz et al., 1991; Winkielman et al., 1998). Building 
on this literature we extend the gap in memory hypothesis and speculate that 
confidence is likely to change as a function of the ease of retrieval experienced 
during the initial recall attempt. In particular, confidence is more likely to decrease 
when the recall test is likely to trigger details that are difficult to retrieve. On the 
contrary when the recall test is unlikely to trigger information difficult to retrieve, 
confidence is more likely to remain stable. 
Confidence is pivotal in the regulation of information reported (Koriat & 
Goldsmith, 1996), but in Study 2 we found no evidence that decreased confidence 
leads participants to report poorer accounts. However, we argued that due to our 
methodology we were unable to fully understand the impact of decreased confidence 
on eyewitnesses’ monitoring of information subsequently reported. For example, it is 
possible that decreased confidence in the quality of own memory led participants to 
systematically associate lowered confidence to the details they subsequently recalled, 
independently on their objective accuracy. Thus, a second aim of Study 3a is to 
investigate whether decreased confidence following an initial recall test influences 
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eyewitnesses’ monitoring process. In order to measure the relationship between the 
confidence judgements and the accuracy of the information subsequently reported we 
used a different statistical test: the calibration analysis.  
 
From correlation to calibration 
It has been suggested that correlation analysis might not be the ideal test to 
investigate the relationship between confidence and accuracy, and researchers have 
proposed the use of calibration analysis instead (Brewer et al., 2002; Juslin et al, 
1996; Olsson, 2000). One major advantage of the calibration analysis is that it 
provides clear information about how participants diverge from perfect calibration, 
and whether and to what extent they over or underestimate the accuracy of their own 
memory. On the contrary, a correlation can only provide information about the 
shared variance between confidence and accuracy and the direction and strength of 
their relationship. As such, researchers have argued that calibration might be more 
informative for the CJS, and Juslin et al. (1996) provided an example to explain this 
advantage. If an eyewitness is 80% confident about a positive identification made, 
the Court might want to know how reliable an identification made with 80% 
confidence really is. In this circumstance information about how over or 
underconfident eyewitnesses can be in an identification made is more useful than 
knowing about the shared variance between confidence and accuracy.  
 Calibration analysis measures the extent to which subjective confidence 
matches objective accuracy. It is calculated by plotting the proportion of correct 
answers given in each confidence category (i.e., 0-20%, 30-40%, 50-60%, 70-80%, 
90-100%). The resulting calibration curve provides information about perfect 
calibration and divergence from it. Here, the diagonal line represents perfect 
calibration; on the contrary a curve that fall above the diagonal line shows under-
confidence, and a curve that falls below the diagonal line shows overconfidence. A 
participant is perfectly calibrated if as an example, 80% of the correct answers given 
is associated with 80% confidence. However, if 80% of the correct answers is given 
with 40% confidence, the participant is under-confident, i.e., their confidence 
judgements are underestimating the probability of correctness of their own answers. 
Similarly, if 80% of the correct answers is given with 100% confidence, the 
participant is overestimating the probability of correctness of their own answers, and 
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therefore they are showing overconfidence in the accuracy of their memory. Two 
further indexes can be calculated to describe the curve: the calibration index (C-
index), and the over/under-confidence index (O/U confidence index). C-index is 
calculated with the equation 1 by finding the differences between mean confidence 
(cj) and proportion correct answers (aj) for each confidence category (j), then 
multiplying the squared difference by the number of total answers (nj) given in the 
category, and finally by summing those across confidence categories and dividing 
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  (1) 
 
C-index ranges between 0 – representing perfect calibration, and 1 - representing 
poor calibration. In order to calculate the O/U confidence index the same formula is 
used, however the differences between mean confidence and proportion correct are 
not squared. O/U confidence index ranges between -1 and +1, whereby negative 
scores represent under-confidence and positive scores represent over-confidence (for 
a guide on how to calculate C-index and O/U confidence index see Brewer, et al. 
2002; Brewer & Wells, 2006). Finally, a further index - the Adjusted-Normalised 
Discrimination Index (ANDI) can be calculated to measure whether participants are 
using their confidence judgements to successfully discriminate between correct and 
incorrect answers.   
 






    (2)                                𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 =  𝑁𝑁∗𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁−𝑇𝑇+1
𝑁𝑁−𝑇𝑇+1
     (3)               
 
In formula 2, ct represents the mean proportion of correct responses in each 
confidence category (t), and c is the overall proportion of correct answers given. The 
NDI is adjusted for number of confidence categories (T), and number of total 
answers (N) (see formula 3), (for a detailed guide on how to calculate ANDI see 
Yaniv et al., 1991). 
 In Study 3a we adopted the calibration analysis to investigate how effectively 





Study 3a aims to investigate (i) the specific cognitive processes that are likely 
to lead to decreased confidence, and (ii) the effects that decreased confidence 
following an initial recall test has on subsequent memory monitoring. We asked 
participants to recall the event seen on two occasions. At Time 1, they answered 
either a Difficult Cued Recall, and Easy Cued Recall, or a Free Recall initial test, 
while a fourth group did not recall the event at this stage (Control group). At Time 2 
half of the sample was given a second Free Recall test, while the other half answered 
a Neutral Cued Recall test. Confidence was measured before and after the initial 
interview and after the second Free Recall test. Furthermore, a confidence rating was 
required after each question of the initial recall test for participants in Difficult Cued 
Recall and Easy Cued Recall group, and for each question of the Neutral Cued Recall 
test. The hypotheses and predictions are as follows: 
 
H1: Confidence will decrease only when participants are more likely to 
experience retrieval difficulty in accessing details in their memory. On the contrary 
when participants are less likely to experience retrieval difficulty confidence is less 
likely to change. 
Prediction: Confidence is expected to decrease only in the Difficult Cued Recall 
group. While confidence is expected to remain stable in the Easy Cued Recall, Free 
Recall, and Control group. 
 
H2: Decreased confidence reported by participants in the Difficult Cued 
Recall group will have an impact on subsequent memory monitoring. 
Prediction: We predict that participants in this group will not report poorer accounts 
(in the second Free Recall test) but will show under-confidence in the information 




We used 4 (Initial Recall Test: Difficult Cued Recall, Easy Cued Recall, Free 
Recall, and Control) x 3 (Confidence Measurement Time: Time 1 - before Initial 
Recall, Time 2 - after Initial Recall, and Time 3 - after Second Recall) mixed design, 
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with confidence measured within subjects. The dependent variables related to 
confidence were: (a) confidence at Time 1 (before the Initial Recall test), (b) 
confidence at Time 2 (after the Initial Recall test), (c) and confidence at Time 3 (after 
the Second Recall test).  
The dependent variables for memory report in the second Free Recall test 
included; (d) amount of correct information and (e) accuracy of information reported 
in the second Free Recall test. The dependent variables for confidence-accuracy 
calibration after the second Neutral Cued Recall test were: (f) C-index, (g) ANDI, 
and (h) OU (over/under-confidence) index. 
 
Participants 
A total of 134 participants took part in the study (99 females, age range 18 to 
51 years, M = 23.61, SD = 6.56). They were recruited among students and staff 
members of all departments at Goldsmiths University. Participants took part in the 
experiment in exchange for either course credits, or £5 compensation.  
 
Materials 
Video stimulus  
The video was the same as described for Study 1, it involved a robbery 
carried out in a Blockbuster video-rental store.  
 
Time 1: Initial Recall Test  
Difficult Cued Recall and Easy Cued Recall Test. The Difficult Cued 
Recall and Easy Cued Recall questions included 16 closed questions (Appendix F). 
To build the set of questions we followed a two stages process. First, we randomly 
selected 10 Free Recall transcripts from Study 2 and calculated the mean correct 
details reported, for each character in each scene. This allowed us to identify the 
scenes and the characters in the video that participants remembered the most. We 
then formulated 38 potentially easy questions on details relating to the scenes and the 
characters with numerically higher means; and 39 potentially difficult questions on 
details relating to scenes and characters with numerically lower means. Second, we 
conducted a pilot test where participants (n = 23) were shown the target video 
followed by the 77 questions. Participants were asked to respond only if they felt 
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they were able to answer the question, and to write ‘I don’t know’ where appropriate 
rather than guessing. Finally, we selected 16 difficult questions with a mean correct 
percentage response rate lower than 40 (overall Mean = 21.51; range = 8 to 33), and 
16 easy questions with a mean correct response rate higher than 60 (overall Mean = 
81.75; range = 63 to 100).  
 
Free Recall. In the Free Recall group participants were asked to report any 
information that they could remember about the target event. In order to allow for 
free control on memory reporting, no further instructions were given. The instruction 
was as follows: “Please write down in your own words everything you remember 
about the video. Use the space below. There is no time limit for this task”. 
 
Control. The control task participants were presented with four geometric 
images, and were required to select the image that matched a single rotated image. 
The task included nine different trials. The overall duration to complete the task was 
similar to that of the two Cued Recall groups. 
 
Time 2: Second Test 
Second Free Recall Test. The instruction for this test was as described for 
the Free Recall test described above; participants were asked to “Write down in your 
own words everything you remember about the video. Use the space below. There is 
no time limit for this task”. 
 
Second Neutral Cued Recall Test. This test constituted eight closed 
questions (Appendix G). In order to identify the neutral questions, we used data from 
the pilot study described above. From this, we chose eight questions associated with 
a mean correct response rate of between 40 and 60 (overall Mean = 48.37; range = 
45 to 54). In order to discourage guessing, participants were instructed to write “I 
don’t know” if they were not sure about their response. The instruction was as 
follows: “Please answer the questions and provide a confidence rating to indicate 
how confident you are that your answer is correct. It is very important that you don’t 





Confidence was measured immediately after the video and before the Initial 
Recall test, immediately after the Initial Recall, and immediately after the second 
recall. Participants were asked to think about their memory for the event, and rate 
how confident they were that the information they remembered could help the police 
to accurately reconstruct the event. The confidence scale ranged from 0% to 100%, 
where 0 indicated ‘not confident at all’, and 100 indicated ‘completely confident’. 
The confidence question was the same across the three-points time.  
 
Procedure 
Participants were tested either individually or in small groups (up to 10) in a 
computer laboratory in the university campus. The study was administered as a 
Qualtrics survey 
(https://goldpsych.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_50hXwUsDGDzEKtD) and took 
between 20 and 30 minutes to complete. The survey was designed to randomly 
allocate participants to each condition2. As soon as the participant(s) arrived in the 
laboratory, they were invited to take a seat in front of the computer and were given 
the headphones. During group testing we ensured participants could only see their 
monitor by placing them far apart from each other. After reading the consent form 
participants were shown the non-violent video clip and then completed a three-
minute word-search filler task. Following this, participants recalled the event 
accordingly to the Initial Recall test they were assigned to (i.e., Difficult Cued 
Recall, Easy Cued Recall, or Free Recall), the Control group did not recall the event 
at this stage, rather they completed the rotation task as described above. In the 
Difficult Cued Recall and Easy Cued Recall test participants were asked to provide a 
confidence rating in relation to each answer given. After this, participants were 
presented with a three-minute word-search filler task, which was different from the 
first they had completed before. Finally, participants in all groups were given the 
second Recall test. Here, sixty-nine participants were allocated to the second Free 
                                               
2 However, the function “evenly present elements” was not activated, thus groups 
have unequal number of participants. There were 35 participants in Difficult Cued 
Recall, 32 in the Easy Cued Recall, 33 in the Free Recall, and 34 in the Control 
group. In the Second Recall test, 69 participants answered the second Free Recall test 
and 65 answered the second Neutral Cued Recall test.  
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Recall test, while sixty-five participants were assigned to the second Neutral Cued 
Recall test. All participants reported a confidence rating immediately after watching 
the video but before the Initial Recall, immediately after the Initial Recall test, and 
immediately after the second Recall test (see Figure 6.1). Furthermore, in the second 
Neutral Cued Recall test, participants provided a confidence rating in relation to each 










Figure 6.1. Procedure of Study 3a 
 
Coding of the second Free Recall Test 
Information reported in the second Free Recall test was transcribed and coded 
for amount and accuracy. Coding was conducted accordingly to the same principles 
illustrated for Study 1. In order to ensure inter-coder reliability an independent 
researcher coded 14 (20%) randomly selected second Free Recall tests. The 
percentage agreement between coders was found to be high (95%). Cohen’s Kappa 
was .84, reflecting almost perfect agreement (McHugh, 2012). 
 
Results 
A conventional alpha level of .05 was used, where relevant for non-
significant results we present Bayesian analysis (conducted with JASP software) in 
order to quantify evidence in support of the null hypothesis. We interpret Bayes 
factors by using Jarosz and Wiley’s (2014) guidelines whereby a BF01 of 1-3 is 
interpreted as anecdotal evidence in support of the null, 3-10 as moderate, 10-30 as 
strong, and 30-100 as very strong (see also Wagenmakers et al., 2018). 
 
Manipulation check 
Video Confidence Time 1 
Difficult Cued Recall 
Easy Cued Recall 
Free Recall 
Control 
Confidence Time 2 Confidence at Time 3 
second Free Recall 





First, we tested whether during the initial recall participants in the Difficult 
Cued Recall group were experiencing lower ease of retrieval compared with those in 
the Easy Cued Recall group. In order to do so, we looked at the number of “I don’t 
know” responses reported. These responses suggest that participants might have 
experienced a degree of difficulty when attempting to access a suitable answer to the 
question but failing to do so. As expected, participants in the Difficult Cued Recall 
reported more “I don’t know” responses (M = 5.14, SD = 3.04) than those in the 
Easy Cued Recall group (M = 1.31, SD = 1.49) and this difference was significant 
t(65) = 6.45, p < .001, d = 1.59, (Mdiff = 3.83, 95% CI [2.64, 5.01]). Following this, 
we tested whether participants in the Difficult Cued Recall group were overall less 
confident in the answers given to the initial recall test compared with those in the 
Easy Cued Recall test. As expected, confidence in answers to the Difficult Cued 
Recall was lower (M = 41.58, SD = 17.68) than confidence in the answers to the 
Easy Cued Recall questions (M = 77.19, SD = 15.81), and this difference was 




We performed a 2 x 4 mixed Analysis of Variance with confidence 
measurement time (Time 1 - before Initial Recall, and Time 2 - after Initial Recall) as 
a within-subjects factor, and Initial Recall test (Difficult Cued Recall, Easy Cued 
Recall, Free Recall, and Control) as a between-subjects factor. We found a 
significant main effect of Time on confidence, F(1, 130) = 41.93, p < .001, η2p = .24, 
a significant main effect of Initial Recall test on confidence F(3, 130) = 4.58, p = 
.004, η2p  = .09, and a significant interaction F(3, 130) = 34.73, p < .001, η2p = .44. A 
post-hoc power analysis conducted in G*power (Erdfelder et al., 1996), with α = .05, 
n = 134, and the average of the observed effect sizes, yielded a power (1 – β) of .99 
(ranging from .70 to 1). This analysis suggests the study might be slightly 
underpowered and unable to detect a small size effect. Bonferroni post hoc tests 
showed that confidence before the Initial Recall test was not different between 
groups (see Table 6.1 for Means and Standard Deviations). At Time 2, participants in 
the Difficult Cued Recall group were significantly less confident than those in the 
Easy Cued Recall (Mdiff  = -18.75, p < .001, 95% CI [-30.57, -6.94]), the Free Recall 
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(Mdiff  = -27.78, p < .001, 95% CI [-39.50, -16.06]), and Control group (Mdiff  = -
24.51, p < .001, 95% CI [-36.14, -12.88]). No other significant differences between 
groups were found at this time point.  
Furthermore, at Time 2, confidence for participants in the Difficult Cued 
Recall group was significantly lower compared with confidence reported at Time 1 
(Mdiff  = -28.28, p < .001, 95% CI [-33.00, -23.57]). On the contrary confidence for 
participants in the Easy Cued Recall, Free Recall and Control group did not show a 
significant change compared with confidence reported at Time 1. In sum, as 
expected, only the Difficult Cued Recall questions caused a drop in subjective 
confidence in the memory of the target event. 
 An exploratory analysis was performed on confidence ratings reported at 
Time 3 - after the second Recall test for participants that completed the Free Recall 
test only. Here we were interested in examining if confidence for participants in the 
Difficult Cued Recall group would increase after the second Free Recall test. A 3 x 4 
mixed Analysis of Variance with confidence measurement time (Time 1 - before 
Initial Recall, Time 2 - after Initial Recall, and Time 3 - after the second Free Recall 
test) as a within-subjects factor, and Initial Recall test (Difficult Cued Recall, Easy 
Cued Recall, Free Recall, and Control) as a between-subjects factor was used. The 
assumption of sphericity was violated therefore we looked at Greenhouse-Geisser 
estimates. There was a significant main effect of Time on confidence, F(1.83, 
118.91) = 11.21, p < .001, η2p = .15, a significant main effect of Initial Recall test on 
confidence F(3,65) = 3.28, p = .03, η2p  = .13, and a significant interaction F(5.49, 
118.91) = 7.30, p < .001, η2p = .25. Bonferroni post hoc comparisons showed that at 
Time 3 participants in the Difficult Cued Recall group did not increase their 
confidence significantly (Mdiff = 7.22, p = .09, 95% CI [-.89, 15.34]). On the 
contrary participants in the Easy Cued Recall group and Control group showed a 
significant increase in confidence, respectively (Mdiff  = 13.52, p = .001, 95% CI 
[5.17, 21.88]), and (Mdiff  = 11.77, p = .003, 95% CI [3.41, 20.12]). At Time 3, 
participants in the Difficult Cued Recall group were significantly less confidence 
than those in the Free Recall group (Mdiff  = -18.49, p = .04, 95% CI [-36.47, -.51]), 
and Control group (Mdiff  = -23.20, p = .005, 95% CI [-41.18, -5.22]), but not less 
confidence than participants in the Easy Cued Recall group (Mdiff  = -17.90, p = .05, 
95% CI [-35.89, .07]), although this last result approached statistical significance. 
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Finally, participants in the Free Recall group did not show any significant change in 
confidence at Time 3.  
In sum, after the second Free Recall test, participants in the Difficult Cued 
Recall group did not increase their confidence and therefore remained significantly 
less confident than participants in the Free Recall and Control group. 
 
Table 6.1. Means (and Standard Deviations) of confidence provided at Time 1 and 
Time 2 in the four groups.  
 Time 1 Time 2 
Difficult Cued Recall 61.71 (17.57) 33.43 (18.30) 
Easy Cued Recall  55.31 (17.41) 52.19 (17.36) 
Free recall  56.67 (14.50) 62.42 (18.88) 
Control 62.65 (16.72) 56.47 (16.67) 
 
Performance in the second Free Recall Test 
We did not expect decreased confidence following an initial recall test to 
influence the quality of the information reported in the second Free Recall test. A 
series of four one-way Analyses of Variance tests, revealed no significant difference 
between groups in amount of correct information F(3, 65) = .76, p = .51, η2 = .03 or 
accuracy of the information reported in the second recall test F(3, 65) = .34, p = .80, 
η2 = .02 (see Table 6.2 for Means and Standard Deviations).  
We also conducted a Bayesian analysis which compares the “null model” and 
“model with the expected effect” in order to assess the model that better predicts our 
data. We have moderate to strong evidence in support of the null for number of 
correct answers (BF01 = 5.85) (i.e. our data are approximately 6 times as likely to 
occur under the null model as they are under the alternative model), and accuracy 
(BF01 = 8.99). In line with the results of Study 2, these findings suggest that the 
decreased confidence after the initial recall test does not impact the number of 








Table 6.2. Means (and Standard Deviations) of correct details and accuracy of the 
information reported in the second Free Recall test in the four groups.  
 




Free Recall Control 
correct details 47.50 (23.71) 50.88 (19.88) 47.18 (15.28) 56.47 (21.78) 
% accuracy 
rate 
90.47 (5.63) 90.96 (4.68) 90.80 (5.39) 92.22 (6.09) 
 
Monitoring in the second Neutral Cued Recall Test 
We were interested in investigating the effect of decreased confidence 
following an initial recall test on confidence-accuracy calibration in the second 
Neutral Cued Recall test. Here, we expected participants in the Difficult Cued Recall 
group to show under-confidence in the information reported. In order to test this 
hypothesis each answer was coded as correct if present in the video or incorrect if not 
present in the video. The ‘Don’t know’ answers were coded as incorrect and these 
were always associated with 0% confidence3. The confidence categories were 
reduced from 11 (0%, 10%, ... 100%) to five (0-20%, 30-40%, 50-60%, 70-80% and 
90-100%). A series of one-way ANOVAs showed that there was no difference 
between groups in C-index F(3, 64) = 1.21, p = .31, η2p = .05; or under/over-
confidence index F(3, 64) = .17, p = .91, η2p = .01, and no difference in the ANDI 
F(3, 64) = .40, p = .75, η2p = .01 (see Table 6.3 for Means and Standard Deviations 
and Figure 6.2 for the calibration curves).  
 Bayesian analysis showed we have moderate to strong evidence in support of 
the null for C-index (BF01 = 3.62), ANDI (BF01 = 7.99), and over/under-confidence 
index (BF01 = 10.02). These results suggest that the change in confidence after the 
initial recall test does not impact confidence-accuracy calibration in a subsequent 
memory test.  
 
                                               
3 There was no difference between groups in the number of don’t know answers 
reported in the second Neutral Cued Recall test F(3, 64) = 1.57, p = .21, η2p = .06. 
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Table 6.3. Means (and Standard Deviations) of the C-index, OU index and ANDI in 
the four group. 
 




Free Recall Control 
C- index .16 (.13)  .09 (.07) .15 (.09) .14 (.09) 
OU index .08 (.25) .09 (.13) .06 (.22) .11 (.19) 






Figure 6.2. Calibration curves for the Difficult Cued Recall, Easy Cued Recall, Free 
Recall, and Control group in Study 3a. 
 
Discussion  
Study 3a investigated (i) the cognitive process that underpin decreased 




















confidence following an initial recall attempt on subsequent memory monitoring. We 
speculated that confidence would only decrease when during the retrieval process 
participants are likely to experience retrieval difficulty. As such, we expected only 
participants in the Difficult Cued Recall group to report decreased confidence 
following the initial recall test. Furthermore, we expected decreased confidence to 
affect participants’ calibration and to lead them to systematically associate lower 
confidence judgements to the information subsequently reported. Our results only 
partially support our hypotheses.  
In particular, as predicted participants’ confidence decreased only in the 
Difficult Cued Recall group, presumably because during the initial recall test 
participants in this group were consistently required to report information difficult to 
recall. This experienced difficulty in answering the questions of the initial recall test 
might have led participants to believe that their memory was poorer than they 
initially thought. However, contrary to participants in the Difficult Cued Recall 
group, participants in the Easy Cued Recall group were more likely to easily recall 
the details triggered by the questions and were unlikely to engage in an effortful 
retrieval search. Thus, their confidence in the quality of the target memory remained 
stable. Similarly, participants in the Free Recall group were unlikely to experience 
retrieval difficulty, presumably because they only focused their attention on the 
details they knew and that were easily accessible, and did not necessarily attempt to 
retrieve information they did not know or that were difficult to recall. Thus, they did 
not report decreased confidence after the initial recall test.  
Overall, these results are in line with and extend the results of Study 2. Like 
in Study 2, in Study 3a we found evidence that a Free Recall test is less likely to 
cause significant shifts in confidence compared with a Cued Recall test. However, 
we found that the Cued Recall questions are likely to cause decreased confidence 
only when they trigger information that are difficult to remember. In other words, 
participants are likely to decrease their confidence when they experience a degree of 
retrieval difficulty during the initial test. As such, it is not necessarily the type of 
question that causes the decrease in confidence following an initial recall attempt, but 
rather the difficulty with which the to-be-remembered detail is retrieved. 
Consequently, when the Cued Recall question is easy or triggers details that are 
known and easily retrieved, participants’ confidence is not likely to change. This 
result is important and provides initial evidence that directed retrieval can leave 
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confidence unaltered in so far as it directs participants’ attention towards information 
that are not experienced as difficult to recall.  
We found no support for our second hypothesis. As in Study 2 decreased 
confidence following an initial recall test did not lead participants to report poorer 
accounts in a second Free Recall test. However, contrary to our expectation 
decreased confidence (i) did not lead to under-confidence - as showed by the lack of 
difference between groups in Over/Under-confidence index, and (ii) did not affect 
how participants monitored the information they reported subsequently - as shown by 
the lack of difference between groups in the Calibration index and ANDI. Overall, 
the calibration indexes across groups ranged between .09 and .16 and were relatively 
close to 0 - representing perfect calibration. While the over/under-confidence indexes 
ranged from .06 to .11 showing that participants across groups were only slightly 
overconfident. These results are in line with previous research and overall, they 
suggest that participants are relatively well calibrated when judging the quality of 
their own memory (e.g., Luna & Martin-Luengo, 2012; Pansky et al., 2005).  
In Study 3a we found no evidence that decreased confidence following an 
initial recall test influences subsequent calibration. However, we found initial 
evidence that decreased confidence might persist as an overall confidence judgement 
on the quality of one’s own memory. In particular, we collected confidence ratings 
after the second Free Recall test. In this time point, despite participants across groups 
receiving the same Free Recall test, participants in the Difficult Cued Recall group 
remained significantly less confident than participants in the Free Recall and Control 
group, and substantially less confident than those in the Easy Cued Recall group 
(although this last comparison only approached statistical significance). Taken 
together, these results show that decreased confidence following a difficult initial 
recall test might not impact the monitoring and the quality of the information 
reported subsequently, however decreased confidence can persist as an overall 
judgement on the quality of own memory. This result is important for the legal 
context, because participants who report lowered confidence are also likely to report 
lowered confidence in engaging with the CJS and its stages, as shown in Study 2. 
Furthermore, evidence exists that lowered confidence in the quality of one’s own 
memory might increase susceptibility to post-event suggestions (Jaeger et al., 2012; 
Leippe et al., 2006), thus undermining the reliability of the information that the 
eyewitness might report in future recall attempts. 
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 Despite these results Study 3a is not without limitations. In particular, the 
calibration analysis in this study was performed on a relatively small data set and 
therefore our results might not be sufficiently reliable. Researchers have argued that 
the calibration analysis requires a large set of data. For example, Juslin et al. (1996) 
suggest analysing at least 200 data points for each confidence category. This can be 
achieved by either increasing the number of participants or by increasing the number 
of confidence judgements collected (via increasing the number of questions asked). 
In Study 3a, sixty-five participants answered eight questions in the second Cued 
Recall test, and thus our data set did not reach the sufficient amount of data points4. 
We therefore believe that the results yielded by the calibration analysis in this study 
are indicative but not sufficiently reliable. Furthermore, the limited sample adopted 
in Study 3a raises the issue of the reliability of the remaining findings. In recent 
years, the replication crisis has highlighted the need to adopt more rigorous research 
practice (Earp & Trafimow, 2015), such as increasing the power of the studies by 
testing larger samples. In an attempt to address these limitations in Study 3a we 
reported a Bayesian analysis for the non-significant results in order to better quantify 
the evidence in favour of the null hypothesis. We found moderate to strong evidence 
for our non-significant results and believe that these can be considered an additional 
evidence that our results are due to a true null rather than a lack of statistical power. 
Nevertheless, in order to adhere with good practice in research in the following 
studies larger samples are adopted. 
In conclusion, in Study 3a we investigated (i) the cognitive processes that 
underpin the decrease in confidence following an initial recall test, and (ii) the effects 
of decreased confidence on participants’ monitoring process. We found evidence that 
confidence decreases only when participants are likely to experience retrieval 
difficulty during an initial recall test, on the contrary when participants are unlikely 
to experience retrieval difficulty confidence is likely to remain stable. However, 
decreased confidence following an initial recall test is unlikely to lead participants to 
report poorer accounts in a subsequent recall test, and to affect their monitoring 
process by leading to under-confidence. However, an exploratory analysis provided 
initial evidence that decreased confidence following an initial recall test might 
persists as an overall confidence judgement in the quality of own memory. We have 
                                               
4 In Study 3a the data points for each confidence category ranged from 19 to 45.  
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also highlighted that Study 3a presents a series of important limitations that 
undermine the reliability of these findings, thus Study 3b was designed to replicate 
































Study 3b was conducted primarily to address the limitations of Study 3a, and 
to increase the size of the sample, and the number of questions asked in the second 
Neutral Cued Recall test. Furthermore, we intended to address the H2 of Study 3a 
with a more appropriate methodology. In particular, in Study 3a we speculated that 
decreased confidence following an initial recall test (i) would not lead participants to 
report poorer quality information in a subsequent recall test, and (ii) it would affect 
their monitoring process, leading them to associate lowered confidence judgements 
to the information reported subsequently. While the second part of the hypothesis 
investigated how participants monitor the information subsequently reported, the first 
part relates to how participants control this information. 
 In Study 3a we investigated participants’ control over memory reporting with 
a Free Recall test. While this methodology enabled us to gauge the impact of 
decreased confidence on a memory freely reported subsequently, it might not be 
ideal to measure the impact that decreased confidence has on the control process. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, previous research investigating participants’ control over the 
information reported has often adopted the Quantity - Accuracy Profile (QAP) 
methodology (Koriat & Goldsmiths, 1996). This method allows researchers to better 
understand how the confidence judgements associated with the details retrieved is 
used to decide the details selected to be reported and those selected to be withheld. 
Thus, in Study 3b we aimed to replicate the results relating to the impact of 
retrieval difficulty experienced during the initial recall test on memory confidence, 
and to investigate the impact of decreased confidence on the monitoring and control 
of the information subsequently reported. The procedure was similar to that of Study 
3a. Participants were asked to recall the event seen on two occasions. At Time 1 they 
were given either a Difficult Cued Recall, and Easy Cued Recall, a Free Recall initial 
recall test, a fourth group did not recall the event at this stage (Control group). After 
a short delay, all participants received a second Neutral Cued Recall test. Confidence 
ratings were collected before and after the initial recall test, and after each question 
of the Neutral Cued Recall test, the Difficult Cued Recall, and the Easy Cued Recall 
initial recall test. We maintained the hypotheses identical to those of Study 3a: 
 
H1: Confidence after an initial recall attempt decreases only when participants 
experience retrieval difficulty. 
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Prediction: We expect confidence to decrease only for participants in the Difficult 
Cued Recall group. 
 
H2: Decreased confidence reported by participants in the Difficult Cued 
Recall group will have an impact on subsequent memory monitoring. 
Prediction: We predict that participants in the Difficult Cued Recall group will show 
under-confidence in the information subsequently reported. 
 
H3: Decreased confidence does no impact participants’ control process.  
Predictions: We expect participants in the Difficult Cued Recall group not to exert 




In Study 3b, we used a 4 (Initial Recall test: Difficult Cued Recall, Easy Cued 
Recall, Free Recall, and Control) x 2 (Confidence measurement time: Time 1 - 
before Initial Recall, Time 2 - after Initial Recall) mixed design, with confidence 
measured within subjects. Dependent variables for memory monitoring were; (a) C-
index, (b) ANDI, and (c) over/under-confidence measured in the Second Recall test. 
The dependent variable for memory control was (d) volunteering rate. 
 
Participants  
Participants were recruited online by using the platform Testable; the final 
sample included 169 participants (76 females, aged ranged from 18 to 56 years, M = 




The crime-video was as described for Study 1. While the Difficult Cued 
Recall, Easy Cued Recall, Free Recall, and Control tests and their instructions were 




Time 2: Second Neutral Cued Recall Test 
In the second recall test, all participants answered 42 Neutral Cued Recall 
questions (Appendix H). In order to identify the neutral questions, we ran a pilot 
study where participants (n = 10) watched the stimulus video and answered 111 
questions about it. We instructed them to only answer the questions they were sure 
about, and to answer “I don’t know” to the questions they did not know the answer 
to. The neutral questions selected (e.g., What colour was the bag used for the 
robbery?) were those with a mean correct response percentage rate of between 30 
and 70 (total M = 44.29, SD = 12.71).  
 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to that of Study 3a, with only three differences. 
First, data collection was conducted online rather than in the lab. Second, as in Study 
3a participants completed the neutral Cued Recall test, however in Study 3b 
participants were instructed to provide an answer to all questions even if they were 
not sure. After each answer participants were asked to rate how confidence they were 
that the answer given was correct; we refer to this as the Forced-Report phase. Third, 
after the Forced-Report phase, participants were asked to imagine that they were real 
witnesses of the robbery they had seen in the video, and were reminded that the 
information they were going to provide was extremely important for the 
investigation. After this, all the participants were presented with the second Neutral 
Cued Recall test and their answers and were asked to (a) volunteer the answers that 
they were sure about, and (b) withdraw any answer that they were not sure about 
(confidence ratings were not displayed at this stage); we refer to this as the Free-
Report phase5. As for Study 3a, confidence was measured before and after the initial 
recall test. Instructions and confidence scale were identical to those used in Study 3a. 
Results 
Manipulation check  
                                               
5 On occasion, and despite instructions, some participants had reported ‘I don’t 
know’ in response to questions in the Neutral Cued Recall test. Thus, a third 
response option (‘Not Applicable’) was provided in the Free-Report phase for 
participants to select instead of ‘volunteer’ or ‘withdrawn’. 
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A manipulation check was performed to verify that participants in the 
Difficult Cued Recall group were more likely to experience retrieval difficulty 
during the initial recall test than participants in the Easy Cued Recall group. As in 
Study 3a, we looked at the amount of “I don’t know” responses reported, and found 
that participants in the Difficult Cued Recall group reported more “I don’t know” 
responses (M = 5.60, SD = 3.32) than those in the Easy Cued Recall group (M = 
2.70, SD = 2.43) and this difference was significant t(83) = 4.59, p < .001, d = .50, 
(Mdiff = 2.89, 95% CI [1.63, 4.145). In addition, and consistently with Study 3a, 
confidence in the answers to Difficult Cued Recall questions was lower (M = 41.90, 
SD = 16.63) than confidence in the answers given in the Easy Cued Recall questions 
(M = 64.68, SD = 19.58); this difference was also statistically significant t(83) = -
5.72, p < .001, d = -.64, (Mdiff = -22.77, 95% CI [-30.62, -14.92]). 
 
Confidence stability 
To examine if we replicated the decrease in confidence after the initial recall 
test in the Difficult Cued Recall group, we conducted a 2 (Confidence measurement 
time: Time 1 - before Initial Recall, Time 2 - after Initial Recall, after Second 
Recall) x 4 (Initial Recall test: Difficult Cued Recall, Easy Cued Recall, Free Recall, 
and Control) mixed ANOVA. We found a significant main effect of Time on 
confidence, F(1, 165) = 21.02,  p < .001, η2p = .13, a significant main effect of Initial 
Recall test on confidence, F(1, 165) = 6.47, p < .001, η2p = .08, and a significant 
interaction F(3, 165) = 17.53, p < .001, η2p = .24 (see Table 6.4 for Means and 
Standard Deviations in each group). A post-hoc power analysis conducted with 
G*power (Erdfelder et al., 1996), with an alpha level of .05, n = 169, and observed 
effect sizes, yielded a power of .98 to 1. Bonferroni post-hoc tests showed that 
confidence was not significantly different between groups before at Time 1. 
However, at Time 2, participants in the Difficult Cued Recall group were 
significantly less confident than those in the Easy Cued Recall (Mdiff = -20.78, p < 
.001, 95% CI [-33.79, -7.76]), Free Recall (Mdiff = -30.71, p < .001, 95% CI [-43.80, 
-17.62]), and Control group (Mdiff = -14.04, p = .028, 95% CI [-27.14, -.97]). 
Participants in the Difficult Cued Recall group also reported a significant decrease in 
confidence at Time 2 compared to Time 1 (Mdiff = -22.14, p < .001, 95% CI [-28.54, 
-15.74]). Whereas, confidence at Time 2 compared to Time 1 did not change 
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significantly for participants in the Easy Cued Recall, Free Recall, and Control 
group. Thus, consistently with the result of Study 3a, only participants in the 
Difficult Cued Recall group reported decreased confidence after the initial recall 
attempt. 
 
Table 6.4. Means (and Standard Deviations) of confidence reported at Time 1 and 
Time 2 in the four groups. 
 
 Time 1 Time 2 
Difficult Cued Recall 58.57 (20.19) 36.43 (23.14) 
Easy Cued Recall 60.70 (21.53) 57.21 (21.30) 
Free recall 64.05 (23.48) 67.14 (22.44) 
Control 52.14 (22.91) 50.48 (24.94) 
 
Monitoring of memory in the second Neutral Cued Recall Test 
We were interested in understanding whether decreased confidence following 
an initial recall attempt affected subsequent memory monitoring. In order to increase 
our data in each confidence category we reduced the number of categories from 11 to 
five (0-20%, 30-40%, 50-60%, 70-80% and 90-100%)6. The confidence category 0% 
registered the least data points and was therefore merged with the category 10-20%. 
Three one-way ANOVAs were conducted on the C-index, ANDI, and over/under-
confidence index. We found no significant differences between groups in the C-
index F(3, 165) = 1.05, p = .37, η2 = .01, or in relation to over/under-confidence F(3, 
165) = 1.73, p = .16, η2 = .03. Furthermore, no difference were found between groups 
in the ANDI F(3, 165) = .56, p = .64, η2 = .01 (see Table 6.5 for Means and Standard 
Deviations, and Figure 6.3 for the confidence-accuracy calibration curves). Bayesian 
analysis showed moderate to strong evidence in support for the null for C-index 
(BF01 = 9.34), ANDI (BF01 =16.78), and OU index (BF01 = 4.18).  
Finally, in order to investigate how well calibrated participants were, we 
compared the C-index and OU index to 0 (perfect calibration), and ANDI to 1 
                                               
6 Data points per confidence categories ranged from 131 to 659, the category 30-40% 
in the Difficult Cued Recall, Easy Cued Recall, and Free Recall group registering 
less data points than 200. 
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(perfect discrimination). We found that in all groups C-index was significantly 
different from 0, [t(42) = 6.58, p < .001, d = 1.05 for the Difficult Cued Recall; t(43) 
= 12.20, p < .001, d = 1.84 for the Easy Cued Recall; t(42) = 5.50, p < .001, d = .84 
for the Free Recall; and t(42) = 10.58, p < .001, d = 1.63 for the Control group], but 
OU measures were not [t(42) = 1.68, p = .10, d = .03 for the Difficult Cued Recall, 
t(43) = .91, p = .36, d = .13 for the Easy Cued Recall, t(42) = .41, p = 68, d = .06 for 
the Free Recall, and t(42) = -1.47, p < .15, d = -.23 for the Control group]. 
Furthermore ANDI in all groups was significantly different from 1 [t(42) = -22.01, p 
< .001, d = -3.3 for the Difficult Cued Recall; t(43) = -22.19, p < .001, d = -3.3 for 
the Easy Cued Recall; t(42) = -23.06, p < .001, d = -3.5 for the Free Recall; and t(42) 
= -18.02, p < .001, d = -2.81 for the Control group].  
In sum, confirming the results of Study 3a, participants in the Difficult Cued 
Recall group compared with participants in the other groups: (i) were not less 
calibrated (as measured by the C-index), (ii) were not systematically associating 
lower confidence judgements to the information reported (as measured by the OU 
index), and (iii) were not less effective in using their confidence judgements to 
discriminate between correct and incorrect information (as measured by the ANDI). 
Furthermore, overall calibration and discrimination for participants across groups 
were significantly different from perfect.  
 
Table 6.5. Means (and Standard Deviations) of C- index, ANDI, and over/under-
confidence measure in the four groups. 
 




Free Recall Control 
C-index .09 (.09) .09 (.05) .12 (.05) .09 (.09) 
ANDI .25 (.22) .22 (.23) .24 (.21) .28 (.25) 











Figure 6.3. Calibration curves for the Difficult Cued Recall, Easy Cued Recall, Free 
Recall, and Control group in Study 3b 
 
Control of memory reporting during the second Neutral Cued Recall Test 
Four participants were excluded from this analysis because they answered “I 
don’t know” to over half of the 42 questions. First, we assessed memory performance 
during the second Neutral Cued Recall test. A one-way ANOVA found that there 
was no significant difference between groups on overall accuracy F(3, 161) = .55, p 
= .64, η2 = .01 in the Forced-Report phase. To test whether participants in the 
Difficult Cued Recall group were exerting stricter control over the information 
reported by volunteering fewer items in the Free-Report phase, we coded each 
answer as “volunteered” (V) or “withdrawn” (W), and excluded the “I don’t know” 
answers7 and a further 244 answers (3.5% of the total) across the whole sample, 
because they were associated with the option “non-applicable”. At this point there 
was no difference between groups in relation to the number of answers included F(3, 
161) = 2.33, p = .08, η2  = .04. A volunteering rate was calculated for each participant 
                                               
7 A one-way ANOVA found no significant difference between groups on the number 





















by dividing the number of volunteered answers by the total (correct and incorrect) 
number of answers given. A one-way ANOVA showed that there was no difference 
between groups on the volunteering rate F(3, 161) = .65, p = .59, η2 = .01. A 
Bayesian analysis confirmed we have moderate evidence for the null regarding 
volunteering rate (BF01 = 8.425). In sum, confirming Study 3a, participants in the 
Difficult Cued Recall group were not exerting harsher control over their memory. 
 
Discussion  
Study 3b was conducted to further test the hypotheses of Study 3a and it 
featured: (i) a larger sample size, a (ii) larger data set to conduct a reliable 
confidence-accuracy calibration analysis, and (iii) a more controlled methodology to 
investigate the effect of decreased confidence following an initial recall test on 
participants’ control over the information subsequently reported. The results of Study 
3b replicate those of Study 3a. In particular, participants’ confidence is more likely to 
decrease after an initial recall test when this triggers details that are difficult to 
access. On the contrary when the initial test is unlikely to trigger details difficult to 
access, participants’ confidence is likely to remain stable. Furthermore, decreased 
confidence following an initial recall test does not impact subsequent memory 
monitoring and control over the information subsequently reported. 
While we evaluated the first set of results in the discussion of Study 3a, in 
this section we focus our attention on the results that decreased confidence does not 
appear to affect monitoring and control over the information subsequently reported. 
These results are not necessarily in contrast with the largely accepted theoretical 
framework of memory regulation (Koriat & Goldsmith, 199b). First, our results are 
consistent; in particular, the lack of difference between groups in how the 
information was subsequently freely reported (Study 2, and Study 3a) and controlled 
(Study 3b), is due to the lack of significant difference between groups on how the 
memory was monitored (Study 3b). Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) suggest that in 
order to observe a difference in the way in which a memory is controlled, it is 
necessary to also observe a difference in how the memory is monitored. Thus, in our 
studies participants in the Difficult Cued Recall group compared with participants in 
the other groups did not show a difference in how they controlled their memory 
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reporting, because they were not monitoring their memory any differently compared 
to participants in the other groups.  
Despite this consistency, it remains a question as to why we find evidence 
that decreased confidence after an initial recall attempt does not seem to impact 
subsequent memory monitoring and regulation. We consider two possible 
explanation for these results. First it is possible that confidence judgements used to 
monitor and control the information reported are primarily based on the retrieval 
experience generated during the ongoing test, and largely disregard any previous 
retrieval attempt. For example, it is possible that during the second recall test 
participants in the Difficult Cued Recall group based their confidence judgements on 
the ongoing retrieval experience, and disregarded the initial recall attempt, and their 
retrieval experience and the overall performance at that stage. This interpretation 
would suggest that confidence judgements might be more dependent on the ongoing 
retrieval process (i.e., experienced-based) rather than the previous belief that the own 
memory for the target event might be poor (i.e., information-based). Overall, this 
interpretation is in line with the existing evidence that confidence judgements are 
largely depend on the retrieval experience and its products (e.g., Kelley & Lindsay, 
1993; Lindholm et al., 2018; Pansky & Goldsmith, 2014) 
However, a second possible explanation is that our methodology is not 
capturing the impact of decreased confidence on the monitoring and control of the 
information subsequently reported. For example, in both Study 3a and 3b only three 
minutes elapsed between the initial and the second recall attempt, and it is possible 
that this time was insufficient to fully integrate the new belief as a new heuristic. 
Thus, although we found no evidence that decreased confidence impacted the 
subsequent monitoring and control over the information reported it is worth 
mentioning that this result is contingent to the short delay used in our studies.  
In Study 3b we replicated the result that confidence is likely to decrease when 
participants are asked to recall details that are difficult to retrieve. On the contrary, 
when participants are not required to recall information that are difficult to retrieve 
their confidence is more likely to remain stable. This result is important and 
highlights a previously undocumented negative effect that Cued Recall questions can 
have on eyewitness cognition; in particular, this type of question is more likely to 
dent eyewitness’ confidence. However, our results also suggest that closed questions 
do not always lead to shifts in confidence. Specifically, if they are easy or likely to 
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trigger details that are easy to remember, they are unlikely to cause any change in 
confidence. Closed questions can be a useful tool for the interviewer, and they can 
help eyewitnesses to focus on and report specific details of the event. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, researchers do not discourage the use of closed questions, rather they 
suggest using them at the right time during an interview (e.g., Gabbert et al., 2015a; 
2015b; Griffiths & Milne, 2006). Therefore, it is important to understand whether 
and how Cued Recall questions can be posed without causing any change in memory 
confidence. However, the results gathered so far cannot be directly applicable to a 
real-life interview, because in real-life interviewers cannot foresee how easy or 
difficult a question is going to be for the eyewitness. Thus, in Study 4 we attempt to 







Chapter 7: Study 4. Investigating shifts in confidence in a good practice and a 
poor practice interview 
 
Introduction 
The results so far have highlighted two core findings: (i) confidence in the 
quality of one’s own memory can decrease following a retrieval attempt, and (ii) 
decreased confidence following an initial recall attempt does not affect the quality of 
the details subsequently reported, nor does it impact participants’ monitoring and 
control of the information reported subsequently. Here, we address the first result 
and examine whether it holds within more realistic types of investigative interview.  
Study 2 showed that confidence is likely to change as a function of the 
quality of the initial interview. In particular, an interview that poses Cued Recall 
questions is more likely to lead to decreased confidence than an interview that 
presents a Free Recall invitation. However, a more in-depth examination of the 
cognitive processes that underpin this result suggests that it is not the type of 
question that lead to decreased confidence, rather the retrieval difficulty experienced 
in answering the different questions. As such, Study 3a and Study 3b confirmed that 
Cued Recall questions only cause decreased confidence in so far as they trigger 
details that are difficult to recall. However, when Cued Recall questions prompt 
details experienced as easy to recall, they are more likely to leave confidence 
unaltered. In the discussion of Study 3b, we argued that this result is important 
because it suggests that there might be circumstances in which Cued Recall questions 
can be asked without causing significant shifts in eyewitness confidence. However, 
in real-life interviews it is not easy to foresee when a Cued Recall question is likely 
to be experienced as easy or difficult. Thus, in Study 4, we address this limitation 
and examine how our previous results can be used to predict shifts in confidence 
within more realistic investigative interviews.  
 
Rationale  
The finding that confidence is more likely to decrease in response to Cued 
Recall questions compared with Free Recall questions suggests that during an 
interview confidence is likely to remain stable after the Free Recall phase and is 
likely to decrease after the probing phase (e.g., when Cued Recall questions are 
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asked). However, as shown by the results of Study 3a and Study 3b, Cued Recall 
questions only lead to decreased confidence in so far as they trigger details that are 
experienced as difficult to recall. Thus, it is possible that the probing phase promotes 
decreased confidence only when the probing Cued Recall questions are experienced 
as difficult to answer. 
 We speculated that confidence following a Free Recall invitation is unlikely 
to decrease, because during a free and undirected retrieval experience, participants 
tend to only recall details relatively easy to access. This result suggests that the freely 
reported details are more likely to be experienced as easy to retrieve, and conversely, 
the unreported details – should they be elicited via further questioning – are more 
likely be experienced as relatively difficult to retrieve. Hence, we speculate that 
following a free-recall phase, the probing Cued Recall questions are likely to be 
experienced as easy or difficult depending on whether the questions focus on topics 
that have already been reported by the witness during their Free Recall account. We 
therefore hypothesise that during an interview, confidence will decrease when the 
probing Cued Recall questions are unrelated to the information reported in the Free 
Recall phase, and will remain stable when the probing Cued Recall questions are 
related to the information freely reported. As such, when an interview follows the 
best practice guidelines (as outlined in Chapter 1) relating to; (i) the interview 
structure and hierarchical use of different types of question, whereby the Free Recall 
phase precedes the probing phase, and; (ii) the use of compatible questions, whereby 
the probing questions are compatible with the interviewee’s free account, then we 
expect confidence to remain stable. On the contrary when the interview does not 
follow the best practice guidelines relating to interview structure and compatible use 
of questions, then we predict confidence to decrease significantly after the probing 
phase.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, focused questions (i.e., Cued Recall questions) 
tend to promote poorer realism (i.e., poorer calibration and discrimination) compared 
with Free Report invitations. Researchers have proposed that this might depend on 
the difficulty of the task (Allwood et al., 2008). In particular, answering focused 
questions is more difficult than responding to a Free Recall invitation, because 
participants are required to answer questions formulated by others, and that might 
request information that had been poorly encoded. Based on this line of argument, 
we predict a difference in realism for easy Cued Recall questions (i.e., Cued Recall 
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questions related to the information freely reported), and difficult Cued Recall 
questions (i.e., Cued Recall questions unrelated to the information freely reported). 
Specifically, we predicted the related Cued Recall questions to promote better 
realism (i.e., better calibration and discrimination) compared with the unrelated Cued 
Recall questions. 
To test these hypotheses, we manipulated the order of the interview phases, 
and the types of probing Cued Recall questions posed. Participants first watched a 
short crime video and were then interviewed about what they had seen. The probing 
phase either preceded or followed the Free Recall phase. Of the participants that 
received the Free Recall phase before the probing phase, half answered the Cued 
Recall questions related to the information they had reported in the Free Recall phase 
(referred to subsequently as Related Cued Recall questions) followed by the Cued 
Recall questions unrelated to the information reported in the Free Recall phase 
(referred to subsequently as Unrelated Cued Recall questions), while the remaining 
half answered the Unrelated Cued Recall questions prior to the Related Cued Recall 
questions. Confidence was measured after the Free Recall phase and after each 
section of the probing phase; following the Unrelated Cued Recall questions and the 
Related Cued Recall questions. Last, participants reported a confidence rating for 
each probing Cued Recall questions (the procedure is illustrated in Figure 7.1).  
 
Hypotheses 
 H1 and prediction: During an investigative interview, initial confidence will 
remain stable following the Free Recall phase and will decrease after the probing 
phase.  
 
H2: Cued Recall questions related to the information freely reported are more 
likely to trigger details that are easily retrieved, therefore they are less likely to lead 
to decreased confidence; on the contrary Cued Recall questions unrelated to the 
information freely reported are more likely to trigger details experienced as difficult 
to retrieve and therefore more likely to decrease confidence. 
Predictions: confidence will decrease after answering unrelated Cued Recall 




H3: Cued Recall questions unrelated to the information freely reported are 
expected to be more difficult and consequently to promote poorer realism compared 
with Cued Recall questions related to the information freely reported. 
Predictions: Participants will be relatively poorly calibrated (indicated by C- index, 
OU index, and ANDI) when answering unrelated Cued Recall questions compared 




A 3 (Interview Type: mixed CR +FR; FR + related CR first, FR+ unrelated 
CR first) x 4 (Confidence Measurement Time: initial confidence (Time 1), 
confidence at Time 2, confidence at Time 3, and confidence at Time 4) mixed design 
was used, with Interview Type manipulated between-subjects, and confidence 
measured within-subjects. The dependent variables for memory reporting were: (a) 
number of correct details reported, and (b) accuracy of the information reported. The 
dependent variables for confidence in the memory for the target event were: (c) 
initial confidence at Time 1, (d) confidence at Time 2, (e) confidence at Time 3, and 
(f) confidence at Time 4. Finally, the dependent variables for calibration were: (g) C-
index, (h) ANDI, and (e) OU measures. 
 
Participants 
An a-priori power analysis conducted in G*power (Erdfelder et al., 1996) 
revealed that n = 99 participants were required to detect a medium effect size η2p = 
.06 with a power (1 – β) set at .80, and α = .05. In order to gather sufficient data 
points for the calibration analysis the number of participants tested was increased 
slightly. A total of 125 participants took part in the study (females = 100, Mean age = 
21.85, SD = 5.05). One participant was excluded because - due to a researcher’s 
mistake they were not given one task of the procedure (they were not asked to 
provide confidence ratings for the details of the Free Recall test). All participants 
were recruited among the first-year cohort Psychology students at Goldsmiths 





Video stimulus  
The video clip depicting a robbery in a Blockbuster video-rental store was the 
same as described in Study 1.  
The Interview phases 
Three interviews were used: the mixed CR+FR, the FR + Related CR first, 
and the FR + Unrelated CR first. They all constituted of two phases: a Free Recall, 
and Probing phase.  
Free Recall phase. The Free Recall phase was administered as a written Free 
Recall test. Participants were instructed to imagine the researcher knew nothing 
about the video and to write down what they remembered about it. In order to allow 
for free control over their reporting, no restrictions were imposed in relation to 
requests for accuracy or detail, and no time limit was given for this task.  
Probing phase. The probing phase was administered verbally and constituted 
of 89 predetermined 5Wh Cued Recall questions (Appendix I). The questions 
focused on the four characters in the video (i.e. dark-haired robber, light-haired 
robber, customer, and shopkeeper) including their person description and actions, the 
bag used for the robbery and the location in which the robbery took place. 
Participants in the three groups answered all the questions. The instruction was 
identical for the three groups, all participants were asked to always answer the 
question even when not sure about their answer. All the participants consented to be 
audio recorded, therefore the predetermined Cued Recall questions were recorded on 
a smartphone.  
 
The order of the Interview phases 
The order of the interview phases was different depending on condition; 
The mixed CR + FR. In this interview, the probing phase preceded the Free 
Recall phase. In the probing phase of this interview, the predetermined Cued Recall 
questions were administered in random order (we refer to this as mixed Cued 
Recall). 
The FR + Related CR first. In this interview the Free Recall phase preceded 
the probing phase. Here, the predetermined Cued Recall questions were administered 
as follows: participants received first the questions related to the information they 
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reported in the Free Recall (we refer to these as Related Cued Recall) followed by 
the remaining questions (we refer to these as Unrelated Cued Recall).  
The FR + Unrelated CR first. In this interview the Free Recall phase 
preceded the probing phase. The predetermined Cued Recall questions were 
administered in the opposite order compared to that described above for the FR + 
Related CR first. In particular, participants received first the questions unrelated to 
the information they reported in the Free Recall (i.e., Unrelated Cued Recall), 
followed by the remaining questions (i.e., Related Cued Recall). 
 
Confidence  
Confidence in the memory for the event seen was measured on four occasions 
throughout the interview: after the video (initial confidence at Time 1), after each 
interview phases, and after each Cued Recall type. The confidence ratings were 
collected through a written questionnaire and the instruction was the same on each 
occasion. Here, participants were asked to think about their memory for the event 
seen, and to report how confident they were that their memory and the information 
they were able to report would help the police to accurately reconstruct the event and 
solve the crime.  
A confidence judgement was also required after each predetermined Cued 
Recall questions, and for each detail reported in the Free Recall test. All the 
confidence scales ranged from 0% to 100%, whereby 0% represented “not confident 
at all”, and 100% represented “completely confident”.  
 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in a quiet laboratory in the university 
campus. The experiment took between 60 and 75 minutes and was completed in one 
session. As soon as the participant arrived in the lab, they were invited to take a seat 
in front of a computer and were provided with the consent form (Appendix J). If the 
participant agreed to participate the researcher checked that the procedure was clear, 
and invited questions. After this, the researcher placed the confidence scale on the 
participant’s desk (the scale was left on the desk and was available to the participant 
during the entire procedure) and explained what it was, and how to use it. They were 
told that 0% on the scale represented “not confident at all that the answer given is 
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correct”, while 100% meant “complete confidence that the answer is correct”. The 
following example was used to clarify the use of the scale: “If I was asked what is 
the capital of the UK, and my answer was London – I would be 100% confident that 
my answer is correct. However, if I was asked, what is the capital of Suriname, and 
my answer was London – then I would be 0% confident that my answer is correct”. 
After this, participants were given a set of headphones and asked to watch the video 
clip, followed by a three minutes word-search filler task. Immediately after the filler 
task participants were asked to provide a confidence rating (initial confidence at 
Time 1). At this stage participants were reminded that the confidence rating they 
were asked to report was related to their confidence in their memory of the video not 
about their performance on the word-search task. Up until this stage the procedure 
was identical for all participants; afterwards the procedure was different for each 
group (see Figure 6.1)  
Participants in the mixed CR+FR group received the probing phase followed 
by the Free Recall phase. Immediately after they had answered all the predetermined 
Cued Recall questions, they provided a second confidence rating (confidence at Time 
2). After this task, participants were asked to complete the written Free Recall test, 
followed by the seven - minute word-search filler task. In the time participants took 
to complete the filler task, the researcher coded the written Free Recall test for 
amount and accuracy. Here each coded detail was underlined with a blue pen. Once 
the participant had completed the filler task, they were asked to provide a confidence 
rating for each detail underlined in blue on the Free Recall account they had 
previously provided. The instruction for this task was as follows: “I would need you 
to report a confidence rating for each piece on information you provided in the Free 
Recall test. I am going to indicate pieces of information highlighted in blue and ask 
you the question “How confident are you that this information is correct?” You 
should answer by giving a confidence rating – please do this using the scale you 
have in front of you.”  In the mixed CR + FR group confidence was measured on 
three occasions: after the video (initial confidence at Time 1), after the mixed Cued 
Recall questions (confidence at Time 3) and after the Free Recall test (confidence at 
Time 4).  
Participants in the FR + Related CR first, were given the Free Recall phase 
followed by the probing phase. The written Free Recall test was administered on a 
paper sheet placed on top of transfer paper which copied the participant’s free report 
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on a second paper sheet. Once the participants had completed the Free Recall test, 
they were given the seven minutes filler task. While the participant completed the 
filler task the researcher coded the Free Recall test for amount of information (here 
details were highlighted in blue), and two research assistants worked on the second 
copy of the Free Recall to identify the Related Cued Recall questions out of the pool 
of predetermined Cued Recall questions. Here, a question was considered related if it 
was associated to a detail reported in the Free Recall test. For example, if in the Free 
Recall the participant mentioned the “dark-haired robber”, all the predetermined 
Cued Recall questions related to the dark-haired robber’s person description were 
considered as Related Cued Recall questions (e.g., What was the dark-haired robber 
ethnicity? How old was the dark-haired robber?). Similarly, if in the Free Recall 
phase the participant mentioned the dark-haired robber’s ‘disguise’, then all the 
predetermined Cued Recall questions related to the dark-haired robber’s disguise 
were considered Related Cued Recall (e.g., What type of disguise was the dark-
haired robber wearing?). At the end of this procedure all the remaining 
predetermined Cued Recall questions were considered Unrelated Cued Recall 
questions. Once participants had completed the filler task, they were asked to provide 
a confidence rating on the details reported in the Free Report (this procedure was 
identical as that described for the mixed CR + FR group above). Next, participants 
answered the predetermined Cued Recall question in this order: the Related Cued 
Recall questions were asked before the Unrelated Cued Recall questions. Confidence 
in the memory for the event seen was measured on four occasions for participants in 
the FR + Related CR first group: after the video (initial confidence at Time 1), after 
the Free Recall test (confidence at Time 2), after the Related Cued Recall questions 
(confidence at Time 3), and after the Unrelated Cued Recall questions (confidence at 
Time 4).  
 The procedure of the FR + Unrelated CR first was identical to that described 
for the FR + Related CR first with one difference. The predetermined Cued Recall 
questions were given in the opposite order. Participants in this group answered the 
Unrelated CR questions first and the Related CR question after. Confidence in the 
memory for the event seen was measured on four occasions: after the video (initial 
confidence at Time 1), after the Free Recall test (confidence at Time 2), after the 
unrelated CR questions (confidence at Time 3), and after the related CR questions 
(confidence at Time 4).  
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Finally, participants in all groups received the written debrief form (Appendix 
K) and were invited to ask any question they had. 
 
Coding  
The Free Recall tests were coded for amount and accuracy of information by 











Figure 7.1. Procedure of Study 4 
 
The Pilot Study  
An initial Pilot Study (n = 5) highlighted one issue with the procedure; when 
answering the predetermined Cued Recall questions, participants tended to also 
elaborate and explain their answer. This led to lengthy answers that included many 
additional details, some of which were correct and some that were incorrect. We 
believed this was problematic because participants were then asked to report a single 
confidence rating in the accuracy of an answer that now contained multiple details. 
In order to overcome this issue, we modified the instruction of the predetermined 
Cued Recall questions and encouraged participants to (a) provide short answers, and 
(b) avoid elaboration. The revised instruction was as follows: “The questions I am 
going to ask you are focused on specific details, and require a one or two word 
answer, i.e., you should be able to answer with one or two words. For this task it is 
important that you always answer the question, even if you are not sure about it. 
After each question I will ask you how confident you are in your answer, you should 
only answer by giving a confidence rating – please do this by using the scale that you 
   
Video Unrelated CR Related CR FR + Related CR first  FR phase 
Related CR Unrelated CR FR phase 
FR + Unrelated CR 
first 
confidence T2  confidence T3  confidence T4  initial confidence T1 
Mixed CR + FR Probing phase FR phase 
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have in front of you. It is important that you do not justify your answer or make any 
further comment during this task. Later I will be available to discuss any comment or 
thought you might have.”  
 A second Pilot Study with the new instruction was conducted (n = 5) and no 
further issues were observed, therefore data collection commenced. The data from 
the second Pilot Study was included within the Study 4 sample. 
 
Results 
We used a conventional alpha level of .05 unless otherwise specified. 
Homogeneity of variance was assessed with Levene’s test (1960).  
 
Manipulation check 
We examined mean confidence associated with the information reported in 
each of the three interview stages (Free Report, Related Cued Recall questions, and 
Unrelated Cued Recall questions). As predicted, overall confidence in the details 
reported in the Free Recall (M = 92.09; SD = 6.95) was higher than confidence in the 
information reported in response to the Unrelated Cued Recall questions (M = 41.19; 
SD = 17.51), and this difference was statistically significant t(82) = 23.03, p < .001, 
d = 2.52, Mdiff = 42.90, 95% CI [39.20, 46.60]. Similarly, confidence in answers 
reported in response to the Related Cued Recall questions (M = 76.38; SD = 12.41) 
was significantly higher than confidence in answers to the Unrelated Cued Recall 
questions t(82) = 18.51, p < .001, d = 2.03, Mdiff  = 27.19, 95% CI [24.27, 30.11]. 
Overall, these results show that retrieval difficulty is higher in answers reported in 
response to Unrelated Cued Recall questions, compared to Related Cued Recall 
questions and Free Recall invitations. 
 
Confidence stability 
In order to investigate confidence stability across the interview phases we 
performed an initial 3 (Interview Type: mixed CR+FR; FR + Related CR first; and 
FR+ Unrelated CR first) x 3 (Confidence Measurement Time: initial confidence at 
Time 1, confidence at Time 2, and confidence at Time 4) mixed ANOVA, with 
Interview Type manipulated between subjects, and confidence measured within-
subjects. In this analysis we did not include confidence at Time 3 because this was 
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only measured for participants in the FR + Related CR first and FR+ Unrelated CR 
first, but not for those in the mixed CR + FR group. The assumption of Sphericity 
was violated therefore we report the Greenhouse-Geisser estimates. There was a 
significant main effect of Time on confidence F(1.87, 226.83) = 22.83, p < .001, η2p 
= .16, a significant main effect of Interview Type F(2, 121) = 4.05, p = .02, η2p = .06, 
and a significant interaction F(4, 226.83) = 11.51, p < .001, η2p  = .16. See Figure 7.2 
for Means and Standard Deviations. Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons showed that 
there was no difference between groups in confidence reported at Time 1. However, 
at Time 2 confidence for participants in the mixed CR + FR was significantly lower 
than that of participants in the FR+ Related CR first (Mdiff = -22.48,  p < .001, 95% 
CI [-32.79, -12.18]), and FR+ Unrelated CR first (Mdiff = -18.29, p < .001, 95% CI [-
28.66, -7.92]). As expected, at Time 2 only participants in the mixed CR+FR 
reported significantly lower confidence compared to their baseline confidence (Mdiff 
= -17.31, p < .001, 95% CI [-24.46, -10.16]). On the contrary, participants in the 
other two groups did not report significant changes in confidence at Time 2 
compared to their confidence reported at Time 1. At Time 4 we found no difference 
between groups in confidence ratings. As expected participants in the FR+ Related 
CR first, and FR+ Unrelated CR first groups reported significantly decreased 
confidence compared to Time 2 (FR+ Related CR first Mdiff = -13.33, p < .001, 95% 
CI [-19.88, -6.78], and FR+ Unrelated CR first Mdiff = -16.58, p < .001, 95% CI [-
23.21, -9.95]). Furthermore, participants in the mixed CR + FR group reported 
significantly increased confidence compared to Time 2 (Mdiff = 8.53, p = .007, 95% 
CI [1.91, 15.16]), however, as expected for this group, confidence at Time 4 was not 
significantly different than initial confidence reported at Time 1. 
 In summary, in the mixed CR+FR group, confidence reported after the 
probing phase (Time 2) (but not confidence reported after the Free Recall phase -
Time 4) was significantly lower than initial confidence (Time 1). Similarly, in the 
other two groups, confidence reported after the probing phase (Time 4) (but not 
confidence reported after the Free Recall phase – Time 2) was significantly lower 







Figure 7.2. Means (and Standard Deviations) of confidence at Time 1, confidence at 
Time 2, and confidence at Time 4 for participants in the mixed CR +Fr, FR + Related 
CR first, and the FR + Unrelated CR first. 
 
Confidence stability across Cued Recall type  
In order to investigate the impact of Related Cued Recall and Unrelated Cued 
Recall questions on confidence in memory for the event seen. A 2 (Interview Type: 
FR + Related CR first; and FR+ Unrelated CR first) x 4 (Confidence Measurement 
Time: initial confidence Time 1, confidence at Time 2, confidence at Time 3, and 
confidence at Time 4) mixed design ANOVA was conducted. The assumption of 
Sphericity was violated therefore we report the Greenhouse-Geisser estimates. We 
found a significant main effect of Interview Type, F(1, 81) = 13.21, p < .001, η2p = 
.14, a significant main effect of Time on confidence F(2.50, 203.09) = 26.22, p < 
.001, η2p  = .25, and a significant interaction F(2.50, 203.09) = 14.03, p < .001, η2p  = 
.15 (see Figure 7.3 for Means and Standard Deviations). Bonferroni post-hoc 
comparisons showed no differences between the two groups on confidence reported 
at Time 1 (Mdiff = -4.95, p = .12, 95% CI [-11.30, 1.39]), and confidence reported at 
Time 2 (Mdiff = -4.19, p = .31, 95% CI [-12.39, 3.99]). However, a significant 
difference was found on confidence reported at Time 3; here confidence for 
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than confidence for those answering the Related Cued Recall questions (Mdiff = -
26.13, p < .001, 95% CI [-33.31, -18.95]). At Time 3 participants answering the 
Unrelated Cued Recall questions decreased their confidence significantly compared 
to confidence reported at Time 2 (Mdiff = -21.46, p < .001, 95% CI [-29.66, -13.26]), 
while participants answering the Related CR questions did not report significant 
changes in confidence compared to Time 2 (Mdiff = .47, p = 1, 95% CI [-7.62, 8.57]). 
Finally, at Time 4 no difference was found between groups on confidence ratings 
reported (Mdiff = -7.44, p = .07, 95% CI [-15.77, .88]). Here, participants that 
answered the Unrelated Cued Recall questions reported significantly lowered 
confidence compared to Time 3 (Mdiff = -13.81, p < .001, 95% CI [-19.89, -7.72], 
while those answering the Related Cued Recall questions increased their confidence 
compared to Time 3, however this increase was not significant (Mdiff = 4.87, p = .21, 
95% CI [-1.28, 11.03]).  
In summary, confidence in both groups decreased following the Unrelated 
Cued Recall questions and did not change significantly following Related Cued 
Recall questions. We found support for our hypothesis that Related Cued Recall 
questions are less likely to decrease in confidence compared with Unrelated Cued 
Recall questions.  
 
 
Figure 7.3. Means (and Standard Deviations) of confidence at Time 1, confidence at 
Time 2, confidence at Time 3, and confidence at Time 4 for participants in the FR + 
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Calibration on Related CR and Unrelated CR questions 
We were interested in examining if participants’ confidence and accuracy  
were more calibrated in answers to the Related Cued Recall questions compared to 
the Unrelated Cued Recall questions. We performed a series of 2 (Cued Recall type: 
Related Cued Recall, and Unrelated Cued Recall) x 2 (Cued Recall order: Related 
CR first, Unrelated CR first) mixed design ANOVAs on (a) C-index, (b) ANDI, and 
(c) OU measures. We did not expect order to have a significant effect on the 
calibration and discrimination measured. 
 On the C-index we found a significant main effect of Cued Recall type F(1, 
81) = 20.96, p < .001, η2p = .20, here independently of the order in which the 
questions were asked C-index was lower for the Related Cued Recall compared with 
the Unrelated Cued Recall questions (Mdiff = -.04, p < .001, 95% CI [-.06, -.02]). We 
found non-significant main effect of Cued Recall order F(1, 81) = .7, p = .37, η2p  = 
.01. However, we found a significant interaction F(1, 81) = 6.41, p = .01,  η2p = .07. 
Bonferroni follow-up comparisons showed that the C-index for the Related Cued 
Recall questions was lower than that for the Unrelated Cued Recall questions (Mdiff = 
-.07, p < .001, 95% CI [-.09, -.04]) in the Related CR first group only; meaning that 
calibration on the Related Cued Recall questions is better than calibration for the 
Unrelated Cued Recall questions only when the former are not preceded by the latter. 
Furthermore, the C-index for the Related Cued Recall questions was lower in the FR 
+ Related CR first group compared with the Unrelated CR first group (Mdiff = -.03, p 
= .02, 95% CI [-.06, -.01]), (see Table 7.1 for Means and Standard Deviations).  
  On ANDI, we found a significant main effect of Cued Recall type F(1, 81) = 
22.06, p < .001, η2p  = .21, meaning that independent of the order in which the 
questions were asked, discrimination was higher for the Related Cued Recall 
questions compared to the Unrelated Cued Recall questions (Mdiff = .17, p < .001, 
95% CI [.10, .24]). The main effect of Cued Recall order was not significant F(1, 81) 
= 1.19, p = .27, η2p = .01, nor was the interaction F(1, 81) = .94, p = .33, η2p = .01. 
 On the OU indexes we found a non-significant main effect of Cued Recall 
type F(1, 81) = .11, p = .74, η2p  = .00, a significant main effect of Cued Recall order 
F(1, 81) = 4.88, p = .03 η2p  = .06, meaning that across all the Cued Recall questions 
(Related Cued Recall and Unrelated Cued Recall) participants in the FR + Related 
CR first group compared with those in the FR + Unrelated CR first were less 
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underconfident (Mdiff = .07, p = .03, 95% CI [.01, .13]). Finally, the interaction was 
found to be non-significant F(1, 81) = .14, p = .71,  η2p = .00.  
 
Table 7.1. Means (and Standard Deviations) of C-index, ANDI, and OU measures 
for the answers to Related Cued Recall and Unrelated Cued Recall in the two groups. 
 
  FR + Related CR 
first 
FR + Unrelated 
CR first 
C-index Related CR .06 (.04) .09 (.07) 
 Unrelated CR  .13 (.07) .11 (.04) 
OU measure Related CR -.02 (.11) -.09 (.17) 
 Unrelated CR -.01 (.19) -.09 (.19) 
ANDI Related CR .41 (.22) .34 (.24) 
 Unrelated CR .20 (.25) .20 (.21) 
 
In summary, we found support for our Hypothesis 3, whereby regardless of 
the order in which the (Related and Unrelated) Cued Recall questions are asked, 
calibration and discrimination were more reliable for the Related Cued Recall 
questions compared with the Unrelated Cued Recall questions, as measured by (a) a 
lower C-index, and (b) a higher ANDI on the former compared with the latter. 
However, calibration for the Related Cued Recall is significantly more reliable than 
that for the Unrelated Cued Recall questions only if the former questions precede the 
latter, as shown by (a) the lower C-index for Related (compared to the Unrelated) 
Cued Recall questions in the FR + Related CR first group, and (b) the overall lower 
under-confidence for participants in the FR+ Related CR first compared with the 
FR+ Unrelated CR first group. On the contrary, if the Related Cued Recall questions 
are preceded by the Unrelated Cued Recall questions, calibration on the Related 
Cued Recall and Unrelated Cued Recall questions become statistically similar. This 
can also be observed in the calibration curves. In particular, the solid lines – 
representing calibration for the Related Cued Recall questions, are closer to the 
diagonal line in the FR + Related CR first group only (Panel a). Furthermore, only in 
the FR + Related CR first group (Panel a) is the solid line closer to the diagonal line 
than the dashed line – representing calibration on the unrelated CR questions. These 
patterns in the curves show that calibration for Related Cued Recall questions in 
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better than calibration for the Unrelated Cued Recall questions only when the 








Figure 7.4. Calibration curves (and data points for each confidence interval) for the 

















































unrelated CR (panel a), and for participants in the FR + unrelated CR & related CR 
(panel b). 
 
Memory report  
Although the impact on memory reporting was not the primary focus of this 
study, in order to report a complete picture of the effectiveness of the Related Cued 
Recall questions compared to the Unrelated Cued Recall questions, we investigated 
their impact on memory reporting. First we tested whether there was any difference 
in the quality of information reported in the Free Recall test and, as expected, we 
found no difference between groups in the amount of correct information reported 
t(81) = 1.94, p = .06, d = .42, or the accuracy of the information reported t(81) = -.82, 
p = .41, d = -.188. In order to investigate the effect of Cued Recall type of memory 
reporting, a 2 (Cued Recall type: Related Cued Recall, and Unrelated Cued Recall) x 
2 (Cued Recall order: Related Cued Recall first, Unrelated CR first) mixed design 
ANOVA was performed on (a) number of correct details, and (b) accuracy rate in 
response to the Related Cued Recall and Unrelated Cued Recall questions9.  
On the number of correct details reported we found a significant main effect 
of Cued Recall type F(1, 81) = 31.34, p < .001, η2p  = .28, meaning that 
independently of the order in which the questions were asked participants reported 
more correct information in response to the Related Cued Recall compared with the 
Unrelated Cued Recall questions  (Mdiff = 8.47, p < .001, 95% CI [5.39, 11.57]). We 
found a non-significant main effect of Cued Recall order F(1, 81) = .26, p = .61, η2p 
= .00, meaning that the order in which the questions were asked did not impact on 
the number of correct information reported. Finally we found a significant interaction 
F(1, 81) = 5.63, p = .02, ηp2 = .06. Bonferroni follow-up comparisons showed that 
participants in the FR + Related CR first group reported significantly more correct 
details in answer to the Related Cued Recall compared to the Unrelated Cued Recall 
questions (Mdiff = 12.00, p < .001, 95% CI [ 7.79, 16.21]), as did those in the FR + 
                                               
8 A research assistant coded 25 (20%) randomly selected transcripts. The percentage 
agreement was found to be high (94%). Cohen’s Kappa was .81, reflecting almost 
perfect agreement (McHugh, 2012).  
9 Overall, participants answered on average 41 Related Cued Recall questions, there 
was no difference in the number of Related Cued Recall questions answered between 




Unrelated CR first group (Mdiff = 4.85, p = .02, 95% CI [ 5.93, 9.11]). However, 
participants in the FR + Related CR first, compared to those in the FR + Unrelated 
CR first group, reported significantly more correct information in response to the 
Related Cued Recall questions (Mdiff = 3.98, p = .03, 95% CI [.382, 7.57]) but not in 
response of Unrelated Cued Recall questions. This means that participants are likely 
to report more correct information in response to the Related Cued Recall questions 
(but not in response to Unrelated Cued Recall questions) only when the Related Cued 
Recall questions are answered before the Unrelated Cued Recall (see Table 7.2 for 
Means and Standard Deviations). 
On the accuracy rate, we found a significant main effect of Cued Recall type 
F(1 ,81) = 440.96, p < .001, η2p  = .85, meaning that regardless of the order in which 
the questions were presented, participants were significantly more accurate in 
response to the Related Cued Recall compared to the Unrelated CR questions  (Mdiff 
= 28.29, p < .001, 95% CI [25.61, 30.98]). Finally, we found a non-significant main 
effect of Cued Recall order F(1, 81) = .98 p = .86, η2p  = .00, and a non-significant 
interaction F(1, 81) = .72 p = .39, η2p = .01.  
In summary the Related Cued Recall questions compared to the Unrelated 
Cued Recall questions yielded more correct and more accurate information. The 
order in which the questions were asked had only an impact on the number of correct 
information reported. In particular, we found initial evidence that if the Related Cued 
Recall questions are not preceded by the Unrelated Cued Recall questions, then 
participants are more likely to report more correct information. 
 
Table 7.2. Means (and Standard Deviations) of number of correct, and accuracy rate 
of information reported in response of Cued Recall type (Related Cued Recall vs 
Unrelated Cued Recall) in both groups 
. 
  FR + Related CR 
first 
FR + Unrelated 
CR first 
Related CR Correct 35.83 (8.90) 31.85 (7.48) 
 Accuracy rate  83.31 (7.39) 82.31 (8.89) 
Unrelated CR Correct 23.83 (6.64) 27.00 (7.77) 





The aim of Study 4 was to investigate shifts in confidence within a realistic 
interview, while still maintaining a high level of experimental control. Based on the 
results of Study 2 we hypothesised that, during an interview, confidence is unlikely 
to change after the Free Recall phase, but it is likely to decrease as a result of the 
probing phase. Furthermore, based on the results of Study 3a and 3b we predicted 
that, during the probing phase, confidence would only decrease in response to Cued 
Recall questions that were unrelated to the information freely reported in the Free 
Recall phase, presumably because these are likely to be experienced as difficult to 
answer. On the contrary, we did not expect confidence to change after answering 
Cued Recall questions that were related to the information freely reported in the Free 
Recall phase, presumably because these are more likely to be experienced as easy to 
answer. Our last hypothesis related to the realism of the confidence judgements 
reported in answers to the Cued Recall questions. In particular, we predicted that 
participants’ confidence and accuracy would be better calibrated for answers given to 
related vs. unrelated Cued Recall questions. 
 We found supporting evidence for all the hypotheses. In particular, initial 
confidence was found to be statistically similar to confidence reported after the Free 
Recall phase, but significantly lower than confidence reported after the probing 
phase. However, the results of Study 4 show that if the questions of the probing 
phase are compatible to the information that had been freely reported previously, 
then confidence is unlikely to change. Therefore, as in Study 3a and Study 3b, the 
results of Study 4 show that the format of probing question is not responsible for 
shifts in confidence, rather it is the difficulty experienced in answering the question 
that leads to decreased confidence. We found that participants are more likely to 
easily retrieve details that were related to units of information freely reported, than 
they were to details that were related to units of information that had not been 
mentioned in the Free Recall phase. Thus, when the probing Cued Recall questions 
trigger details relating to information already recalled, confidence is less likely to 
change. On the contrary, when the probing Cued Recall questions seek details 
relating to information not yet recalled, confidence is more likely to decrease. 
 Overall, this result shows that confidence strongly depends on the cues 
generated while retrieving a memory (i.e., ease of retrieval), and is in line with the 
literature (e.g., Gustafsson et al., 2019; Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; Lindholm, 2018). 
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However, we found initial evidence that the retrieval process and its cues are not 
exclusively dependent on internal factors (such as the quality of a memory), rather 
they can be influenced by external variables, such as the interview type used to 
trigger the memory. Thus, if the interview is designed to maximise the ease of 
retrieval, confidence is unlikely to change. In Study 4 we found evidence that an 
interview featuring open questions followed by closed questions and, specifically, 
where the closed questions are compatible with the interviewee’s own account, might 
promote ease of retrieval and thus confidence stability. This result is in line with the 
broader literature on investigative interviewing, and it suggests that the best practice 
guidelines related to the interview structure, the hierarchical organisation of different 
types of question asked and the use of compatible questions, might all be beneficial 
for confidence as well as memory output. In other words, these techniques are not 
only likely to yield complete and accurate accounts, and but also confidence stability. 
 Finally, the results of Study 4 support the hypothesis that participants are 
better calibrated in response to Cued Recall questions when these are related to the 
information freely reported in the Free Recall phase. In particular, we found both 
calibration and discrimination to be higher for the related compared to the unrelated 
Cued Recall questions, as measured by the lower C-index, and higher ANDI for the 
former compared to the latter. Overall, this result is important, and it suggests that 
the extent to which confidence is a reliable predictor of accuracy might depend, at 
least in part, on the way the memory is cued. As such, confidence appears to be a 
better predictor of accuracy when participants are asked compatible rather than 
incompatible questions.  
 However, Study 4 also showed an unexpected impact of Cued Recall 
question order. In particular, while discrimination was more reliable for related 
compared to the unrelated Cued Recall questions, regardless of the order in which 
these were asked, calibration was more reliable for related compared to unrelated 
Cued Recall questions only when the former preceded by the latter. The impact of 
Cued Recall order was also evident on the Over/Under-confidence indexes. In 
particular, participants were more confident in response to all the Cued Recall 
questions when the related Cued Recall questions were asked before the unrelated 
CR questions. We did not expect the order of Cued Recall questions to affect 
calibration, therefore it is difficult to explain why calibration for related Cued Recall 
questions diminished when the unrelated Cued Recall question were asked first. It is 
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possible that participants found answering unrelated Cued Recall (i.e., experienced as 
difficult) particularly tiresome, and when they were subsequently asked to answer 
related Cued Recall questions, they were also less motivated, which in turn affected 
their ability to reliably monitor the accuracy of their memory. However, the order in 
which the Cued Recall questions were asked was found also to influence memory 
reporting, thus taken together, these results show that when the compatible questions 
are asked after non – compatible questions, both the ability to monitor one’s own 
memory, and memory reporting, are impoverished.  
 Study 4 is not without limitations. In particular, in order to collect a large 
dataset for the calibration analysis, participants were asked a large set of Cued Recall 
questions. This was clearly a demanding task that potentially had an impact on 
participants’ attention and concentration throughout the task. As such, it is 
recommended that future studies increase the sample size and decrease the number of 
Cued Recall questions asked, should this be possible. Another issue relates to the 
ecological validity of the Study; although one important aim of Study 4 was to build 
upon the findings of the prior studies within a relatively realistic investigative 
interview, we acknowledge that in real-life eyewitnesses are unlikely to be asked 
such a large amount of Cued Recall questions, or to be asked compatible and 
incompatible Cued Recall questions in the spilt order adopted in this Study. In real-
life interviews incompatible questions are more likely to be interposed among more 
compatible questions and this might affect confidence in different ways.  
However, the results of Study 4 are important and shed light on the impact of 
different aspects of an interview on eyewitness confidence. In particular, the 
structure of the interview, the sequential organisation of the probing questions asked, 
and their compatibility with the free account, all contribute to shape confidence as 
well as memory output. Following best practice guidelines appears to promote 
confidence stability in a memory reported during an interview, and to increase the 
extent to which eyewitness confidence predicts accuracy. These results are important 
and contribute to our understanding of the impact that different interviewing 
techniques can have on eyewitnesses. 






Chapter 8: General Discussion 
 
Introduction and overview 
The information eyewitnesses report is vital at all stages of the investigative process, 
and it is often the only source of evidence in a case. The errors eyewitnesses report 
can result in delays, a waste of police resources, and - at worst - in the apprehension 
of innocent people while guilty perpetrators remain at large. Therefore, it is essential 
that eyewitnesses remain engaged with the Criminal Justice System and report 
accurate accounts at all the stages of the investigative process. However, the 
information eyewitness report is not always correct, and a wealth of empirical 
evidence shows that they can and do make mistakes. In the past forty years, 
researchers have investigated the most effective way to extrapolate accurate and 
detailed accounts from memory. Based on such work, interviewing techniques and 
best practice guidelines have been made available to ensure that investigators are 
successful in eliciting accurate and complete accounts from witnesses. In the UK, 
best practice guidelines in eyewitness interviewing are summarised in the PEACE 
model, currently recognised as the official framework of professional practice in the 
field on eyewitness interviewing. Despite the large body of literature in support of 
the PEACE model and its techniques, very little is known about how these 
techniques impact eyewitnesses’ confidence.  
Generally, the effectiveness of eyewitness interviewing is measured in terms 
of the quality of the information the techniques are able to elicit, such as the amount, 
the accuracy and the granularity or specificity of the information reported. Clearly, 
whether interviewing techniques can extrapolate complete, accurate, and detailed 
accounts from witnesses is pivotal. However, this focus overlooks the processes that 
underlie eyewitnesses’ memory reporting, and it does not fully unable an 
understanding of the impact that these techniques might have on the eyewitnesses.  
Research on metamemory suggests that memory reporting is not a simple 
automatic process. As such, when people are asked a question, they don’t 
automatically initiate their memory search and report the information they retrieved. 
Rather they engage in several cognitive operations that underpin decisions about 
whether and how report a recalled memory. It has been suggested that confidence is 
central when making decisions related to the regulation of memory output (e.g., 
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Ackerman & Goldsmith, 2008; Brewer et al., 2018; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; 
Goldsmith et al., 2002). Thus, in order to fully understand the effectiveness of 
interviewing techniques in eliciting high quality information, it is important to 
investigate how the techniques influence memory confidence. 
In line with this, the aim of this PhD is to enhance our understanding of the 
impact that interviewing techniques have on eyewitness confidence. Study 1 
investigated whether a Best Practice compared to a Poor Practice interview would 
affect confidence differently. However, contrary to predictions, a Best Practice 
interview and a Poor Practice interview led to a statistically similar decrease in (i) 
confidence in the quality of a memory, and (ii) confidence in engaging with the 
Criminal Justice System. However, a more controlled methodology whereby a Free 
Recall and Cued Recall interview were used as proxies of a Good Practice and a Poor 
Practice interview (Study 2) showed that confidence in the quality of one’s own 
memory and confidence in engaging with the CJS, are unlikely to change in response 
to a Free Recall invitation, and likely to decrease in response to Cued Recall 
questions. A further investigation of the impact of different types of question on the 
cognitive processes that underlie confidence judgements (Study 3a and 3b) showed 
that Cued Recall questions only lead to decreased confidence in so far as they trigger 
details that are difficult to remember, whereas when the Cued Recall questions elicit 
easily accessible information, confidence is unlikely to change. 
A second important aim of this PhD was to investigate whether decreased 
confidence following an initial recall attempt would impact the amount and accuracy 
of the information subsequently reported. Contrary to expectations, Study 2 showed 
that the decrease in confidence following a Cued Recall interview was not correlated 
with a decrease in the quality of information reported in a subsequent recall test. 
Furthermore, Study 3a and 3b showed that a self-reported decrease in confidence 
does not impact on the ability to monitor and control the information in a subsequent 
recall test. In other words, while global confidence judgements differed between 
conditions, participants’ confidence-accuracy calibration, and their volunteering 
rates, did not. Finally, Study 4 - designed to build on the previous results - 
investigated the interviewing conditions most likely to promote (i) confidence 
stability and (ii) effective monitoring. As predicted, the results showed that when the 
structure of the interview and the type of probing questions asked follow best 
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practice guidelines, confidence is less likely to change, and the monitoring of the 
information reported in the probing phase is more effective.  
 
The malleability of confidence in the interviewing context: a gap in the 
literature 
A large body of literature has investigated the effectiveness of memory 
confidence and underlined its malleable nature, although we do not know if 
eyewitness confidence changes during an interview. Research suggests that people 
are effective in monitoring their memories and controlling the information they 
report. In other words, people are able to assess the likely accuracy of their memories 
via their confidence judgements, and then use these judgements to regulate the 
amount and type of information that is reported (Koriat & Goldsmith,1996; 
Goldsmith et al., 2002; Pansky et al., 2005). This confidence-driven process is 
generally effective in supporting the accurate reporting of information from memory. 
It is therefore important that confidence is not artificially inflated or deflated during 
an interview. In other words, the extent to which witnesses believe that their 
memories are correct should not be altered within the interviewing setting. However, 
confidence is malleable, and research has shown that it can be influenced by external 
variables. For example, the literature investigating the effect of social influence on 
confidence has shown that the interviewer’s feedback can shift confidence, leading 
eyewitnesses to either increase or decrease confidence in their own memory (e.g., 
Luus & Walls, 1994; Steblay et al., 2014; Wells & Bradfield, 1998; Wells & Seelau, 
1995).  
Despite the evidence that confidence is malleable and can be easily altered, 
the literature lacks a systematic examination of the impact that variables at play 
during an interview can have on eyewitness confidence. In order to fill this gap, this 
PhD investigated targeted factors of an interview that are likely to cause changes in 
confidence. In particular, this research focuses on the impact that the interview 
structure and the types of question asked during an interview have on eyewitness 
confidence and on the cognitive processes that underpin it.  
 




Research has investigated the organisation of different types of question 
within an interview that are most likely to yield accurate and detailed account from 
witnesses. Current best practice guidelines suggest following a hierarchy of the 
question types, whereby different questions are asked at different stages of the 
interview (Gabbert et al., 2015a; 2015b; Griffiths & Milne, 2006). This interview 
structure is designed to maximise memory recollection and minimise errors. Ideally 
an interviewee should always be given a free and uninterrupted recall opportunity, 
and the Free Recall invitation should always precede the probing phase whereby 
more specific types of question can be asked. This hierarchical organisation of the 
question types ensure the opportunity for eyewitnesses to initiate their memory 
search in a way that better suit their own memory representation, and at a pace that is 
appropriate for them (Gabbert et al., 2015a; 2015b).  
After a Free Recall opportunity has been given, the interviewers can engage 
in a probing phase. Here, the freely reported narrative can be further explored via the 
use of different types of probe, such as Cued Recall questions. These questions direct 
the eyewitnesses’ attention towards single aspects or specific details of a memory, 
and they can help the eyewitnesses to reach details of the memory overlooked during 
the Free Recall attempt. In this phase of the interview, the interviewer has a more 
active role, thus the opportunity to contaminate eyewitnesses’ memory can increase 
and so the probability of eliciting errors (e.g., Dando, 2013; Dando et al., 2009; 
Kontogianni et al., 2020). However, several techniques can be used to minimise the 
interviewer’s contamination and researchers suggest probing eyewitnesses’ memory 
with questions that are compatible to the eyewitnesses’ own free report (Fisher et al., 
2011; Gabbert et al., 2015a; 2015b; Kebbell et al., 2001). For example, the questions 
asked at this stage of the interview should match the content of the information 
reported in the Free Recall phase. 
While research in investigative interviewing has focused on the impact that 
the hierarchical use of question types has on the quality of information reported, 
research on metamemory has investigated whether different types of question elicit 
information associated with different degree of confidence. Evidence shows that 
information elicited via Free Recall invitations compared to Cued Recall questions is 
generally associated with higher confidence (Allwood et al., 2008; Knutsson et al., 
2011). The suggested explanation is that when answering Free Recall invitations 
eyewitnesses have a high control over the output of their memory. Here, they can 
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decide the details to report based on the evaluation of their likely accuracy, and 
presumably they tend to select only the information they are highly confident about. 
On the contrary, when answering Cued Recall questions eyewitnesses have less 
control over their memory, because they do not control the questions, and they are 
more likely to report information they are less sure about. Based on this literature this 
PhD investigated whether eyewitness’ confidence in their memory for the whole 
event would be influenced by different types of question asked during the different 
phases of an interview.  
Overall, the findings of this research consistently show that different types of 
question, asked at different stages of an interview are likely to trigger eyewitnesses’ 
retrieval processes in different ways and therefore to differently affect memory 
confidence. In particular, during a free and undirected recall attempt, participants are 
likely to pay attention and retrieve the information they know, and as a consequence 
their confidence in the memory for the event seen is more likely to remain stable. 
However, when answering Cued Recall questions, eyewitnesses’ retrieval process is 
directed towards information that is more likely to be unknown, thus gaps in memory 
are more likely to be highlighted and confidence is more likely to decrease.  
Furthermore, the investigation of the processes upon which confidence is 
based (i.e., retrieval difficulty), provide a more comprehensive understanding of the 
effect that different types of question might have on confidence. In particular, the 
results showed that the questions are likely to cause a decrease in confidence only in 
so far as they trigger information that are difficult to access. As such it is not the type 
of question that is likely to cause a shift in confidence but rather the difficulty in 
retrieving the details triggered by the questions. When freely recalling a memory, 
eyewitnesses are likely to engage in the retrieval of highly memorable information 
and they are unlikely to attempt to retrieve information that is difficult to access. On 
the contrary, when answering Cued Recall questions – where the eyewitnesses 
cannot control the information to be recalled, their retrieval process is more likely to 
be directed towards information that are difficult to access. Here, Cued Recall 
questions are only likely to cause a decrease in confidence when they trigger 
information that is difficult to access. On the contrary, when Cued Recall questions 
are easy, i.e., more likely to trigger information that are easily accessible, confidence 
is likely to remain stable.  
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Overall these results support an understanding of the impact of different types 
of question on eyewitness confidence. In particular, a consistent finding within this 
PhD is that confidence can change during an interview and the way in which 
memory is triggered is pivotal in determining such change. Confidence is only likely 
to decrease in response to questions that trigger information that is difficult to access. 
The likelihood of eliciting difficult information increases under directed retrieval, 
i.e., when Cued Recall questions are asked. As such, we present a new, previously 
undocumented, effect that Cued Recall questions can have on eyewitnesses. 
Research shows that, in real-life, interviewers still rely strongly on Cued Recall 
questions to elicit information from witnesses (e.g., Carson & La Rooy, 2015; La 
Rooy et al., 2013; La Rooy et al., 2011; Loftus & Greenspan, 2017; Otgaar et al., 
2018; Oxburgh et al., 2012; Wade et al., 2018). Therefore, it is of interest to 
underline that an interview dominated by the use of Cued Recall questions is likely 
to lead eyewitnesses to feel unsure about the extent to which their memory for an 
event seen is accurate.  
 
The effect of best-practice and poor-practice interviews on confidence  
Beside extending our knowledge of the effects that Free Recall and Cued 
Recall questions have on confidence in memory for events, the results of this PhD 
also provide the opportunity to predict the conditions of a realistic interview in which 
confidence is likely to remain stable and the conditions in which confidence in more 
likely to change. Here, the result of interest is that Cued Recall questions compared 
with Free Recall invitations are more likely to lead to decreased confidence, and that 
the extent to which Cued Recall questions lead to decreased confidence is contingent 
to the difficulty experienced in answering them.  
Based on these findings, Study 4 featured two realistic interviews in which 
the Cued Recall questions asked in the probing phase were either easy or difficult. 
Here, the prediction was that confidence would only decrease in response to the latter 
type of Cued Recall question, but not in response to the former. We speculated that 
any Cued Recall question focused on the information freely reported by the 
eyewitness in the Free Recall phase would likely be experienced as easy. Conversely, 
any Cued Recall questions focused on information not freely reported in the Free 
Recall phase would likely be experienced as difficult. As predicted, confidence 
remained stable when the Free Recall was followed by Cued Recall questions 
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probing information freely reported in the Free Recall phase. Conversely, it 
decreased when the Cued Recall questions focused on information not reported in the 
previous Free Recall phase. In other words, following best-practice hierarchy of 
asking questions based on witness-led topic areas is unlikely to significantly alter 
eyewitness confidence.  
Taken together, these results add to the existing literature on investigative 
interviewing and to the body of findings in support of best practice in interviewing 
witnesses. In sum, across four studies this PhD showed that eyewitness’s confidence 
is likely to be unaffected by the interview, should this follow best-practice 
recommendations relating to: (i) the structure and hierarchical use of questions - 
whereby a Free Recall invitation precedes the probing phase, and (ii) the use of 
compatible questions in the probing phase - whereby these questions target 
exclusively information freely reported in the Free Recall phase.    
 
Potential risks of shifts in confidence in the interviewing setting 
Research has shown that memory confidence can influence the willingness to 
testify (Hafstad et al., 2004; Wells & Bradfield, 1998); and in this PhD initial 
evidence suggests that should eyewitness confidence decrease following a poor 
practice interview, their confidence in engaging with the Criminal Justice System is 
also likely to decrease. In particular, it was found that following a Cued Recall 
interview (but not following a Free Recall interview), not only did confidence in the 
accuracy of a memory decrease, but so did also confidence in the reported likelihood 
of (i) signing a witness statement, (ii) participating in an identification task, and (iii) 
reporting evidence in Court.  
 These results are important because they broaden our understanding of the 
potential risks related to confidence shifts during a poor practice interview. These 
findings suggest that if the interview leads eyewitnesses to lose confidence in their 
memory, then they are less likely to engage in other aspects of the investigation (for 
similar findings see Wells & Bradfield, 1998). This can be particularly problematic 
in cases whereby the eyewitness is the primary source of information. Researchers 
have argued that eyewitness testimony is pivotal in many investigations, and in order 
to ensure justice and apprehend the perpetrator investigators often rely on the 
information eyewitnesses report (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992; Wells & Olson, 2003). 
Ensuring eyewitnesses remain cooperative and engaged with the different stages of 
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the investigative process can increase the chances of identifying potential leads and 
solving the crime. Best practice guidelines encourage interviewers to leave the 
eyewitnesses with a positive state of mind, should they be asked to continue 
collaborating with the investigation (Bull, 2010). In addition to current 
recommendation, this PhD reports initial evidence that conducting a good quality 
interview might also contribute to ensuring eyewitnesses’ engagement.   
 
The relation between shifts in confidence and subsequent confidence-accuracy 
calibration  
Given the main findings, discussed above, a second important aim of this 
PhD was to investigate whether the consistently observed decrease in confidence 
following an initial recall attempt would impact people’s ability to effectively 
monitor and control the information in a subsequent recall test. The results gathered 
across this PhD did not support this hypothesis. In particular, decreased confidence 
following an initial recall attempt (reported by participants in the Difficult Cued 
Recall group only) did not lead participants to freely report poorer accounts in a 
subsequent recall test. This result was confirmed by the findings that decreased 
confidence following an initial recall attempt did not lead participants (i) to report 
under-confidence in the information subsequently recalled, or (ii) to exert harsher 
control over the information reported.  
Although this set of findings were not expected, they consistently confirm 
only a trivial effect of decreased confidence in the memory for the whole event on 
the monitoring and control of information subsequently reported, which is ultimately 
a positive finding. We interpreted these results as evidence that the monitoring and 
control over the information reported is largely based on the task in hand rather than 
being influenced by previously declared beliefs regarding the accuracy of memory. 
In other words, these results suggest that participants appeared to disregard their 
previously declared belief that confidence in one’s memory had declined, and 
instead, based their confidence judgements relating to the subsequent memory task 
on current perceptions of the retrieval process and its cues (e.g., the ease of retrieval). 
As such, these results are in line with the notion that confidence is primarily 
experienced-based and heavily reliant upon the qualitative experience of retrieval 
(e.g., Brewer et al., 2005; Gustafsson et al., 2019; Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; Lindholm 
et al., 2018; Robinson et al., 2000). 
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Although these results are consistent and in line with the literature, it is worth 
mentioning that in real-life settings the delay between two interviews is likely to be 
more significant than that adopted in this research (Gabbert et al., 2015; La Rooy et al, 
2008; Odinot et al., 2013). As such, the methodology adopted in this PhD studies 
does not allow to draw confident conclusions or to make practical recommendations 
for the applied context. In particular, the lack of a statistically significant effect of 
decreased confidence on subsequent monitoring and control of information, is 
contingent to the short delay used in the studies. Consequently, I am unable to 
conclude whether decreased confidence impacts upon subsequent memory 
monitoring and regulation, should a longer delay elapse between the initial and 
subsequent recall attempt. As such, this particular finding should be considered 
carefully, and further research should investigate whether decreased confidence in 
the memory for an event might affect eyewitnesses’ monitoring and control after a 
longer and more realistic delay.  
 
A contribution to the debate on the confidence- accuracy relationship 
A further contribution of this PhD relates to the evidence that eyewitnesses’ 
monitoring, i.e., the extent to which their confidence judgements predict memory 
accuracy, might depend (at least in part) on the quality of the interview given. It was 
found that eyewitnesses are more effective in monitoring the accuracy of their 
memories when the interview follows best practice recommendations relating to the 
type and organisation of the questions used. In particular, Study 4 tested the 
hypothesis that participants’ confidence and accuracy would be better calibrated if 
the Cued Recall questions asked in the probing phase related to the topics freely-
reported by the participant in the Free Recall phase (but not if the follow-up 
questions were unrelated). As expected, participants’ calibration and discrimination 
were found to be more reliable when the interview followed recommended best-
practice relating to the use of compatible questions in the probing phase. This result 
is important; providing an initial insight into the interviewing conditions in which 
eyewitnesses confidence is a more reliable predictor of accuracy, and contributing to 
the evidence-base supporting the practice of witness-led interviewing. 
Although the extent to which confidence is a good predictor of accuracy is 
still debated in the eyewitness literature, research on identification memory has 
shown that confidence can be a good predictor of accuracy, under conditions 
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whereby confidence has not been influenced, e.g., short retention interval, unbiased 
line-ups, and the absence of social feedback (see Brewer & Wells, 2006; Palmer et 
al., 2013; Sauer et al., 2010; Wixted & Wells, 2017; also Wixted et al., 2015). The 
studies in this PhD confirm this finding in the context of memory recall rather than 
recognition. Specifically, confidence and accuracy in memory recall appears to be 
better calibrated when the interview is witness-led, rather than featuring interviewer-
led questions. In particular, our results show that participants’ monitoring (as 
measured by calibration analysis) during the probing phase is more reliable when the 
Cued Recall questions are compatible with the eyewitness’s freely reported account. 
However, this is only the case when non-compatible Cued Recall questions do not 
precede compatible Cued Recall questions.  
 Taken together, these results support the literature on identification and they 
underline that the characteristics of an interview not only influence eyewitnesses’ 
confidence in the memory for the whole event, but also how effectively eyewitnesses 
are at monitoring their memories. In particular, the types of question asked during the 
probing phase, and whether these questions are compatible with the information 
freely reported, contribute to shape the extent to which eyewitnesses’ confidence is a 
reliable predictor of accuracy.  
 
Limitations of the PhD 
Despite the contributions to the field of investigative interviewing, and to the 
current debate on the reliability of memory confidence, this PhD is not without 
limitations. In addition to the short delay between the initial and subsequent recall 
attempts discussed above in this Chapter, it is important to mention also some of the 
methodological issues relating to (i) the sample size, and (ii) the ecological validity 
of the studies.  
Researchers have shown that statistical significance is strongly influenced by 
the size of the sample. Studies adopting small samples are more likely to incur false 
negative (Type II errors), occurring when the researcher rejects the experimental 
hypothesis, when this is true (Goodwin, 2010). It is therefore important to ensure that 
studies are run with enough participants to be able to detect the predicted effect, 
should this exist. A sound experiment can be achieved by using a Power Analysis, 
that can assist in determining the most appropriate sample size, depending on 
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established parameters (e.g., alpha level, effect size, type of inferential test, and 
desired statistical power) (Faul et al., 2007). The issue of incurring a Type II error 
due a small sample size is particularly problematic when the results do not reach 
statistical significance and the hypotheses are rejected. In these circumstances the 
researcher is unable to establish whether the hypothesis is rejected because the effect 
does not exist or because it has not been detected (i.e., due to a low powered study). 
In order to mitigate these limitations, in this PhD I have adopted alternative statistical 
tests (i.e., Bayesian analysis) to establish whether the non-significant results were 
more likely to be reliable (i.e., due to a true null) or to be due to a lack of power. 
Despite allowing me to draw conclusion more confidently, the importance of 
adopting more appropriate size samples in order to build more robust experiments is 
acknowledged. 
A further limitation of this PhD relates to the ecological validity of the 
studies, which on occasions has prevented me from making strong conclusions (e.g., 
the issue of the short delay discussed above in this Chapter). It is well established 
that the artificial nature of empirical studies reduces the extent to which the results 
can be applied to real-life contexts (Schmuckler, 2001). This can be particularly 
problematic for applied research, that ultimately aims to be informative for 
practitioners. In particular, throughout the studies and in order to achieve 
experimental control, participants were shown a crime video, and this experience 
differs greatly from witnessing a crime in real life. Similarly, in this PhD the 
interviews are either delivered by myself, or presented via an online survey. While in 
real life eyewitnesses are interviewed by an authoritative police officer, and this can 
result in a completely different experience. These differences are important, and they 
can influence people and their cognitive functioning in ways experimental studies 
cannot fully capture.  
Considering these limitations and the applied nature of the results of this 
PhD, it is essential to replicate these findings in order to enhance the validity and 
reliability of the results found.  
 
Suggestions for future research 
The findings of this PhD have highlighted several important research 
questions that are currently unanswered. Despite this body of research demonstrating 
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that confidence can change during an interview, and that poor practice interviews are 
likely to lead to decreased confidence, the extent to which this is problematic is not 
yet understood. As such, further research should investigate the effects that decreased 
confidence following an interview can have on eyewitnesses’ performance.  
Research has shown that the belief regarding the strength of one’s own 
memory can influence the decision to take on board post-event information 
suggested by others (Gabbert et al., 2012). For example, when deciding whether the 
information suggested by a co-witness should be believed, participants can compare 
the quality of their own memory to the perceived quality of a co-witness’s memory. 
Research has found that when participants believe the co-witness’s memory is 
stronger than their own memory, they are more likely to report suggested details 
(especially when their memory is objectively poor) (Allan et al., 2012). In line with 
this research, it is not unreasonable to think that decreased confidence following a 
poor practice interview might increase reliance on the co-witness’s memory, and thus 
increase the extent to which an eyewitness conforms to the co-witness’s account.  
 Evidence exists that decreased confidence following negative feedback 
exacerbates suggestibility. For example, Leippe et al. (2006) found that participants 
who believed to have poor memory following receiving negative feedback were 
more likely to report suggested details compared with those that did not receive the 
negative feedback (see also Leippe et al., 2009; Lida et al., 2019). Based on these 
results, it is possible to formulate the hypothesis that decreased confidence following 
a poor practice interview might affect suggestibility similarly, and future research 
should investigate this further.  
Overall, further research should not only focus on replicating the findings of 
this PhD, but also on investigating further the effects that shifts in confidence can 
have on eyewitness and on the quality of the information they report.  
 
Conclusions 
 To conclude, this PhD addresses a gap in the literature by investigating the 
effect of targeted interviewing techniques on eyewitness confidence. Good practice 
interviewing techniques are unlikely to alter confidence, while poor practice 
techniques are more likely to lead to a drop in confidence. These results add to the 
wealth of evidence in favour of good practice interviewing techniques relating to the 
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type and order of questions used. As such, the use of (i) Free Recall invitations, (ii) 
hierarchical organisation of different types of question (from Free Recall to Cued 
Recall questions), and (iii) compatible witness-led questions appear to promote 
confidence stability and more effective monitoring (i.e., calibration). Furthermore, 
this PhD reports evidence of a novel and undocumented detrimental effect of poor 
practice interviewing techniques on eyewitness confidence. As such, it increases our 
understanding of the risks relating to interviewing styles that are interviewer-led and 
dominated by the use of closed questions. Cumulatively, the studies in this PhD have 
shown that confidence - like memory - is malleable and can be easily influenced by 
the quality of the interview given. Ensuring that eyewitnesses are interviewed by 
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Confidence in Engaging with the Criminal Justice System 
 
Imagine that the event you’ve seen was a real robbery and you witnessed it while you 
were in the store looking for a DVD, based on your memory for this incident, how 
confident would you be to:   
 
a. Talk with a police-officer?   
10%  20%  30%  40%  50%  60%  70%  80%  90% 100%  
 
b. Provide and sign a witness statement? A witness statement is a document 
recording the evidence of a person, which is signed by that person to confirm that the 
contents of the statement are true.  
  
10 %  20%  30%  40%  50%  60%  70%  80%  90% 100%  
  
c. Go to an identification parade? The identification parade involves watching a 
three 3 minutes video, made up from a number of volunteers who look similar to the 
suspect. Each clip plays for approximately 15 seconds. Each person starts off looking 
directly at the camera, then turns the head from left to right, finishing by facing the 
camera again.  
10%  20%  30%  40%  50%  60%  70%  80%  90% 100%   
 
d. Provide evidence in Court? Sometimes witnesses can be requested to go to 
court and give evidence in a trial. This requires the witness to review the statement 
provided to the police officer after the incident, and then answer questions, under oath, 
asked by the prosecution and defence.  
  









Participant information sheet and consent form 
 
The study you are taking part in investigate the impact of different styles of 
interviewing on people’s confidence in their own memory quality. We are also 
interested in the effect of repeated questioning on people’s memory performance. 
 
As a participant you will be asked to watch a short video clip and afterward to recall 
what you saw in the video in a face to face interview. Before and after the interview 
you will be given a short questionnaire asking you to rate how confident you are in 
your memory for the event witnessed.  
Finally, you’ll be asked to write down what you can remember about the video clip. 
Your participation is entirely voluntary. You may decide to stop being a part of the 
research study at any time without explanation or consequence. The data collected do 
not contain any personal information about you and your identity will remain 
anonymous. Please note that you are free to withdraw your data from analysis up 
until the point we have entered it into the dataset in an anonymous format. At this 
stage we will have no way to associate it with you, and it will no longer be possible 
to withdraw it. 
The Departmental Ethics Committee has reviewed and approved this research. 
 
If you have any questions about the study, please feel free to ask. 
Alessandra Caso: acaso006@gold.ac.uk 
Supervisor: Fiona Gabbert (f.gabbert@gold.ac.uk) 
 




STUDENT ID:   
Signed      Date:  








The Criminal Justice System relies on people’s memory to assert the truth and 
convict offenders for the crimes they are responsible for. Interviewing witnesses is a 
crucial part of an investigation. However human memory is a fragile process and 
it can easily be influenced by a number of external variables. People’s confidence in 
their memory for an event can also be influenced. The present study therefore 
investigates the impact of different interviewing styles on memory confidence.  
Research in cognitive psychology has looked at the effect of different recall tests on 
memory confidence in an experimental setting.  
  
In real life an eyewitness’s memory is in first place tested in a face to face interview 
with a police officer. Research in applied psychology in a forensic field has 
developed advanced techniques for interviewers with the aim of both reducing the 
impact of bad interview practice on witnesses’ memory and providing supportive 
techniques to help the interviewee in the recollection task.   
 
In this study “Poor Practice interview” or a “Good Practice interview” was used to 
elicit information with the aim to explore their influence on memory confidence. A 
final memory test will enable an insight into changes in recall accuracy, and amount 
of information provided in relation to confidence levels expressed. 
  
For further queries regarding the study please contact me:  
Alessandra Caso Email: a.caso@gold.ac.uk  
Supervisor: Fiona Gabbert Email: f.gabbert@gold.ac.uk  
 
  
Hope you enjoyed it!  









General rules:  
• Correct:   
• info presented in the video  
• correct attribution of subject to a specific action  
• Incorrect:   
• Info not presented in the video  
• Incorrect attribution of subject to a specific action  
NO NOT SCORE REPETITIONS  
NO NOT SCORE NOT CLEAR INFORMATION  
NO NOT SCORE OPINIONS OR ASSUMPTIONS   
  
Actions (a):   
• What characters do: (he stayed (a), he entered (a)).  
• Movements from an area to another: (they went (a) towards the 
cashier, he came (a) back to the front).  
DO NOT SCORE unclear action or opinion: (they seemed to be looking for 
something (do not score)).  
• Conversations:  
• What people actually say: (he said: ‘it’s a robbery!’ (a), he said it was a 
robbery (a)).   
DO NOT SCORE unclear information: (he said something (do not score)).  
• People who are spoken to: (the robber said to the cashier (a); he said to his 
mate (a)).  
  
Location (l):  
• Details about the store:  
• Specific part of the store related to an action: (he went into a different 
area (l)).  
DO NOT SCORE: description of the store if not related to an action: (the 
robbery happened in a block buster store (do not score)).  
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• Complex descriptions that help picturing the store or a part of it: (they went 
towards the area where the cashier can’t see them (l)).   
• Characters’ position in the store: (he stayed by the door (l)).  
• Characters’ position used to indicate a part of the store: (he went toward the 
guy at the tills (l)).  
  
Person description (pd):    
• The character described: (one (pd) of the two robbers was wearing a jeans).  
DO NOT SCORE a re-mentioned person when it has already been 
coded: (they (2pd) were dressed in black, they (do not score) had jeans and 
jackets).  
SCORE attribution of descriptors to the right person: ((they (pd) were 
dressed in black, the blond one (pd) had a green hoodie).  
• Clothes: (he was wearing a jeans (pd), t-shirt (pd)).  
• Colours: (black (pd) jacket, blue (pd) jeans).  
• Fabric: (wool (pd) hat, lather (pd) jacket).  
• Objects carried: (the pull out their masks (pd)).  
• Other descriptors: (light (pd) brown, long (pd) brown hair, up to the 
shoulder (pd))  

















Cued Recall condition 
My name is Alessandra, thank you for taking part in this experiment. We are now 
going to talk about the video you saw. I will ask you questions about the setting in 
which the event happened, the people involved, what they did, and what they looked 
like.  
Setting:   
1. Which colour was the store decorated with?  
2. Where was the customer standing when the robbers were looking at the DVDs?  
3. There was any window? If yes where was it located?  
4. What brand was advertised on the vending machine?  
5. By which brand was the bag given to the shopkeeper by the robber?  
6. What price was advertised on the poster hanged above the counter?  
7. How many tills did the shopkeeper take the money from?  
8. What kind of light devices lightened the store?  
Actions:  
1. What was the shopkeeper looking at when the robbers came into the shop?  
1. Which side did the robbers go to cover up their faces?  
2. What did the shopkeeper do after giving the money to the robber?  
3. What happened to the customer before the robbers left the store?  
4. Where was the robber with the balaclava standing while the other one was 
talking with the shopkeeper?  
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5.  Which side did the robbers go after leaving the store?  
6. What did the robbers do after the customer got pushed and before they left the 
store?  
7. In which pocket did the robber hide his hand when he said that he had a gun?  
8. Which of the robbers did push the customer?  
 Person descriptions:  
1. What was the customer, who first come into the shop wearing?  
2. What colour was the shopkeeper’s hair?  
3. What was the light -haired robber wearing?  
4. What was the brown - haired robber wearing?  
5. What did the light - haired robber use to cover his face up?  
6. What kind of accent did the robbers have?  
7. What colour was the shopkeeper’s t-shirt?  
















Difficult Cued Recall questions 
 
1. How many doors were in the store?  
(One) 
2. What kind of Dvds was the customer browsing when the robbers were walking 
through the aisles?  
(New releases)   
3. What did the light - haired robber touch during the robbery? (List all)  
(Door), (if they answered correctly and no error is reported score as correct)  
4. What pattern was on the dark - haired robber’s jacket?  
(Two white stripes) 
5. Which of the people present in the store left the shop before? (If one of the 
robbers, please specify if dark or light - haired)  
(Dark haired robber) 
6. What colour was the clothing the light - haired robber was wearing underneath the 
hoodie?  
(White) 
7. How did the robbers communicate to each other they were ready to go to the till 
and rob the store?  
(They nodded/look at each other) 
8. What objects in the store did the dark - haired robber touch? (List all)  
(Two DVDs, the till, the computers, and the door) (if they answered correctly and no 
error is reported score as correct) 
9. What happened to the bag after the robbery?  
(It was not displayed) 
10. What kind of shoes was the light - haired robber wearing?  
 (Grey/brown trainers)  
11. Who touched the customer? (List all), (if robber, please specify if dark or light - 
haired)  
(Light - haired robber) 
12. What kind of shoes was the dark - haired robber wearing?  
(Black trainers)  
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13. Who did the dark - haired robber speak to? (List all)  
(The shopkeeper and the light - haired robber)  
14. What did the robber throw at the shopkeeper when he first said "this is a 
robbery"?  
(Two DVDs) 
15. What price was advertised on the posters hanging all over the store?  
(£4.99)  
16. Who did the light - haired robber speak to? (List all)  
(All those present in the video)  
  
Easy Cued Recall questions 
 
1. Where did the shopkeeper direct the customer?  
(To his left) 
2. What kind of item was mainly sold in the store?  
(DVDs) 
3.  From how many tills did the shopkeeper take the money from?  
(Two) 
4. Where did the shopkeeper take the bag from? 
(The dark - haired robber handed it over) 
5. Where was the shopkeeper standing?  
(Behind the till) 
6. Where did the dark - haired robber go to cover himself up?  
(In the room where the DVDs are/ left/back of the store) 
7. What colour was the customer’s hat?  
(Grey/black) 
8. What side of the store did the light - haired robber go to cover himself up?  
(In the room where the DVDs are/ left/back of the store) 
9. What was the customer wearing on the upper part of the body?  
(A hoodie/jumper) 
10. What kind of bag did the shopkeeper use to put the money in?  
(Tesco/carrier bag) 




12. Where was the customer while the robbery was going on?  
(In the separate/DVD room) 
13. What did the light - haired robber use to cover himself up?  
(Balaclava)  
14. What did the shopkeeper do immediately after putting the money in the bag? 
(He lays down on the floor) 
15. What colour was the dark - haired robber’s jacket? 
(Dark blue/black)  





























Neutral Cued Recall questions (Study 3a) 
 
1. What colour was the shopkeeper t-shirt?  
(Blue) 
2. What colour was the store decorated in? (List all)  
(Blue, yellow, white) (at least blue and yellow – if an incorrect colour is present 
score as incorrect)  
3. What was the light - haired wearing underneath his jacket?  
(Hoddie/ jumper) 
4. What kind of trousers was the dark - haired robber wearing?  
(Baggy/ tracksuit/ sport trousers)  
5. What colour was the shopkeeper hair?  
(Blond, dark blond/ light brown) 
6. Where was the dark - haired robber standing during the most part of the robbery?  
(By the till) 
7. What did the dark - haired robber do immediately before leaving the store?  
(Took off the mask/ talk to themselves/ shouting)  
8.  What did the light - haired do immediately after before leaving the store?  


















Neutral Cued Recall questions (Study 3b) 
  
1. What colour is the light - haired robber’s jacket?  
(Black)  
2. Indicate at least one individual in the shop who is wearing a hooded jumper (If 
robber specify which one) 
(Customer or light - haired robber)  
3. Which person in the shop is wearing a short sleeves top?  
(Shopkeeper)  
4. What colour is the shopkeeper's hair?  
(Brown/blond, blond, light brown, dark blond)  
5. Which robber does step first in the DVDs section of the shop?  
(Light - haired robber)  
6. 45. Where was the light - haired robber standing during the majority of the 
robbery?  
(Near the door)  
7. Which robber does enter the shop first?  
(Light - haired robber)   
8. Does the light - haired robber look at the shopkeeper when entering the store?  
(No)  
9. Which hand does the robber hide in his pocket when he says that he has a gun?  
(Right)  
10. With which hand does the shopkeeper empty the first register?  
(Right)   
11. With which hand does the shopkeeper empty the second registers?  
(Right) 
12. How many main rooms are there in the shop?   
(Two)  
13. Which individuals in the shop are wearing a hat?  
(Customer and one robber)   
14. Which robber is taller?  
(Dark - haired robber) 
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15. With which hand does the robber hand the bag over to the shopkeeper?  
(Right) 
16. Where was the dark - haired robber standing during the majority of the robbery?  
(In front of the till)  
17. Where do the robbers have their masks hidden?  
(In the pocket/in the coats) 
18. Where exactly does the shopkeeper put his hands when laying down on the floor?  
(On the floor/ above his head/ in front of him) 
19.  Does the customer look at the robbers when they are in the DVDs section of the 
shop?  
(No)  
20. Which individuals do leave the shop? (If robber specify which one)  
(Both robbers)  
21. Which individuals do touch the bag? (List all. If robber, specify which one)  
(Dark - haired robber and shopkeeper) 
22. What were the main colours of the store? (List at least two)  
(Blue, yellow, creamy yellow, grey) 
23. Which person in the shop has the longest hair?  
(Shopkeeper)  
24. How does the shopkeeper open the cash registers?  
(Typing/ inserting codes on keyboard) 
25. Do the robbers make eye contact with the shopkeeper when they first enter the 
shop?  
(No)  
26. How many people leave the shop by the end of the robbery?  
(Two)  
27. Where does the customer fall off when he is pushed over?  
(Stairs, isles)  
28. How was the light outside the shop?  
(Dark/no light) 
29. What colours was the bag? (List at least two colours)  
(White, blue, red)   
30. What is the shopkeeper’s ethnicity?  
(White/ Caucasian)  
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31. What does the robber with the hat use to cover up the lower part of his face?  
(Scarf/ his hoody/collar/ neck of top) 
32. Which individual does NOT step into the DVDs section of the store?  
(Shopkeeper)  
33. Who did touch the counter?  
(Dark - haired robber or the shopkeeper)  
34. How many customers are there in the shop?  
(One)  
35. Which person in the shop has dyed hair?  
(Light - haired robber) 
36. Which robber does put on his disguise first?  
(Light- haired robber) 
37. Does the customer speak?  
(Yes)  
38. Which individuals do speak at least ones?  
(All)  
39. What part of the customer's body does the robber hit when he pushes him over?  
(Shoulder, chest, upper body) 
40. How many men are there in the shop?  
(Four)   
41. Which robber is wearing a full - face mask?  
(Light - haired robber)  














Predetermined 5Wh Cued Recall questions 
 
Light haired robber: 
Person description  
1. How old was the light- haired robber?  
(Between 18-30) 
2. What was the light- haired robber ethnicity?  
(Caucasian/ white/ white British) 
3. Where was the light- haired robber standing during the majority of the robbery? 
(In front to the door/ behind the other robber/at the entrance) 
4. How long was the light- haired robber’s hair?  
(Short not too short – longer than the other – up to his hears)  
5. What colour exactly was the light- haired robber’s hair?  
(Blond/ strawberry blond/ dyed blond/ light blond) 
 
Disguise 
6. What type of disguise/mask is the light - haired robber wearing?  
(Balaclava/ sky mask/ full face mask/ mask with holes) 
7. What colour was the light - haired robber’s disguise/mask? 
(Black) 




9. What colour was the light - haired robber’s jacket?  
(Black) 
10. What type of materials was the light - haired robber’s jacket?  
(Leather)  
11. What is the light - haired robber wearing underneath his jacket?  
(Jumper – hoody) 
12. What colour was the light - haired robber’s jumper?  
(Cream/ creamy green/ light brown) 
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13. What kind of trousers was the light - haired robber wearing?  
(Jeans – baggy)  
14. What colour were the light - haired robber’s trousers?  
(Blue)  
15. What kind of shoes was the light - haired robber wearing?  
(Trainers) 
16. What colour were the light - haired robber’s shoes?  
(Brownish – green) 
 
Actions 
17. What did the light - haired robber say to the shopkeeper?  
(Did not talk to him) 
18. What did the light - haired robber do at the door?  
(Watching out/ guarding)  
19. Where did the light - haired robber take the disguise off?  
(Near the door/ at the entrance/ in the main room) 
20. When did the light - haired robber take the disguise off?  
(Before leaving / after the robbery) 
 
Dark haired robber: 
Person description 
22. How old was the dark - haired robber?  
(Between 18-30) 
22. What was the dark - haired robber’s ethnicity?  
(Caucasian/ white/ white British) 
23. Where was the dark - haired robber standing during the majority of the robbery? 
(Front of the counter/ near the counter)  
24. How long was the dark - haired robber’s hair?  
(Short – very short) 
25. What colour exactly was the dark - haired robber’s hair? 
(Brown – black)  
 
Disguise 
26. What type of disguise/mask was the dark - haired robber wearing?  
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(Hat and scarf/ turtleneck) 
27. Where did the dark - haired robbers have his disguise/mask/hat hidden?  
(Pocket) 
28. What type of hat was the dark - haired robber wearing?  
(Beanie/ woolly/ winter hat) 
29. What colour was the dark - haired robber’s hat? 
(Black/ dark grey) 
30. What part of the face did the dark - haired robber’s scarf/turtleneck cover up?  
(Up to his nose)  
 
Clothing 
31. What type of materials was the dark - haired robber’s top?  
(Waterproof/ cotton/ rain jacket)  
32. What colour was the dark - haired robber’s top?  
(Black/ dark blue) 
33. How many strips were there on the dark - haired robber’s top?  
(Two) 
34. Where exactly on the haired robber’s top were there the strips?  
(His left) 
35. What colour were the strips on the dark - haired robber’s top?  
(Grey/ white) 
36. What type of trousers was the dark - haired robber wearing?  
(Baggy/ tracksuit)  
37. What colour were the dark - haired robber’s trousers?  
(Black/ dark blue) 
38. What type of shoes was the dark - haired robber wearing?  
(Trainers) 




40. With which hand did the dark - haired robber bang the computer monitor?  
(Right) 




42. What did the dark - haired robber say to the shopkeeper?  
(This is a robbery/ give me the money/ hurry up) 
43. Where did the dark - haired robber take the disguise off?  
(Near the door/ at the entrance/ in the main room) 
44. When did the dark - haired robber take the disguise off?  




45. How old was the customer?  
(Between 18-30) 
46. What was the customer’s ethnicity? 
(Caucasian/ white/ white British) 
47. Where was the customer standing during the majority of the robbery?  
(Other room/ DVD room/ small room) 
48. What colour was the customer’s hair?  
(Dark brawn/ black)  
49. What type of beard did the customer have?  
(Stubble/ short/ moustache)  
 
Clothing 
50. What type of top was the customer wearing?  
(Tracksuit/ jumper)  
51. What colour was the customer’s top?  
(Black)  
52. How many strips were there on the customer’s top? 
(Two) 
53. What colour were the strips on the customer’s top?  
(White) 
54. How long was the customer’s hair? 
(Short) 
55. What type of hat was the customer wearing?  
(Beanie/ woolly hat/ winter hat) 
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56. What colour was the customer’s hat?  
(Black/ dark grey)  
57. What type of trousers was the customer wearing?  
(Tracksuits/ baggy/ joggers) 




59. What did the customer ask the shopkeeper for?  
(DVDs/ direction) 
60. What exactly did the customer say to the robber?  




61. How old was the shopkeeper? 
(Between 18-30) 
62. What was the shopkeeper’s ethnicity?  
(Caucasian/ white/ white British) 
63. Where was the shopkeeper standing during the majority of the robbery?  
(Behind the counter) 
64. What colour was the shopkeeper’s hair?  
(Blond)  
65. How long was the shopkeeper’s hair? 
(Long/ below his ears/ above the shoulders) 
 
Clothing 
66. What kind of top was the shopkeeper wearing?  
(T- shirt/ polo shirt/ shirt/ blockbuster top) 
67. What colour was the shopkeeper’s top? 
(Blue) 
68. What kind of trousers was the shopkeeper wearing?  
(Smart/ work trousers/ Chinos) 






70. In which direction did the shopkeeper direct the customer?  
(To the left)  
71. What did the shopkeeper say to the customer?  
(To the left) 
72. What did the shopkeeper say to the robber?  
(Ok)  
73. With which hand did the shopkeeper empty the registers?  
(Right) 
74. In what position did the shopkeeper lay on the floor?  
(On his stomach/ flat) 
75. Where did the shopkeeper put his hands when laying down?  




76. What type of bag was used?  
(Carrier bag/ shopping bag/ plastic bag/ supermarket bag) 
77. What material was the bag used made of?  
(Plastic) 
78. What brand was the bag?  
(Tesco) 
79. What was main colour of the bag?  
(White) 
80. Where did the shopkeeper take the bag from?  
(From the robber) 
81. What colours was the pattern seen on the bag? 
(Red/ Blue) 
82. Who exactly did touch the bag (list them all, if robber - specify which one)?  





83. How was the customer confronted by the robber?  
(Pushed)  




85. How many people did leave the shop by the end of the robbery? 
(Two) 
86. How many people were left in the shop by the end of the robbery?  
(Two) 
87. How many computers were there in the shop? 
(Two) 
88. How many tills were there in the shop?  
(Two) 






















Participant information sheet and consent form 
This study aims to investigate the effect of different types of questions on 
eyewitness’ confidence. Research in psychology has showed that open-ended 
questions are more effective than closed questions in eliciting detailed and reliable 
information for witnesses. In this study we explore this finding further by looking at 
how the aforementioned types of question contribute to shape confidence in the 
quality of own memory.     
 
As a participant you will be asked to watch a short video clip and afterward to 
recall what you saw in the video with both open-ended and closed-questions. In 
different stages of the study you will be asked to rate how confident you are in your 
memory. A researcher will give you detailed instruction about each task you are 
asked to complete, and they will be available to answer any question you might have. 
After the study you will be fully debriefed about the study procedure, and the group 
you were assigned to.   
 
Your participation is entirely voluntary. You may decide to stop being a part of the 
research study at any time without explanation or consequence. The data collected do 
not contain any personal information about you and your identity will remain 
anonymous. Please note that you are free to withdraw your data from analysis up 
until the point we have entered it into the dataset in an anonymous format. At this 
stage we will have no way to associate it with you, and it will no longer be possible 
to withdraw it.  
The Departmental Ethics Committee has reviewed and approved this research.   
  
If you have any questions about the study, please feel free to ask.   
Alessandra Caso: acaso@gold.ac.uk  
Supervisor, Prof. Fiona Gabbert; f.gabbert@gold.ac.uk   
 











Signature:                                                            Date:  
































The Justice System relies on witnesses’ memory to assert the truth and convict 
offenders for the crimes they are responsible for. Interviewing witnesses is a crucial 
part of an investigation, however human memory is a fragile process and can easily be 
influenced by the type of questions asked. Research has showed that some types of 
question can have detrimental effects on memory, for example leading questions that 
introduce information that the witness did not mention can encourage the witness to 
assimilate that information in their original memory.   
After thirty years of research in eyewitness memory, we have learned what types of 
question are less likely to change a witness’s memory, and which are more effective 
in eliciting reliable information. For example, there is a general consensus that open-
ended questions are more likely to elicit accurate information than closed-questions, 
or yes/no questions, or 5Wh. type of questions (why, what, who, where, when). 
However, the extent to which different types of question change people’s confidence 
is yet to be explored. 
As human beings we have the ability to think about our cognition. In particular, 
research on metamemory has studied the array of thoughts and beliefs that we hold 
regarding our memory, and how we generate them. In particular the experienced-based 
approach speculates that confidence depends on the retrieval process. When we are 
asked a question, we retrieve some possible answers, those are associate with a number 
of cues (i.e. vivideness, fluency, completeness). Confidence in the accuracy of a 
retrieved answer is built on these cues: i.e., we are likely to be more confident in an 
answer that has come to mind quickly and seems clear and detailed.      
 
In this study we tested participants’ memory for the event seen with different types of 
question: ‘Free-Recall’, and ‘Cued-Recall’; furthermore we divided the Cued Recall 
test in questions that are related with information reported in the Free Recall, and 
questions that are not related to the information reported in the Free Recall. Across 
three conditions we manipulated the order in which these questions were asked: group 
a) answered Cued Recall questions before the Free Recall test, group b) answered the 
Free Recall test first, and subsequently answered Cued Recall questions (related 
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questions before and unrelated afterward), group c) answered a Free Recall test and 
then Cued Recall questions (unrelated questions first and subsequently related 
questions afterward). Confidence was measured throughout the study.  
Our hypothesis is that when freely reporting a memory the participants’ attention is 
not directed towards information not know, because they tend to only report what 
comes to mind, and confidence in expected to be higher. On the contrary when 
answering Cued Recall questions, attention is directed towards information that might 
not be known, and confidence is expected to be lower. We also predict that confidence 
for information elicited through related Cued Recall questions will be higher than 
confidence for information elicited through unrelated Cued Recall questions. This is 
because the former are focused on information initial associated with high confidence 
(i.e. freely reported in the Free Recall). 
For further queries regarding the study please contact me: 
 
 
Alessandra Caso, Email: a.caso@gold.ac.uk 
Supervisor: Fiona Gabbert, Email: f.gabbert@gold.ac.uk 
 
Hope you enjoyed it! 
Thank you for taking part in my study. 
